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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the dissertation of Gretchen Oosterhout for the Doctor ofPhilosophy in 
Systems Science presented April I 0, 1996. 
Title: An Evolutionary Simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons 
In his seminal essay, 11The Tragedy ofthe Commons11 (1968), Garrett Hardin 
argued that unless human population growth is controlled, the tragedy of common 
resource destruction is inevitable. This research consists of the development of an 
evolutionary computer model to simulate the Tragedy of the Commons, and social and 
economic solutions that have been proposed. In the simulations, multiattribute decision 
models are used to represent the tradeoffs a variety of types of individuals make among 
economic and social values in an uncertain environment. Individuals in each iteration of 
the simulation decide whether or not to exploit a common resource that has a 
stochastic regeneration rate. A genetic algorithm is used to simulate the way the 
decision makers respond to economic and social payoffs that result from their choices, 
as the commons responds to their actions over time. 
Game theory analyses of the commons dilemma are also included that, in 
contrast to previous analyses of the Tragedy of the Commons, incorporate not only 
economic attributes, but social and aesthetic attributes as well. These analyses indicate 
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that the games underlying the Tragedy of1the Commons may be similar to not only the 
N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, as is sometimes argued, but also N-person games of 
Chicken, Benevolent Chicken1 and Hero. Population diversity is found to be 
particularly important to solut.ions in bothl the evolutionary simulations and the game 
theory analyses. 
2 
The simulations and ar1alyses support the hypothesis that, even if potential 
solutions that Hardin dismissed as unrealistic in the real world are given an opportunity 
to work in a simulated computer world, Hardin is right: for any given commons 
regeneration rate, the ultimate destruction of the commons can be prevented only by 
draconian economic or politic~l measures; unrealistic rates of technological innovation 
or changes in social values, or coercive control of population growth. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of the development of a computer simulation model 
that is used to explore the effects of individual decision processes on the development 
of, and potential solutions to, the Tragedy of the Commons (TOC). Garrett Hardin 
argued in his seminal 1968 essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons", that the tragedy of 
common resource destruction is the inevitable result in a finite world with no 
restrictions on population growth (Hardin, 1968). A "commons" was a public grazing 
area owned communally in villages in pre-industrial England and America, but the idea 
of a commons includes any resource (natural or otherwise) to which access is more or 
less open to all. Hardin argued that each villager always stands to profit by adding an 
additional cow to the commons, because the cost of the cow's grazing is shared by all, 
whereas the profit from the cow accrues to the villager alone. Villagers who decide not 
to add a cow in order to help conserve the commons stand to gain nothing, while their 
self-restraint adds to the profit earned by their less-responsible peers. Hence, the only 
"rational" decision is to exploit the resource. 
Unfortunately, since all"rational" villagers must follow this line of reasoning, 
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the result is that "ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his 
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons" (Hardin, 
1968). Hardin cites examples of such tragedies in the making as overgrazing of public 
lands and overfishing of the ocean. Hardin argues that as long as the population of 
exploiters is small enough that the resource can regenerate itself, the commons can 
survive; but because population growth ultimately increases demand beyond the 
commons' regeneration capacity, the tragedy ofMalthusian "misery and vice" will 
inevitably result as necessary resources fall short of the requirements of the growing 
population. 
2 
Hardin argues that this tragedy is unavoidable because "natural selection favors 
the forces of psychological denial. The individual benefits as an individual from his 
ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, ofwhich he is a part, suffers" 
(Hardin, 1968). People who refrain from exploiting common resources, he says, have 
fewer viable offspring than those who exploit, and so biological and/or social evolution 
removes their sense of responsibility from the gene pool. 
Hardin's model is driven by a neoclassical economist's strict definition of 
rationality, in which people who are "rational" choose behaviors that they believe will 
provide them as individuals the most economic benefit. In the model developed in this 
research, this definition of rationality is expanded to include other considerations; in 
particular, the decision-makers' consciences. In this model, a common resource is 
exploited by decision-makers (DMs) whose beliefs, values, and choices are represented 
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3 
by multi-attribute value models (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards, 1986). The social evolution ofthese DMs' beliefs and values is driven by how 
successful they are in achieving what they desire from the commons. 
The commons is chamcterized by its regeneration rate, which is affected not 
only by the actions of the DMs but also by stochastic natural disturbances (beneficial as 
well as harmful). Social evolution is modeled via a genetic algorithm (GA). GAs are 
computational methods based on genetics and evolution that are used for two, 
somewhat overlapping, purposes: (1) to solve nonlinear optimization problems, where 
the objective function (i.e., a mathematical function being maximized or minimized) is 
interpreted as a measure of relative "fitness" of potential optimization solutions; and (2) 
to simulate the genetic components of evolution. When used as an optimizatbn tool, a 
GA is used to identity a region in the solution space that is relatively more optimal than 
other potential solution regions. When used as a tool for simulating evolutionary 
processes, a GA is used for simulating evolution, in order to explore evolutionary 
phenomena such as population dynamics (Lindgren, 1990), adaptation to environments 
(Bedau and Packard, 1990), interactions ofhosts and parasites (Hillis, 1990) and 
punctuated equilibria (Lindgren, 1990). When a GA is used for optimization, the 
process by which the system evolves is generally of little interest; but when the GA is 
used as a tool to investigate evolution, the process itself and the final outcome are both 
of interest. In this research, the GA is used as a tool for simulating an evolutionary 
social process, rather than for doing an optimization. 
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The GA is used here to explore how individual OMs' beliefs and values could 
evolve and interact, given a particular model of a commons and a variety of kinds of 
OMs. The purpose of this research is to explore approaches that have been proposed 
for solving the TOC, and to provide new insights into this important, and complex, 
kind of problems. 
The fundamental research question is: "Is Hardin right?" That is, can the 
Tragedy of the Commons be avoided without controlling population growth? 
In answering this question, the objectives are: 
o To develop an evolutionary computer model that can be used to shed new 
light on the Tragedy of the Commons. 
• To investigate what variables have the most impact on the outcome, and how 
they interact with one another. 
4 
• To investigate conditions under which the Tragedy of the Commons might be 
avoided. 
The first five Chapters of this dissertation constitute the background and 
problem formulation. Chapter II begins with a description of the TOC, and contrasts 
the approaches to understanding the TOC favored in the fields of psychology, 
economics, and ecology. Chapter III discusses some difficulties with previous 
approaches to modeling the TOC. Chapter IV describes proposals in the literature for 
solving the TOC. Chapter V discusses the significance of the proposed work. Chapter 
VI describes the methodology used for simulating the TOC, Chapter VII describes the 
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model development, Chapter VIII discusses the game theory analysis and simulation 
results, and Chapter IX is a conclusion and summary. 
5 
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Chapter II 
BACKGROUND 
Some of the most important, and intractable, problem!i facing humankind are 
I 
social dilemmas such as the TOC. Dawes describes social dilemmas as being "defined 
I 
by two simple properties: (a) each individual receives a higher payoff for a socially 
defecting choice (e.g., having additional children, using all the energy available, 
polluting his or her neighbors [sic]) than for a socially cooperative !Choice, no matter 
I 
what the other individuals in society do, but (b) all individuals are better off if all 
cooperate than if all defect" (Dawes, 1980, 169). 
The most well known model of social dilemmas is the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). 
I 
The PD is a game theory model of cooperation and competition, illustrated by the 
I 
dilemma of two suspected criminals shown in the game theory matrix of Figure 2.1. 
In this game, two suspected criminals are offered the same deal by the police: 
I 
betray your accomplice and get the minimum sentence while your accomplice gets the 
maximum sentence, or stay silent. If you stay silent and your accomplice talks, your 
I 
accomplice gets the minimum sentence (the best outcome, "3," indicating ordinal, not 
I 
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cardinal, preferences) :and you get the maximum (the worst outcome, "0"), but if you 
stay silent and ypur ac,complice also stays silent, you both get a reduced sentence. The 
reduced sentenc~ is the~ second ("2") best outcome. The third ("1 ")best outcome, a jail 
term longer thaQ the r€tduced sentence but shorter than the maximum, results when 
both prisoners tfl,lk. For example, if A is silent while B talks, A receives the worst (''0") 
outcome and B receiv(:s the Best ("3") outcome (Figure 2.1). 
Prisoner B 
Silent Talk 
Silent 2, 2 0, 3 
< 
L. 
~ 
c:l Q 
"" Talk 3, 0 I, I 'C j:l, 
Figure 2.1. Prisioner's Dilemma. In each cell, the first payoff in each pair 
indicateslhe ordinal payoff to Prisoner A, and the second payoff indicates the 
ordinal p~yoff to Prisoner B. "3" indicates the most preferred outcome, "0" 
indicateslhe least preferred outcome. 
The dilel'flma ai:ises because both players have a dominant choice: both players 
prefer betraying their accomplice, regardless of what the accomplice does. The result is 
a deficient outco,111e: both receive the third-best outcome (" 1, 1 ") when if they had 
somehow been a.ble to 1cooperate and both stay silent, they would have been better off 
("2, 2"). 
The PD i~ a pojpular model of many social dilemmas because it so elegantly 
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illustrattes the conflict and apparent paradox between narrowly focused self-interest and 
tile int,erests of the group to which a person belongs. For example, why should an 
individlual ride a bus to work in order to reduce air pollution, since the payoff for being 
sp responsible is the inconvenience and occasional frustration of relying on mass transit, 
with lilttle real impact on the ultimate outcome? Taking a bus when others drive is the 
(0, 3) !Payoff in the PD. If many other people took the bus, everyone would enjoy 
cleaneJr air (2, 2), but it would still be more appealing to any individual to drive (3, 0). 
Oriving is thus the dominant choice, with the deficient outcome of increased air 
pollution and traffic congestion (1, 1). The dilemma results because everyone's welfare 
would be improved if they could somehow reach a cooperative agreement to reduce 
driving (2, 2). 
It is important to recognize that many people do take the bus to work, not only 
b~cause they prefer riding to driving, but also because they enjoy a sense of doing the 
morally right thing. As a society, we particularly admire people who go so far as to 
give their lives for the sake of the morally right thing. Russian scientists chose to starve 
t9 death in the 1940's rather than eat the seeds in the world's largest seedbank, which 
h;~d be1en left in their care by geneticist Nikolai Vavilov (Fowler and Mooney, 1990). 
Vavilov was arrested, and eventually died in prison, because genetics research was 
viewed as anti-communist, and because he dared disagree with the party line that 
a~:quire:d traits could be inherited. Before Vavilov's arrest he had managed to instill in 
his staff a belief in the vital importance of protecting biodiversity. A powerful belief it 
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must have been, since they eventually died in order to protect their charge. 
The point here is !hat the PD fails to predict the behaviors of a significant 
number of people, in a significant variety of settings, because some people consider 
different attributes and have different preferences than are accurately represented by the 
PD payoff matrix. Nonetheless, because it does so often predict what most people in 
fact do, it is a powerful model ofthe dilemma nature of many social and environmental 
problems. 
Since the 1960s, there has been an explosion of research and literature 
concerning social dilemmas in the fields of psychology, political science, economics, 
biology, natural resource management, and ecology. Yet there is no consensus, even 
within fields, about how to solve these problems. 
People who study human systems (social scientists), and those who study 
biological systems (ecologists) and have traditionally modeled social dilemmas from 
very different perspectives. Ecologists focus on biological systems, often relying on 
relatively simple models such as predator-prey relationships (e.g., Lotka-Volterra 
models, or Nicholson and Bailey's models (Holling, 1976)) or host-parasite models 
(Alexander, 1981 ). Their focus tends to be on characteristics of the biological system 
such as carrying capacity, species extinctions, and equilibrium concepts such as 
maximum sustainable yields. Because of all the difficulties in modeling these nonlinear 
systems, it has been difficult to develop ecosystem models unless stable equilibria could 
be assumed. Until recently, such systems have been analytically tractable only over 
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small regions of the potential solution space, or through simplification so they could be 
treated as quasi-linear and sta.ble. Furthermore, because the primarily biological 
perspective may miss important characteristics of the social, economic, and political 
system that cause social dilemmas, this perspective may also fail to get to the essence 
of the dilemmas. 
In contrast to ecologi~ts, social scie:ntists have focused more on human 
behaviors such as organizatiopal decision-making, community responses to resource 
scarcities, public policy devel<~pment, and economic activities. Much theoretical and 
empirical work has been don~ in these fields, but researchers have had to rely on case 
studies, particularly in the fielps of ocean filsheries (Hogarth, Norbury, Cunning, and 
Sommers, 1992; McCay, 197~; Ntiamoa-Baidu, 1991; Vrijenhoek, 1985), public lands 
management (Agarwall, Shukla, and Pal, 1\993; Hardin and Baden, 1977), and water 
rights allocations (Allan and Ii'lecker, 1993j Heinen and Low, 1992; Kompaore, 1989; 
Stott, 1991; Vrijenhoek, 1985); experimental work to learn more about why and how 
people respond to various aspects of dilempms (Dawes, 1980; Edney and Harper, 
1978; Vrijenhoek, 1985); theqretical arguments (Costanza, 1987; Dawes, 1980; 
Hamburger, 1973; Hardin, 1993; MacCrim:mon and Messick, 1976); and very limited 
computer simulations such as iterated toumaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma 
(Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod, 1987; Hamburger, 1973; Lindgren, 1990; Miller, 1989). 
Just as few ecologists .are social sci<~ntists, however, so are few social scientists 
ecologists. Ecologists and soc;ial scientists approach social dilemmas from within the 
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frameworks of their ~artic:ular fields, and neither field has been able to solve the 
problem. Political an~ economic solutions to social dilemmas are sabotaged by 
ecological aspects of the problem such as nonlinear, stochastic, or chaotic 
characteristics so cornmon in biological systems but so uncommon in political, social, 
or economic: models. 
II 
The ·contrast fn pe1rspectives is perhaps most dramatic between economists and 
ecologists. Although ecology and economics are beginning to share the rejection of 
reductionism in favor· of a system level focus, as well as the acknowledgment of the fact 
that feedback cycles 1nay be not only stabilizing but also amplifYing (Hardin, I993), 
there are some profo1-1ndly important differences. To begin with, economists focus on 
human economic systems, regarding the biologic system is primarily a source of raw 
materials and a sink fbr waste; while ecologists focus on biologic systems, regarding 
humans primarily as clisturbance input sources. 
In addition, althouJgh there is a growing understanding of nonlinear dynamic 
systems, chaos, and catastmphe theory, the assumption of ceteris paribus (11everything 
else being equal11 ) is ~xplicit in discussions of economic system response to 
perturbatioms, at least, in most classical economics textbooks (Hardin, I993). As a 
result, in a n1eo-classi~:al ec:onomic system, nonlinearities tend to be ignored (Hardin, 
1993). For this appro11ch 1to be valid, the variables must be independent from one 
another and Jthe syste1n mUist be linear, or at least the effects of nonlinearities and 
interactions must be s,mall. In contrast, the most fundamental idea of ecology is that 
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everything is connected to everything else: "you can never do just one thing" (Hardin, 
1993). Interactions are very important to ecologists: "As the ecologist might say, it is 
the secondary impacts that will get you if you do not consider the whole" (Odum, 
1977, 1292). 
The most fundamental construct of neo-classical economics has long been the 
"rational actor" model, which is based on the assumption that people left to their own 
devices will do what is in their own best interests. According to Adam Smith, the net 
effect of all these rational actors is that an "invisible hand" appears to guide their 
individual efforts to the serendipitous result that all prosper (Hardin, 1993). In contrast, 
according to ecologists such as Hardin {1993) and psychologists such as Dawes 
(1980), neo-classical economics is based on the fallacy of composition. That is, what 
appears to be good to an individual may end up being disastrous for society. This is 
particularly true when individuals are making decisions about commonly-held resources 
such as air, ground water, ocean fisheries, national forests, and public rangelands. As 
Hardin put it in his famous essay ( 1968, 20, ellipsis in original): 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. 
Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, •what is the 
utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?• This utility has one 
negative and one positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one 
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the 
additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional 
overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of 
overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any 
particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
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Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational 
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to 
add another animal to his herd. And another ... But this is the conclusion 
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his herd without limit- in a world that is limited. 
Dawes suggests that we "contrast Hardin's analysis of herdsmen rushing 
13 
toward their own destruction with Adam Smith's ... analysis of the individual work~r's 1 
unintended beneficence in a laissez-faire capitalistic society" (Dawes, 1980, 172). As 
Adam Smith put it (1776, 477): 
As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both 
to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to 
direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society 
as great as he can ... By preferring the support of domestic to that of 
foreign industry, he intends his own security; and by directing that 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be for the greatest value, 
he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led hy an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention. 
The difference between Hardin and Smith, says Dawes, is not that they have 
different beliefs about the effects of selfish actors, but that "they are discussing different 
situations," in that Hardin is concerned with externalities that "are negative and greater1 
than the individual's payoffs; [whereas] in Smith's Scotland they are positive" (Dawes, 
1980, 173). Both are describing nondeterministic, emergent systems, but in ecolo~ist 
Hardin's system, the whole is greatly threatened, and ultimately diminished, by the sum 1 
of the parts. In economist Smith's system, the whole is greater than the sum of the 
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parts. 
Hardin and Smith ij.re both desctribing systems that include positive-feedback 
cycles, but in Hardin's, feepback amplifies the rate of growth of harmful impacts, 
wherea.s in Smith's, feedback amplifies 1the rate of growth of beneficial impacts. In 
Hardin's sy:stem, social dil~mmas tend to accelerate the destruction of the commons and 
ultimately the welfare of the citizens who are dependent on it. Smith's system, in 
contrast, d(:pends for its v~ry stability, 1and also its presumed beneficence, on social 
dilemmas: in a free market consisting of a large number of producers and consumers, 
there is always motivation for any member of a collective (e.g., a collective ofproduct-
price-s•etting producers, or labor-cost setting workers) to defect from the group's 
attempt to t<:ontrol the market. Smith and Hardin are not describing systems that are 
simple opposites; they are defining theilr systems differently and making different 
assumptions about stability: Smith treats as external to the problem the finiteness of 
resourc:es that Hardin belie;ves to be central. 
Many researchers &gree that a major cause of social dilemmas is the human 
tendent~y t01 discount the importance of potential impacts that seem spatially or 
temporally distant (Heinen and Low, 1992). They argue that the ability of humans to 
discount probably evolved in response to uncertainty, so that "the longer or farther 
something is away from 04r immediate reproductive interests, the less it will pay us to 
invest lime, money, and/or energy, in its consideration" (Heinen and Low, 1992, Ill}. 
Animals and even insects apparently discount in much the same way (Griffin, 1992). 
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Discounting fails to take into account the conflict regarding what the future will 
be like. Hardin portrays this conflict as being between the "meliorist" and the "pejorist" 
perspectives (Hardin and Baden, 1977, 126). Meliorists (such as many neo-classical 
economists, according to Hardin) believe that even if we truly are running out of fossil 
fuels and destroying the rain forests, the ozone layer, and so on (and they do not 
necessarily concede that we are), we will find a way to fix or ameliorate the problem 
(Morowitz, 1991; Pimm, Russell, Gittleman, and Brooks, 1995; Simon and Wildavsky, 
1993). Pejorists, on the other hand, believe that all this meddling in extremely complex 
systems which we do not understand can result only in disaster, not only for human 
beings but also for the biosphere (Ehrenfeld, 1981; Hardin, 1992; Meffe and Ehrlich, 
1993). Meliorists are optimistic, not only about whether we are creating disasters, but 
also about whether we can recover from them if they should happen to occur; whereas 
pejorists are pessimistic, believing that we are indeed creating disasters, and that they 
are not likely to be reversible. 
Economists employ discounting explicitly by using interest rates to discount 
future costs and benefits in public policy decision-making. The result is that time frames 
greater than a decade or two simply drop out of economic decisions. Conservationists 
object, arguing that some environmentally important investments, such as growing 
forests or rebuilding watersheds, "may require 50 or more years to come to fruition" 
(Weiss, 1990, 30). Ecologist E.P. Odum suggests that a major source of conflict 
between conservation-oriented people and economics-oriented people is the difference 
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in time frames considered. He says economic time frames tend to be two to four years 
because of the electoral cycle, in contrast to ecologists' time frames, which m(ly be as 
long as centuries (Odum, 1977). Furthermore, the practice ofusing a discoun~: rate in 
economic decision models encourages, rather than counteracts, the human ten,dency to 
disregard future effects, so that "the very process of discounting ... encourages the 
public to underestimate the importance of future costs and defer their payment" (Daily 1 
and Ehrlich, 1992, 767). 
Others object to discounting on moral grounds, because they see the conflict as 1 
between this generation and the next (Weiss, 1990). Some argue that discount;ing 
implies " ... a gamble with the welfare offuture generations, [because] estimate15 of 
future costs and benefits are uncertain, and there is both subjectivity and unce11ainty in 
the selection of an appropriate discount rate" (Daily and Ehrlich, 1992, 767). 
Discounting may get carried to extremes when individuals expect that ifthey clo not 
exploit a scarce resource now, someone else will; hence the future value ofth~ resource 
to those individuals is essentially zero. 
Hardin (1968) pointed out that distributional equity is theoretically an 
optimization problem. Different people have different value systems, so that eyen 
posing the optimization problem is difficult: one person might believe that immediate 
economic growth is the most important benefit not only to this generation but to future 
ones whose welfare is assumed to build on today's success. Another may believe that 
the future aesthetic values of streams and forests are most important. The TQC is 
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enormously complicated by 1social values, and the question of how we are to compare 
I 
the actual values that different people put on different things -"commensuring the 
I 
incommensurables," as Hardlin says, is difficult: "We want the maximum good per 
I 
17 
person; but what is good? To one person it is wilderness, to another it is ski lodges for 
I 
thousands. To one it is estuaries to nourish ducks for hunters to shoot; to another it is 
I 
factory land. Comparing one good with another is, we usually say, impossible because 
I 
goods are incommensurable! Incommensurables cannot be compared". He offers an 
I 
uncharacteristically optimistic view when he goes on to add (1968, 18-19): 
... in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a 
criterion of judgment and a system ofweighting are needed. In nature 
the criterion is survival. Is it better for a species to be small and 
hideable; or large antl powerful? Natural selection commensurates the 
incomme.:nsurables. The compromise achieved depends on a natural 
weighting of the valtles of the variables .. .It is when the hidden decisions 
are mad~ explicit that the arguments begin. The problem for the years 
ahead is to work outi an acceptable theory of weighting. Synergistic 
effects, nonlinear var,iation, and difficulties in discounting the future 
make the intellectual! problem difficult, but not (in principle) insoluble. 
I 
Unfortunately, Hardin could not tell us exactly how we should go about 
I 
determining -let alone agneeing on as a society- what the "criterion of judgment" 
I 
and system of weighting should be. In fact, even if we could identify and agree on this 
I 
theoretical objective function, it would undoubtedly be complex and nonlinear. There is 
no way to identifY the global optimum for nonlinear optimization problems, although 
I 
for many problems, the GA can at least identify regions of a solution space that are 
I 
relatively more optimal that others. As Hardin acknowledges, the problem is indeed 
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extremely difficult and may even be insoluble. Nonetheless the problem is important, 
and it is just these criteria of judgment, systems of weighting, and synergistic 
(nonlinear) effects, that this work explores. 
18 
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Chapter III 
GAME THEORY MODELS VERSUS DECISION 
THEORY MODELS 
1. A GAME THEORY MODEL AND A DECISION THEORY MODEL 
The two most widely used approaches to analyzing complex decisions are game 
theory and decision theory. There are advantages and disadvantages to both, and in 
order to see how these advantages and disadvantages might affect understanding the 
TOC, consider a simplified case of a DM who is considering whether to exploit a 
commons. The DM could be, for example, a logger who is deciding whether to 
undertake a clear-cut, a commercial fisher deciding whether to expand a fishing fleet, a 
factory owner deciding whether to pollute, or a couple deciding whether to have 
another child. We shall rely here on Hardin's idea of a herdsman and a common 
grazing area: a herdsman is deciding whether to add an additional cow to the open 
range. This herdsman is considering only two decision options (add a cow or not), 
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although of course the decision could involve how many cows to add, whether to add 
them now or later, and so on. 
There are many uncertainties facing anyone trying to make this kind of decision, 
and evaluating uncertainties is one of the most important parts of decision-making. 
However, for the sake of conceptual simplicity, all these uncertainties are here reduced 
to two potential outcomes: either everything will be "okay," or it will not. For example, 
the DM might ask whether the commons can carry an additional cow at a profitable 
level, and whether the market will be profitable when the cow is ready to be sold. There 
is the question ofwhether, if"everything" turns out not to be okay, the problem can be 
fixed or adapted to: that is, if the commons collapses, can the herdsman can go into 
another line of work, or can a technological fix be found, and so on. This decision 
could be conceptualized in a game theory matrix shown in Figure 3 .I, where a 
herdsman is playing a game against Nature (the payoffs shown are the payoffs to the 
herdsman; in game theory, Nature receives no payoff but is only an actor). 
In this matrix, the best outcome for the herdsman is when he adds a cow and 
everything is "okay" (cell"3" in Figure 3.I). The worst outcome ("0") is if he does not 
add a cow and everything is "not okay".anyway. In this matrix, the second (''2") best 
outcome is preferred to the third best outcome ("I") because Hardin argued that a 
herdsman who adds a cow would still be better off than the herdsman who decides not 
to add a cow, regardless ofwhether everything turned out "okay" or not (Hardin, 
I968). This point is certainly debatable, but for the moment we shall remain consistent 
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with Hardin. 
Nature 
ok not ok 
Add cow 3 2 
§ 
e 
"' "0 I. 
Ill 
ttl Refrain 1 0 
Figure 3.1. Game theory representation of the TOC. Ordinal payoffs 3, 2, 1, 
0 = Best, Second, Third and Worst outcomes for the Herdsman. 
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The point illustrated by this simple matrix (for either arrangement of the "2" and 
"1'11 preferences) is that, according to the classic model, the herdsman has a strategy 
that is dominant; i.e., no matter what Nature does, he is always better off adding a cow. 
The reason for this is the key to the TOC as a social dilemma: the cost to the herdsman 
of any damage his added cow might do to the commons is small because it is shared by 
all, whereas the immediate benefit to him of adding a cow is potentially significant, 
be1cause it is shared with no one. Regardless of whether or not the herdsman believes 
that "everything" will be "okay," as long as he believes that the costs will be mostly 
paid by others while the benefits will accrue only to him, he has no rational choice but 
to add a cow. In Hardin's terms, meliorists would assume the probability of "everything 
okay" to be high, regardless of which decision option they chose: hence, why not take 
the profitable option? Pejorists will see that "everything11 may not be 11okay", regardless 
of their choice. Since again it does not matter what they do, why not add the cow 
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anyway? 
The tlragedy occurs because all herdsmen are supposedly "rational" and 
therefore must follow this same line of reasoning (a dominant choice), with the result 
that everyone decides to add an animal, and the commons gets destroyed (a deficient 
outconw). Wihether or not any of the herdsmen recognizes the inescapable end result is 
irrelevant to their immediate decision regarding adding one more animal, because it is 
theoreti•t:ally :always rational to just add that one cow. This conflict between individual 
self interest and the long-term interests ofthe society to which the individual belongs is 
what results in the tragedy, because the individual's self interest always wins, and 
ultimately evc~ryone loses. 
The TOC in the real world is more complicated than a simple game theory 
model, however. Herdsmen may take into account more attributes than just their 
immedia1te sellf interests, and most important, uncertainty plays a substantial role in the 
real world. Although multiple attributes can be represented in game theory matrices, 
only the aggr•egate payoffs can easily be shown in the cells. Illustrating the relative 
impacts of diJferent attributes is thus awkward at best. The decision trees used in 
multiple attribute decision models show the individual attribute function payoffs clearly, 
and thus are more useful than game theory matrices for illustrating complex tradeotfs. 
Furthermore, one ofthe most important advantages of decision theory over game 
theory in that uncertainty is an important part of decision theory models, whereas game 
theory cannot represent probability notions about future states of nature. 
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There are many theories about how people actually do make decisions. 
However, it is widely accepted in decision theory that the normative decision rule is 
Expected Multiattribute Value or Utility (EMA V or EMAU), in which DMs try to 
choose the course of action that will maximize the vaJue or utility they will receive as a 
result of their actions (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). One of the reasons EMA V 
is the normative choice is that it requires explicit con~ideration of!all the important 
components of a decision (i.e., attributes, attribute w~ights, value 1functions, and risk 
attitudes in the EMAU part ofthe model, and beliefs ~bout uncert!ain events in the 
expectation part of the model). Although the analyticfll rigor ofErV1A V lends itself well 
to computer modeling, it has not been used much out.side the field of decision theory 
and optimization. Because the use ofEMA V to mod~! evolving decision processes is 
believed to be unique, this work should help expand the scope of applicability of this 
powerful tool. For these reasons, DMs in this model ~bllow the EMAV rule (see 
Chapter VI). 
It is important to note that there is little if any evidence that people ordinarily 
make decisions this carefully. We are known to be supject to a vaniety ofbiases, and to 
rely on sometimes-counter-productive heuristics that reduce the el[ort required to make 
decisions, but reduce their efficacy as well (c.f. Costanza, 1987; Russo and Shoemaker, 
1989; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). Assumin~ that DMs use EMA V is a 11best 
case11 approach, which errs on the side of showing Hqrdin to be wrong. The burden of 
proof, in other words, remains with Hardin. 
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To see how the decision problem shown in the game theory matrix. (Figure 3.1) 
might be modeled in more detail with EMAV, consider the influence diagram shown in 
Figure 3 .2. The herdsman's choices that were shown in Figure 3.1 are the same in the 
influence diagram (shown lower case in parentheses), but Nature's choices are shown in 
the event nodes, which in an EMA V model have probabilities associated with them 
(event nodes that are completely determined by predecessor nodes shown in the 
influence diagram are indicated with rounded-corner boxes, whereas evenlt nodes only 
partially determined by predecessor nodes are indicated with ovals). The decision 
choice is shown in the square box in Figure 3.2: TAKE OR NOT? Arrows indicate 
direction of influence. The net value of the outcome to the DM is indicateo with the 
sideways triangle on the right side of Figure 3.2. 
In Figure 3 .2, PAYOFF TO ME is determined by two things: whelther or not 
the DM chooses to TAKE, and the STATE OF THE COMMONS, whichl is in turn 
affected by ACTIONS BY OTHERS. The number ofDMs who extract m preserve 
(ACTIONS BY OTHERS) affects the STATE OF COMMONS and ultimately a 
particular DM's payoffs. The STATE OF COMMONS node is shown as an oval rather 
than a rounded box because it is not completely determined by its predecessor node 
(ACTIONS BY OTHERS), but also by other factors not shown in the influence 
diagram (e.g., Nature's stochasticity). PAYOFF TO ME and PAYOFF TO OTHERS 
are both completely determined by their predecessor nodes, and are shown as rounded 
boxes. 
R
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Figure 3.2. Influence diagram of the TOC. 
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In this work (though not in Hardin's paper) PAYOFF TO ME may consist of 
not only a direct payoff due to a share of the commons ~:aken or not 1( e.g., the money 
the herdsman gets from grazing a cow, or foregoes for not grazing a cow), but also a 
payoff that has to do with the DM's moral concerns, if any. The DM's sense of moral 
concerns affects how the DM feels about the course of <~ction selecte:d. The NET 
PAYOFF TO ME may thus consist of not only the DM' s direct paydff from the 
commons, but also an indirect payoff due to that DM's rnoral concenns. 
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One of the key characteristics of the dilemma of the TOC is reflected in the fact 
that the decision made by any individual DM has negligible effect oq the state of the 
commons: hence, there is no arrow from the decision nqde to the STiATE OF 
COMMONS; but the aggregate effect from many other DMs does have significant 
effect on the state of the commons in each generation: hence, there are arrows between 
ACTIONS BY OTHERS and STATE OF COMMONS, Most of an !individuals DM's 
actual payoffs (for a particular choice) is determined by what other OMs do. 
The EMA V decision model is different from the game theory1 matrix in three 
key ways: (I) in the EMA V model, uncertain events are incorporate~l into the 
calculation via probabilities, whereas in game theory, th€t likelihood of uncertain events 
is not indicated; (2) in EMA V, the sequence of events that could impact the outcome is 
clear, whereas in game theory it is not (although game "flloves" by the players can be 
shown in extensive, or sequential, form); (3) in EMA V, the tradeoff.os a DM might 
make among multiple attributes are explicit because the single-attribute value functions 
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are important components of decision trees, whereas in game theory matrices, the 
tradeoffs among multiple attributes are not so clear because only the total payoffs are 
typically shown in the matrix cells. 
2. GAME THEORY MODELS 
The model developed in this dissertation may be the first computer model of 
social dilemmas based on the TOC. Many computer models of social dilemmas have 
been based on the Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Dawes, 1980; Hamburger, 
1973; Lindgren, 1990), although it appears from the literature search that none has 
presented itself as a model ofthe TOC. 
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Because both the TOC and the PD are models of dilemmas where individually 
"rational" decision-making leads to collectively irrational outcomes, it could be argued 
that under some conditions the TOC could be modeled as an "N-person PD," which is a 
PD played by more than two players at a time (for a detailed description ofN-person 
game analysis methodology, see Chapter VIII). In theN-person PD, the payoff each 
player receives depends on how many players choose to remain loyal (in game theory 
terms, this option is to "Cooperate") and how many choose betrayal (in game theory 
terms, this option is to "Defect"). The underlying payoff structure is the same as in the 
pairwise PD, and is in effect summed over all players (see Chapter VIII). 
The question here is whether the N-person PD is a good model for the TOC. 
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The "remorseless logic" ofHardin's TOC (Hardin, 1968) is certainly present, because 
the collectively irrational result of the underlying two-person game is also characteristic 
of theN-person game. However, a number of researchers (Dawes, 1980; Hamburger, 
1973; Rapoport, 1967; Shubik, 1970) have questioned the validity of applying theN-
person PD to social dilemmas. In particular, Hamburger (1973) explored N-person 
social dilemmas through the examination of two similar, but still distinct, types of 
games: games of contribution, and games of conservation. As an example of a 
"contribution problem" he describes a situation where each person in a group of people 
considers contributing a fixed sum to provide a playground that all can enjoy. Access to 
the playground is open to everyone, regardless ofwhether they contribute, and thus the 
"free rider" logic of the game dictates that no one contributes (a dominant choice). The 
result, of course, is that there ends up being no playground (a deficient outcome). 
Hamburger argues that social dilemmas that arise because of conservation 
concerns, which he calls "conservation problems," are fundamentally different fi·om 
"contribution problems" such as the playground problem described above. This 
distinction is important because it is argued here that the TOC is a conservation 
problem, not a contribution problem, and as such may not best be modeled as anN-
person PD. Hamburger says that a conservation problem occurs, for example, when 
residents of a city in the grip of a heatwave are warned not to run their air conditioners 
for fear of electrical blackout. He calls this a "probabilistic take-some game" 
(Hamburger, 1973). In this kind of game, "if everyone refrains, the resulting decrease in 
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probability of blackout corresponds to an increased expected utility to the individual 
which exceeds his cost in perspiration .... Thus again, if each individual acts in his own 
best interest, the result is worse for each of them than if each had acted oppositely., 
(Hamburger, 1973, 28). He argues that, although the irrationality of the net result is 
typical ofPDs, the games of contribution (e.g., the playground problem) and 
conservation (e.g., the blackout problem) are fundamentally different from each other. 
In short, he says the contribution problem becomes a game of the same form as anN-
person PD, whereas the form of the game underlying the conservation problem depends 
on who is playing. Because this is a subtle but important point, Hamburger's arguments 
will be considered in more detail. 
Hamburger argues that a different game than the PD could underlie the game of 
conservation: the game of Chicken. Chicken is based on the contest between two hot-
rodders racing towards each other in a single lane; the driver who 11Chickens out11 by 
swerving out ofthe lane loses face but is not otherwise injured (or dead), whereas if 
neither chooses to chicken out, both may die in the resulting crash. A comparison of 
payoffs between the two games is shown in Figure 3.3, and a generalization of the two 
is shown in Figure 3.4. 
If the TOC were posed as a game of Chicken instead of the PD, the worst 
outcome for any DM would no longer be to not add a cow to the commons when the 
other player (or players, in the case of anN-player game) added a cow (outcome (0, 3) 
in Figure 3.3a). In Chicken, the worst outcome for any player would be for both (all) 
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players to add cows (outcome (0, 0) in Figure 3.3b), a point of view that may be more 
consistent with the environmentalist's or pejorist's perspective than the herdsman's. 
Everyone else Everyone else 
Don't add Add Don't add Add 
cow cow COW cow 
Don't add 2,2 0,3 § Don't add 2,2 1,3 § cow cow e e 
"' "' "0 "0 
... Add cow 3,0 1,1 ... Add cow 3,1 0,0 ~ ~ 
::r:: ::r:: 
Figure 3.3a Prisoner's Dilemma Figure 3.3b. Chicken 
Figure 3.3. Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. 
Everyone else 
Don't add Add 
cow cow 
Don't add b,c § cow a, a e 
"' "0 
... Add cow c,b d,d ~ 
:I:: 
Figure 3.4. General case for payoffs of PO and Chicken. 
In the PD shown in Figure 3.3a, the payoff preference order for a PD is: 
(3 .1) c > a > d > b 
whereas in Chicken (Figure 3.3b), the preference order is: 
(3.2) c >a> b > d 
The difference between these two games is that the preference of d > b ofEq. 
(3.1) is reversed in Eq. (3.2): in the PD, the dominant strategy (shown shaded in Figure 
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3.3) is always to add a cow, regarqless of what the other player do(is, but an Chicken, 
there is no dominant strategy: the ~>est choice depends on what the other player does. 
31 
Hamburger argues that wh~ther a game of conservation is more liMe the PD or 
Chicken depends on the mix ofstr~tegies ofthe various players. That is, the strategic 
form of the game depends on how many players are deciding together at a! time, how 
much they know about the other players' actio111s, what their prefer~nces are, and what 
they believe about the true state ofNature. In the PD, none ofthat fnformation affects 
the DM's choice, because defectin& is always the dominant strategy; but inl Chicken, the 
other players' likely actions do mat~er, regardle:ss of whether the other player is other 
humans or Nature. 
In a game of conservation, Jhe city residents suffering from ~he hea:twave have 
no way of knowing the point at which point the blackout will occur, and tfteir payoff 
structures beyond that point are different from I their payoff structur~s just before that 
point. As long as the players are fairly certain that they are reasonaqly safe: from 
disaster, the game is probably most like the PD. But if any players believe 1they may be 
in the region of this disaster point, ~he game becomes more like Chij;ken td them. That 
is, the probabilities regarding what the other players, and Nature, wfll do, rlnatter. 
Different players may have pifferent beliefs and values, and ~hus mmy be playing 
different games and following different strategres. This situation caqnot be1represented 
with theN-person PD. lfthere are only relatively a few players, there is neither 
dilemma nor tragedy, since an individual's paydfffor adding a cow i!S morel or less the 
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same regardless of whether or not others add cows. If the commons has collapsed, 
adding a cow is pointless because it will starve to death: again there is no dilemma. The 
dilemma occurs when the commons is in the gray area where it is in danger ofbeing 
exploited beyond its carrying capacity. Because Nature is playing a significant role, the 
true form of the underlying game is thus probabilistic: ifHamburger is right, then the 
TOC is in reality more like a game among N players plus Nature (Hamburger, 1973 ), 
and under many of the most important circumstances is thus not well modeled by the 
N-player PD. 
3. PRISONER'S DILEMMA COMPUTER TOURNAMENTS 
Another approach to modeling N-person social dilemmas has been to allow a 
mix ofPD strategies to compete with one another in a computer-simulated tournament. 
Axelrod (1984) held two such tournaments, in which each strategy submitted by a 
contestant played one at a time against all the other strategies submitted, each 
accumulating game points according to the two-person PD payoff matrix. Both 
tournaments were won by a simple strategy submitted by Amnon Rapoport, called "Tit 
for Tat" (TFT). In TFT, the player chooses the 11Cooperate11 option at the first 
encounter with another strategy, and thereafter chooses whatever action the opponent 
used in the last move. If two TFT players encounter each other repeatedly, they would 
consistently cooperate and would thus win the maximum number of points over time. 
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Axelrc>d recruited! biologist William Hamilton to help interpret the results of his 
tournaments i;n the light of evolutionary theory, and they developed an idea they called 
"cooperation theory" to extend the results of these tournaments to solving social 
dilemmas. H<;. argued that these tournaments demonstrate that cooperation could 
evolve in a population if tenough TFT players exist, because TFT is both "nice" and 
"provokable." By this he meant that a TFT player would generously offer to cooperate 
first, thereby mnning the1chance ofbeing taken advantage ofby a "mean" strategy, but 
because a TFT player repteats the other player's previous move, a TFT player is 
"provokable" and thus can be taken advantage of only once. He concluded that the 
computer tournaments show that (Axelrod, 1984, 173): 
... cooperation can get started by even a small cluster of 
indiviquals who are prepared to reciprocate cooperation, even in a 
world where no one else will cooperate. The analysis also shows that 
the two key requisites for cooperation to thrive are that the cooperation 
be based on reciprocity, and that the shadow of the future is important 
enougn to make this reciprocity stable. 
Axelrqd emphasized that a social order based on reciprocity requires that 
individuals be able to reci:Jgnize one another and to know the prior history of their 
interactions. lie argued that since even bacteria could meet this requirement (by 
interacting wi~h only one'kind of organism), "so can people and nations" (Axelrod, 
1984, 173). H.e further claimed that his tournaments showed that "there is no need to 
assume trust qetween the players: the use of reciprocity can be enough to make 
defection unproductive . .li\.ltruism is not needed: successful strategies can elicit 
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cooperation even from an egoist. Final1ly, no central authority is needed: cooperation 
based on reciprocity can be self-policing11 (Axelrod, 1984, 174). 
Artificial life researchers have also explored N-person PD competitions, by 
modeling PD strategies as genotypes competing pairwise for game points in simulated 
evolutionary systems (Axelrod, 1987; Lindgren, 1990; Miller, 1989). Miller and 
Axelrod both used GAs to simula.te pairwise competition among PD strategies. Miller 
allowed all the strategies to compete pairwise against one another, so that each strategy 
worked as a selection mechanism for each other strategy, whereas Axelrod used the 
higher-scoring performers from hls previous iterated tournaments (Axelrod, 1984) to 
provide the fitness selection mechanism, although he too relied on pairwise interactions 
for the payoffs. 
Kristian Lindgren develop~d th~~ most intriguing evolutionary model of the PD 
because he included 11 noise. 11 By 11I10ise',' he meant mistakes, as when for example a 
player intended to cooperate but qefectied instead (due, in his model, to mutation) 
(Lindgren, 1990). He found that n.eitheit TFT nor any other pure strategy could be 
evolutionarily stable. Lindgren's evolving populations developed two particularly 
interesting phenomena: punctuate~! equilibria, and evolutionarily stable strategies1 
(ESS) consisting of long memorie~; and 'probabilistic or 11 mixed11 strategies. He argued 
that punctuated equlibria (long periods oominated by particularly successful strategies 
1 Lindgren argues that there is in fact nQ evolultionarily stable pure strategy in the iterated PD, but that 
"in our model the presence of noise implies that every strategy can be regarded as a mixture of two 
opposite pure strategies, which allows for evolutionary stable strategies to exist" (Lindgren, 1990, 
307). 
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followed by catastrophic collapses) might be necessary in order for dramatictllly nc;w 
and better strategies to gain a toehold, and suggested that such punctuated equilibria 
might be the key to how such complex marvels as eyes evolved; at least in his 
simulations, these abrupt collapses seemed necessary for the evolution of sucqess~l 
ESS. In contrast to Axelrod, Lindgren's solutions relied entirely on knowledge; of past 
intemctions. Axelrod argued that concern for the future is necessary for evoh1tion11ry 
solutions to the PD. 
Although these tournaments might shed some light on what is requirecl for 
rational humans to behave cooperatively, there are difficulties with extending their 
conclusions to the real world. The solutions they identifY rely on pairwise interacti(lns 
and knowledge of past interactions. These requirements make these solutions 
questionable for problems such as the TOC, which involves more or less anonymot.IS 
individuals playing against anonymous multitudes, as well as Nature. Dawes (J980) 
argues that when iterated PD games are played between two players at a time1 as they 
are in computer tournaments, they are unrepresentative of social dilemmas suqh as the 
TOC in general. He gives three reasons: in the real world, "harm for defecting beh(\vior 
is diffused over a considerable number of players," rather than visited complet~ly op 
one other player; in the real world, rather than each player knowing with certainty how 1 
the other has behaved, defecting behavior may be essentially anonymous; and fllOSt 
important, in pairwise games, "each player has total reinforcement control ov~r the 
other .... Thus, each player can attempt to shape the other's behavior by choice of 
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defection and cooperation, while partially determining his or her own outcome by that 
same choice ... .In fact, Amnon Rapoport (1967) has shown that if subjects really can 
influence each others' subsequent choices, then the iterated PD isn't a dilemma at all!" 
(Dawes, 1980, 183). 
Furthermore, TFT may work better than other strategies if players interact 
pairwise, but if one cannot tell what "TAT" was, or there was a variety of"TATS," 
then it is impossible to tell what "TIT" should be. TFT thus has no clear meaning when 
a DM is playing against many others, as well as Nature, simultaneously. 
Despite these limitations, it can be argued that the PD, as a limiting case and 
provocative paradox, has been invaluable to the process of thinking through the causes 
of, and difficulties in solving, social dilemmas (Rapoport, 1967). Solutions to the 
commons dilemma require a more complex model, however, because of the reasons 
outlined above: the real players in the TOC perceive that they are playing different 
games (e.g., PD, Chicken, some mix of the two, or something else), they may consider 
multiple, conflicting objectives in their decisions; the probabilistic aspects of their 
choices are important and cannot be modeled effectively by game theory; and unlike the 
players in existing computer models, they are not restricted to pairwise interactions and 
knowledge of past histories for their solutions. 
When players are assuming different payoff structures and rules, and those 
payoffs and rules depend on beliefs and moral values, the greater power and flexibility 
of decision theory may be required if a solution is to be found. The assumption that all 
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players are strictly rational, have a role to play, and ar~ playing the s!ame game is 
fundamental to game theory. If one of the players is N <~ture, these assumptions become 
problematic. For example, although there are many definitions ofratlionality, in game 
theory, "rationality" has to do with choosing the cours~ of action that is expected to 
provide the most of whatever the player desires. By thifi kind of defhtition, Nature may 
or may not be called "rational," but Nature's rationality (ifthere is su1ch a thing) is most 
likely fundamentally different than human players' ratio111~1ity. Nature I may be playing a 
very different game than the humans are (or than huma~t~ think Nature is playing), and 
can certainly change the rules without telling anyone. Nature's role inl. the TOC is as a 
source of uncertainty, and because decision theory can hiindle uncerti:tinty so much 
more easily than can game theory, it is thus a more useftll tool. 
If all of the players cannot be assumed to be playing the same!game, or even 
having an effective part to play, game theory may be helpful in thinking through the 
various strategies different kinds of players might select1 put it will be1 of little help in 
finding a solution. Game theory cannot include the impa,c~ ofDMs' conflicting 
probability assessments, and does not explicitly account fpr the trade01ffs inherent to 
multiple objectives as easily as does decision theory. In the N-person J?D, players' 
ordinal preferences are all the same, uncertainty plays no role, and potlential tradeoffs 
among multiple attributes are invisible. In the real world, i.f a player values cooperation 
because of a belief that cooperation is morally right, and this player be.lieves it is highly 
probable that the other player will cooperate, then this pl.ayer will cho(bse the 
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"cooperate" option rather than the "defect" option because not only years in prison but 
also moral precepts alfe important; the additional attribute changes the payoffs so that 
the payoffs are no longer consistent with the PD. In sum, decision theory is a more 
powerful tool tpan game theory for dealing with uncertainty. Game theory is more 
useful for dealh1g with strategic aspects of a situation arising from the potential for 
cooperation am~ competition among actors. 
The real issue,l however, is not the game theory/decision theory dichotomy, but 
rather whether ~he TOC is more productively modeled as a game against Nature (i.e., 
as a multiattribt.Ite decision tree), a game against other players (as a game theory 
model), or even as a game against Nature and other players (i.e., some mix of the 
decision and game theory approaches). In particular, if the strategic aspects of the 
problem - the aspects of competition and cooperation among players - are 
important, then game theory has much to contribute; if the probabilistic aspects of the 
problem- the uncertainties about the state of the commons and the actions by other 
players- are i1nportant, then decision theory has more to contribute. Both approaches 
in fact have important I contributions to make. 
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Chapter IV 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Given the complexities of human decision-malQng, apd the dilemmas resulting 
from the conflicts between our biological heritage and our l)fological futute, escaping 
the TOC is a truly difficult challenge, because as Hardin andl Baden so eloquently put it 
(Hardin and Baden, 1977, xii): 
Memory decays; subconscious denial blinds; private interest 
corrupts; and long-standing institutions seek (sp to speak) their own 
survival. In culture, as in biological ecosystems, we qan never do merely 
one thing. Even when we perceive the errors of the 1~ast and the dangers 
of the future it is not obvious how we should, qr can, alter human 1 
institutions to improve human welfare. In this crowd~d world of ours 
unmanaged commons are no longer tolerable: ~>Ut h~~w shall we manage 
them? What core norms of society need to be altered, and how? 1 
It is also important to ask what we really mean by "s1plution." At al minimum, 
"solution" could mean merely that H. sapiens does not go e~tinct. The tragedy Hardin 
feared was defined only as "ruin,'' which in the context of hi~ essay did not appear to 
mean extinction, necessarily, but rather the condition where !Malthusian feedback 
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mechanisms of "misery and vice" hold the population in check. In Malthus' framework, 
humans may be able to survive, but unless we deliberately control our population 
growth, we will often be miserable. In the literature about solutions to the TOC, clear-
cut objectives for a solution are rarely (if ever) defined, but the assumption appears to 
be that mere survival, though necessary, is not sufficient. Since these objectives appear 
to be shared by the researchers who have written about solutions to the TOC, in this 
work it is assumed that a "solution" results not only in survival of the human species, 
but also the survival ofthe commons, both at some desirable level of quality. 
Many different solutions have been proposed by researchers and philosophers in 
many fields. Costanza, for example, argues that "All animals capable of choice can be 
trapped with the right bait. Intelligent ones can learn to avoid traps. Ingenious ones can 
even escape from traps. If we are to survive, we need to exercise our vaunted 
intelligence and ingenuity to see, avoid, and escape from the many complex traps we 
have laid for ourselves" (Costanza, 1987, 412). He cites a list of potential solutions 
developed by Cross and Guyer, consisting of"education (about the long-term, 
distributed impacts); insurance; superordinate authority (i.e., legal systems, 
government, and religion); and converting the trap to a tradeoff" (Costanza, 1987, 
409). 
Heinen and Low similarly identified five categories of proposed solutions: 
"information/education programmes, social incentives (through direct reciprocity), 
economic incentives (through small fines, etc.), the formation of coalitions, and broad 
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governmental regulations" (Heinen and Low, 1992, Ill). From their survey of 
empirical studies, they found considerable support for the hypothesis that "solutions 
will be easier for problems which are smaller in scale, and more immediate to the actor, 
than for those that are larger and farther away .. .in general, as problems become larger 
in scale, more difficult and drastic solutions will be required" (Heinen and Low, 1992, 
111). They also found that one ofthe most important factors in preventing commons 
tragedies is the presence of rapid and clear feedback (Heinen and Low, 1992; Low and 
Heinen, 1993). They reasoned that "if enhancement ofindividual and familial survival 
and reproduction is the trait favoured by natural selection ... resources should be most 
conservatively used when there is rapid and clear feedback regarding the impact on 
family and individual welfare" (Heinen and Low, 1992, 1 08). 
They also argue that, unfortunately, given "our evolved psychological 
mechanisms," the most important problems are also often the most difficult (Heinen 
and Low, 1992, 109): 
The easiest problems are those in which the costs are paid, and 
the benefits derived, by the same individuals, and the benefits come 
quickly ... ; in such cases, simply having the correct information may lead 
to a solution. When costs or benefits accrue at higher-than-individual 
levels, there is a potential for conflicts of interest within a level (e.g. 
gasoline prices: we all agree that something must be done, but we loathe 
to inflict taxes) .... The most difficult cases are those such as global 
warming: the costs are incurred from the individual to the national 
levels ... and the costs must be paid now for potential benefits in, say, 20 
to 50 years. In such cases, anyone asked to pay a cost now is predicted 
to discount the value of information, the benefits to be derived, etc. In 
sum, the farther any case is from the individual costs, individual benefits 
corner, and the longer the time-scale, the more difficult it will be to 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42 
solve. 
In this suiVey of the literature, the proposed solutions appear to fall into six, 
somewhat overlapping, categories: technology, community identification, financial 
incentives, property rights, regulatory control, and population control. These 
approaches rely on changing the rules ofthe TOC (technology and property rights), 
changing the payoffs (community identification and financial incentives), or both 
(regulatory control and population control). The technology, property rights, 
community identification, and financial incentives solutions are based on an assumption 
that the commons can be preseJVed while still allowing more-or-less free individual 
choice decision-making. In contrast, the regulatory control approach assumes that 
decision-making should not be left to individuals, but should instead be regulated by an 
outside body. 
Hardin's only solution -population control - is in reality a commons dilemma 
of its own. IfNature somehow achieved it for us (via, say, a pandemic or reduced 
fertility), then free choice decision-making could be preseJVed. If not, then according to 
Hardin, free choice in reproduction is not acceptable, because "freedom to breed will 
bring ruin to all" (Hardin, 1968, 29). Coercion, "preferably mutual", is thus required 
(Hardin, 1968). 
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1. TECHNOLOGY 
Throughout history, new scientific discoveries have repeatedly made "a 
mockery of old statements ofimpossibility," as Hardin puts it. As a result, "many 
nonscientists (but few scientists) think that anything we can dream of we can have 
(sooner or later) ... Maybe tomorrow someone will invent an antigravity machine or find 
a way to travel faster than the speed of light. Who is to say what is impossible? The 
'Who is to say?' of the cornucopists opens the mind's door to all conceivabilities" 
(Hardin, 1993, 68). 
The "cornucopist" argument is that doomsayers have always been with us and 
have usually been wrong (Hardin, 1993). The reason doomsayers' prophesies fail is 
that it is impossible for forecasters to anticipate teclmological advances which, invented 
often by necessity, inevitably arrive to save the day. There may be limits on 
nonrenewable resources, but there are no limits on human ingenuity (Simon and 
Wildavsky, 1993). Groundwater may become increasingly polluted, for example, but 
technology will find a way to clean it up: all that is required is an increased dedication 
of technological resources. 
As technology improves people's standards of living, people become healthier 
and better educated, so that they also tend to become more responsible citizens; better 
ways can then be found to manage commons- or so the argument goes (Dietz and 
Rosa, 1994; Morowitz, 1991; Pimm, et al, 1995; Simon and Wildavsky, 1993; Wilson, 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44 
1993 ). The regeneration rate can be improved, say with fertilizers or genetic 
improvements in crops and livestock. People can recycle more, and recycling can 
become more efficient, the end products more useful, and so on. In the extreme, the 
most optimistic cornucopians believe that the infinite substitutability of factors such as 
labor and capital means that, as Nobel prize-winning economist Robert Solow puts it, 
"[T]he world can, in effect get along without natural resources" (Daly, 1980, 7). 
The pessimists, however, disagree. There is no technical or structural solution 
to the commons problem over the long run, they say; ultimately, no matter how a 
commons is managed, its final fate is determined by the number of people exploiting it 
(Hardin and Baden, 1977). Along these lines, Daily and Ehrlich argue that despite the 
fact that there is a widespread belief that "technological advances will sufficiently lower 
per-capita impacts so that no major changes in lifestyle will be necessary," there is an 
inescapable limit: "technological achievements cannot make biophysical carrying 
capacity infinite ... The bottom line is that the laws of thermodynamics inevitably limit 
biophysical carrying capacity if shortages of inputs or ecological collapse do not 
intervene first" (Daily and Ehrlich, 1992, 763). 
Some even argue that technology is part of the problem, rather than the catch-
all solution. Environmental ethicist Georgescu-Roegen is one of the best-known 
advocates of simpler lifestyles, particularly in the wealthy countries; he argues that too 
many resources are wasted on trivial wants, whereas for the sake of long term 
sustainability and higher quality of life, resources should only be used for necessary, 
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rather than "nonvital" purposes (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 21): 
... the maximum of life quantity requires the minimum rate of 
natural resources depletion. By using these resources too quickly, man 
throws away that part of solar energy that will still be reaching the earth 
for a long time after he has departed. And everything that man has done 
in the last two hundred years or so puts him in the position of a fantastic 
spendthrift. There can be no doubt about it: any use of natural resources 
for the satisfaction of nonvital needs means a smaller quantity of life in 
the future. Ifwe understand well the problem, the best use of our iron 
resources is to produce plows or harrows as they are needed, not Rolls 
Royces, not even agricultural tractors. 
2. COMMUNITY IDENTIFICATION AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS 
45 
Human beings have evolved not only to be selfishly biological competitors, but 
also to be strongly social, and thus susceptible to social forces such as religion, 
conscience, pride, and reciprocity. Cooperative tendencies might be built upon to 
manage common resources more rationally. For example, Heinen and Low suggest 
that, "Because of our inescapable history as a long-lived, social primate, we possess 
evolved proximate mechanisms to maximize our functioning in the social context. If we 
can play upon these evolved mechanisms again, we may be able to promote 
conservation strategies more effectively than if we require conscious cost-benefit 
calculations, or rely primarily upon economic costs and benefits" (Heinen and Low, 
1992, 112). 
Cooperation appears to be more likely when people do not feel threatened by 
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scarcity, due either to actual shortages, or to other people's competitive behaviors. For 
people to not feel threatened by scarcity, the commons needs to be so large with 
respect to the population that there is little motivation for competitive (or, for that 
matter, cooperative) behaviors, or people need to feel connected enough to one 
another that sharing is valued more highly than the potential profit available from 
competition. Ostrom, for example, found in an empirical survey that common-pool 
resources could be sustainably managed when "individuals have shared a past and 
expect to share a future [where] it is important for individuals to maintain their 
reputations as reliable members ofthe community" (Ostrom, 1990, 88). 
Heinen and Low note that "The most successful coalitions comprise individuals 
who have convergent interests: e.g. kin ... monogamous mates ... or frequently 
reciprocating individuals .... While all of us are loath to inflict costs upon ourselves, 
there is a possibility that we can use coalitions- which will sometimes accept small 
costs in order to impose greater costs on others or on society at large- to help us to 
'leapfrog' from small-scale successes to larger-scale successes" (Heinen and Low, 1992, 
113). 
These arguments also appear to be supported by a number of studies of 
nomadic tribes and fishing villages in Mrica (Bassett, 1988; Bencherifa and Johnson, 
1991; Monbiot, 1994; Ntiamoa-Baidu, 1991; Stott, 1991). These researchers found 
that grazing and fishing commonses apparently worked for centuries, as long as their 
use was mediated by tribal customs and taboos. Unfortunately, when historical 
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migration routes hav(~ been lcut off or traditional beliefs altered by the increasing impact 
ofEuropean and American JPOiitics and culture, these commonses have collapsed. 
Dawes and others have found empirically that cooperation is much more likely 
when groups are smaller and more homogeneous, somewhat more likely if choice is 
public rather than anonymous, and significantly more likely if subjects believe others 
will cooperate (Daw(:s, 1980). Rapoport accidentally discovered that even allowing 
experimental subjects: to chat by the water cooler during a break significantly improved 
the rates of cooperation in IN-person iterated PD experiments (Dawes, 1980). Since one 
of the most important defining features of the PD is the requirement that one's own 
choice is independent: of what other player(s) may do, then people who change their 
choices because of others' expected behaviors are not, by definition, participating in a 
PD. 
Some environmental ethicists and "deep" ecologists (Ehrenfeld, 1981; Etzioni, 
1988; Sagoff, 1995; White, 1995; Wilson, 1992, 1993) call on human responsibilities to 
future humans as well as to 1other species. Weiss argues for "education to foster a new 
planetary ethos rooted in a sense ofbelonging to a community of past, present, and 
future generations-· all of which are responsible for the use and care of planet Earth" 
(Weiss, 1990, 1 0). Wilson tlheorizes that humans have an innate need to interact with, 
and care for, the natural world (the "biophilia hypothesis," see Wilson, 1984 and 1992). 
Working to invoked is presumably biologically-based need, and educating people 
about our responsibil ties to: future humans and other species, is an approach often used 
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by biologists and environmental ethicists, perhaps because caring about the biosphere 
was what drew them to their disciplines in the first place. 
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People do seem to be sensitive to moral suasion in many contexts. Dawes, for 
example, found that the tendency of experimental subjects to cooperate in iterated N-
person PD games was significantly improved by "a 938 word sermon about group 
benefit, exploitation, whales, ethics, and so on" (Dawes, 1980, 188). Costanza supports 
the view that in some cases, relatively rigid social structures such as religion might 
work, but he also points out that " ... there are problems with religion as a means to 
avoid social traps. The moral code must be relatively static to allow beliefs learned 
early in life to remain in force later. And it requires a relatively homogeneous 
community oflike-minded believers for religion to be truly effective" (Costanza, 1987, 
410). 
Hardin expresses little faith in the efficacy of moral arguments, because 
"appeals to conscience" place people in double binds. People being preached to may 
feel that the person making the appeal regards them as "simpletons" (Hardin, 1968). 
The double bind occurs because if the "swayee" acts consistently with his or her newly-
enlightened conscience, it could mean feeling taken advantage of, particularly if the 
sermonizer may not be trusted to also act conscientiously. The only way this double 
bind could be avoided, Dawes says, is ifboth the person being swayed and the person 
making the appeal feel bound together by a similar set of values: if, as Dawes says, "the 
person making the appeal also has a regard for his own 'clear conscience' .. .then he is 
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equally bound" (Dawes, 1980, 179). 
In effect, proponents of solving the TOC through education are hoping to 
change social values. It can take a long time to change social values, however- time 
which some believe we may not have. In addition, when the undt:!rlying game is PD or 
Chicken, it does not take too many defectors to ruin things for everyone Ieise. Thus, 
"For education to be effective in avoiding traps involving many individuals, all the 
participants must be educated" (Costanza, 1987, 409), quite an ambitious undertaking. 
The key may be that education has an effect on behavior primaril)y when it 
provides information about near-term potential impacts on individuals (and their near 
kin). Thus, we would expect that as costs of not sharing or cooperating, 'and/or benefits 
of sharing or cooperating, become more salient, less-selfish behavior would become 
more attractive. It may be that if education can make resource sc:arcities more apparent, 
the payoffs will change. 
Could they change enough? Dawes argues that the answ(~r is "No, for while 
utilities associated with altruism, norms, and conscience may be made salient by 
knowledge, they do not necessarily overwhelm those associated with the: payoffs. 
Repugnant as it may be from a normative point ofview, moral and monetary (or 
survival) utilities combine in a compensatory fashion for most people" (Dawes, 1980, 
191 ). That is, "Everyone may not have his or her price, but it dot~s not require a 
systematic survey to establish that most people in the world will compromise his or her 
[sic] altruistic or ethical values for money or survival" (Dawes, 1980, 191). 
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Unfortunately, successfl.JI communit~-based commons management examples in 
the literature are restricted to Slnall, usually primitive, homogeneous communities with 
low rates of population growth and shared OIWnership not only ofthe commons but also 
of any proceeds from the commons. It may be that community-based commons 
management methods only work as long as population is small relative to the 
commons, or at any rate is small enough, and homogeneous enough, that social 
cohesiveness can provide the m;cessary control. Under these conditions, there is in fact 
no dilemma and thus no tragedt Unfortunately, there are no examples where 
community-based commons m&nagement has been shown to work when the population 
of the community grew beyond the carrying capacity of the commons. 
3. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
Some researchers argue that because1we are biologically selfish organisms as 
well as social ones, solving the TOC may require stronger incentives than social and 
cultural mechanisms alone. Heipen and Low 1 (Heinen and Low, 1992, 1 07), for 
example, point out that: 
If we suggest. .. tpat everyone should pay an immediate, relatively 
small cost. . .in the intere~ts of gaining1long-term global benefits which 
will be shared with non-.relatives and competitors, we are asking for 
behaviours that have no evolutionary I precedent. When we ask people to 
do things that cost them individually, I with no benefit in the short term, 
and no matter how sensjble they may1be, we see defection; it hasn't 
worked as a widespreaq strategy in the past, and we see no convincing 
evidence that it will in the future. I 
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Appealing as a solution to the TOC based on cooperation might be, Daily and 
Ehrlich offer the view that, "Planning a world for highly cooperative, antimaterialistic, 
ecologically sensitive vegetarians would be of little value in correcting today's 
situation ... In short, it seems prudent to evaluate the problem ofsustainability for selfish, 
myopic people who are poorly organized politically, socially, and economically" (Daily 
and Ehrlich, 1992, 763). Hence, economic incentives. 
To an economist, the problem with a commons is that the costs of exploitation 
are not reflected in the net benefits to the exploiter. The supply-and-demand control 
system envisioned by Adam Smith relies on prices for the linkages, but when supply 
and demand are decoupled by faulty pricing mechanism, the invisible hand no longer 
functions. The result is that, as Daily and Ehrlich (1992, 769) put it: 
Prices relate to both biophysical and social carrying capacities in 
at least two important ways. First, underpricing of resources encourages 
unsustainable management. Underpricing often occurs because future 
generations have no means of making their demands for a resource 
known ... Prices also play an important role in the rates of innovation. 
High prices constitute incentives for research and development of 
technologies that are more efficient or that substitute more abundant for 
scarce resources. 
The implication seems to be that, to solve the TOC, one only has to create a 
payoff structure that accurately reflects the true long-term cost, supply, and demand 
functions. Then people will do what they should because they want to. Much has been 
written recently regarding the possibility of this approach to changing the payoffs 
inherent to the TOC (Heinen and Low, 1992; Low and Heinen, 1993; Ridley, 1993). 
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The general ide11 is as1 follows (Heinen and Low, 1992, 108, italics in original): 
tiumans have evolved to use resources in reproductively selfish 
ways, and thus, if benefits of conservation can be made to outweigh 
costs for peop;le- for example through a system of economic or other 
incentiv~s which confer immediate or very short-term benefits on 
individu.als anril/or their families and potential reciprocators- then 
effectiv<; conservation strategies are likely to persist and spread. If this is 
the case, gove:rnments and organizations may find it productive to 
implem{;,nt policies that create systems of incentives to conserve: the 
more immediate the benefit, the more successful should be the outcome. 
Daily apd Ehrlich similarly favor creating mechanisms that act on the market, 
such as fees, taxes, and insurance in order to "make short-term incentives consistent 
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with long-term ~ustairmbility" (Daily and Ehrlich, 1992, 769). Costanza also favors fees 
or taxes, arguing that 
1
"many theorists believe that this method is the most effective in 
avoiding and escaping from social traps ... one could turn the trap into a trade-offby 
taxing any cons1Jmpticm above the optimum level for resource stability" (Costanza, 
1987, 410). 
Costanz.a has inore recently advocated treating commons resources, such as 
rangeland and fisheries (which he calls "natural capital stocks"), in a way that is similar 
to how capital i~ treated by investors: "By maintaining natural capital stocks (preferably 
by using a natural cap~tal depletion tax), we can satisfY both the skeptics (since 
resources will be conserved for future generations) and the optimists (since this will 
raise the price of natural capital depletion and more rapidly induce the technical change 
they predict)" (Costanza and Daly, 1992, 38). Under this system, just as a responsible 
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investment analyst would take into account the acceptable risk of a propos1~d 
investment, resource managers would be encouraged to take into acqount the 
acceptable risk of resource exploitation through a requirement that djscount rates 
reflect the worst case scenarios for the future. 
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This question of uncertainty about the future, and what levels of rislk we should 
assume on behalf of future generations, is at the heart of environmemat conflicts. 
Hazardous waste management is a good example of a particularly difficult commons 
issue because there is often a great deal of ignorance and uncertainty (as well as 
potentially devastating risks) associated with hazardous waste issues. Costanza argues 
that in order to find an equitable solution to the problem ofhazardou.s waste, "one must 
charge the producers of hazardous waste for the ultimate long-run er,vironf111ental and 
health costs of these wastes, and the charges must be imposed at the time af the waste's 
production ... [But] how can we charge producers of hazardous waste.s for the ultimate 
long-run costs of their waste if we have no idea what (if any) those cpsts will actually 
be?" (Costanza, 1987, 410). Costanza suggests that society charge produc:ers the 
worst-case costs, given the current knowledge. Producers will then be motnvated to 
undertake research as well as to pollute less, he says. 
The "catch" inherent in the idea of using financial incentives, \1owe~er, is that it 
is difficult to imagine how, exactly, to put it into effect. As Dawes p~ts it, ''IThe 
simplicity of this approach is appealing until we ask who will change the payoffs and 
how. The almost universal answer to the first question is government, and+--
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somewhat surprisingly given the cultural background of the writers- the most 
common answer to the second question is: through coercion" (Dawes, 1980, 174). 
Particularly in our political system, although people might agree that changing the 
payoffs is desirable, in an election year few politicians want to be perceived as "tax and 
spend" types; as a result, " ... the immediate individual costs to a politician promoting tax 
increases are seldom seen as counterbalanced by the long-term societal gain" (Heinen 
and Low, 1992, 1 09). Politicians campaign to lower, not to increase, taxes. 
4. PROPERTY RIGHTS 
If the problem is that important resources are mismanaged when held in 
common ownership, then perhaps the solution is to eliminate the common ownership. 
Perhaps Smith's invisible hand would work then, given the chance. The fact that people 
take better care of what is theirs, than what is shared, is well known: "Aristotle, for 
example, remarked: 'What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of 
care. Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is 
common ... When everyone has his own sphere of interest. .. the amount of interest will 
increase, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what is his own"' 
(Hardin and Baden, 1977, xi). 
The idea of the private property solution is to put a price on everything, and let 
demand determine the supply. Thus, for example, everyone would receive a certificate 
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for a certain amount of clean air, and those who wished to, could sell their certificates 
-say, to a factory that wants to pollute. The price of pollution then would be paid by 
the beneficiaries, so that the problem of externalities would be reduced or eliminated. If 
people prefer to protect a threatened bird rather than to log a forest, let them get 
together and buy the forest (a Ia The Nature ConseiVancy). 
One difficulty with converting publicly-owned resources to private property is 
in figuring out how to distribute a commons equitably (e.g., who should get it? how 
should it be priced? by what process should it be sold? what about future generations?). 
There is also the question of what kinds of laws are needed to protect everyone's long 
term interests. Hardin asks: "What shall we do? We have several options. We might 
sell them off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate 
the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an 
auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon 
standards. it might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-seiVed basis, 
administered to long queues." Unfortunately, he concludes, "These, I think, are all 
objectionable" (Hardin, 1968, 21 ). His objection is that either the distribution would 
not be equitable ("Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of 
somebody's personal liberty" (Hardin, 1968, 29)), or the system might accelerate 
liquidation of a commons that is critical to suiVival. 
Privatizing public resources is no guarantee that the resources will be used 
sustainably, anyway. In a series oflaboratory experiments, Cass and Edney found that 
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discount rates and fears about the effects of competition tended to cause problems even 
when property rights are imposed on commonses. In these experiments, subjects were 
allowed to draw points from a regenerating common pool. Despite the fact that 
subjects were always informed of the optimal harvesting strategies, subjects 
consistently overharvested the common resource. When the points were divided into 
"territories," subjects harvested optimally only when visibility of resource levels was 
provided, which is very difficult to do for commonses such as fisheries, groundwater, 
and clean air. If subjects were uncertain about resource levels, they still harvested their 
own private territories unsustainably (Cass and Edney, 1978). Fife explains such 
behavior by pointing out that it makes sense to liquidate a resource if the profit can be 
reinvested elsewhere for a greater return; the driving mechanism is that different people 
have different discount rates for different resources, and if there is sufficient uncertainty 
related to slowly harvesting one resource, it is "rational" to harvest it quickly and invest 
the proceeds in an enterprise subject to less risk (Fife, 1971). 
A further difficulty arises because it may be technically difficult if not impossible 
to impose property rights on a commons when there are problems with restricting 
access. These issues have been dealt with recently in ocean fisheries, particularly in 
New Zealand and Alaska, by issuing individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to 
commercial fishers to "help match the fishing capacity to the stock's size while easing 
some of the social dislocation caused by such a transition" (Fujita and Hopkins, 1995, 
B7). The idea is that if people currently dependent on fishing are issued ITQs, which 
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they can trade or sell just as if they were private property , then it is easier to manage 
access and to reduce total fishing efforts: fishers can be encouraged to go out of 
business by transferring their ITQs to others, including the state or conservation 
organizations which will not use them to fish (Jeffreys, 1993). 
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Unfortunately, ITQs have mainly been tried only in fisheries that were already in 
trouble, and there have been problems with implementation and enforcement (Duncan, 
1995; Mathews, 1995). In a survey ofiTQ efforts, Mace found that "The net effect is 
that, even with property rights, the discount rate ... of commercial harvesters is almost 
certainly higher than that of the general public, particularly that of recreationists and 
conservationists" (Mace, 1993, 30). She argued that ITQs failed to save New Zealand's 
orange roughy fishery because managers did not understand the biology of the fish until 
it was too late (Mace, 1993). There have also been problems in New Zealand's ITQ 
efforts because political pressures have resulted in increased corporate control at the 
expense of entrepreneurial artisanal fishers (Duncan, 1995). Enforcement has also 
turned out to be a serious problem (Mace, 1993; Duncan, 1995). 
5. REGULATORY CONTROL 
Along the continuum from purely common to purely private ownership there is 
also a range of various forms of government. In fact, all the solution approaches 
described here rely on what Hardin calls "mutual coercion"- i.e., government- to 
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some degree, because some kind of governmental system is required to provide the 
structure within which these solutions occur. However, all the solutions discussed 
above rely on more-or-less manipulated free choice: technological solutions change the 
rules so that people can harvest as they please without causing longterm problems, 
property rights solutions change the rules to eliminate the elements of the problem due 
to unrestricted access, and community identification or financial incentives change the 
payoffs so that people harvest sustainably by preference. 
In order to not confuse it with other approaches, the "regulatory control" 
solution here is narrowly defined, and is essentially what Prugh, Costanza, Daly and 
others call a "command and control" approach (Prugh et al, 1995). For the purposes of 
this work, regulatory control is defined to include only solutions that turn over the 
responsibility for deciding who gets to harvest, when, and where, to a governmental 
body. For example, the state Department ofFish and Wildlife determines catch limits, 
methods, and timing; the Bureau of Land Management determines how many cattle can 
be grazed, by whom, on which allotments; the U.S. Forest Service determines how 
many trees can be logged, where, and how. Licenses or allotments may be auctioned 
off or sold to the public, and in some cases ITQs may fit in this category better than the 
"private property" category, depending on how strictly they are regulated. The bottom 
line, and the characteristic that distinguishes regulatory solutions here, is that the 
government, not the individual, decides whether or not an individual can Take. 
Regulatory control solutions work both by changing the rules and by changing 
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the payoffs. They change the rules because they restrict access, as do property rights 
based solutions. The difference between the solutions that are categorized here as 
"property rights" and those that are "regulatory control" is that "property rights" 
solutions assume that individual decision-making will lead to the optimal outcome, and 
"regulatory controJI' assumes that it cannot. Regulatory control solutions rely on an 
authoritarian body that decides who gets to harvest, how, and when, according to some 
assumptions about what the harvest levels should be. Property rights solutions are 
based on an assumption that the market (i.e., free choice) will and should determine the 
optimal harvest levels. 
For example, ITQs in fisheries fit the "property rights" solution category if the 
decisions about buying and selling the ITQs can be freely made by individuals, similarly 
to the way woodlot owners would buy and sell woodlots; i.e., the ITQ approach is 
truly a property rights approach if it leads to supply and demand controlling harvest 
levels. If instead, ITQs are simply thinly veiled licensing schemes like those that have 
traditionally been used by agencies to control the number of fish caught, then they 
really belong in the "regulatory control" category. 
Regulatory control solutions assume that, left to their own devices, individuals 
will not achieve an optimal harvest level, and that the decision should not rest in their 
hands. In the limit, of course, regulatory control solutions also work by changing the 
payoffs, because a DM always has the option of breaking the law, and paying a penalty 
or going to jail. 
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Many, if not most, commonses are in fact regulated by some administrative 
system. The rationale behind formation of governing structures is that, if people cannot 
always be depended on to be virtuous, then at least they can create social or political 
structures to coerce one another for their mutual benefit. The argument is that since 
humans have evolved to try to take as much of the pie for themselves and their 
offspring as possible, some kind of structure has to exist to force them to treat one 
another equitably. Creating a system of controls should make the future more 
predictable and thus the present more secure, than relying on unpredictable social and 
economic dynamics. Hardin advocates "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" (as a 
means of managing a commons over the short run, but more importantly as a means of 
regulating population growth over the long run), but points out that the problem with 
any governmental system is always that of regulating the regulators themselves, who 
are subject to political pressures as well as ordinary greed (Hardin, 1968). 
Administrative systems are intended not only to maintain social stability, but 
sometimes also to ensure the future. Future generations have no say in decisions made 
today that may have consequences for them. Given the human tendency to discount the 
future, there is little natural motivation to forego using resources today in order to 
ensure that unknown, unrelated people some time in the future might possibly need 
them. To some, this is an issue that must be dealt with formally. For example, arguing 
that "every generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from its ancestors 
and holds it in trust for its descendants," Weiss proposes that an inter-generational (and 
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speak for future generations 11 (Weiss, 1990, I 0). 
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The major objections to coercive systems are that, in the long run, they cost too 
much, and besides, at least on the scale of states or nations, they simply do not work: if 
they did, there would be some coercively-managed commons today that could be 
looked to as an example of sustainable management. The reason they do not work is 
that people try to get around the rules, and there may even be an increased motivation 
for many to do so ifthe system seems unfair (Dawes, 1980). Since people may prefer 
to try to cheat the system, monitoring and enforcement are required; thus, 
11Governments can forbid or regulate certain actions that have been deemed socially 
inappropriate. The problem with this approach is that it must be rigidly monitored and 
enforced, and the strong short-term incentive for individuals to try to ignore or avoid 
the regulations remains. A police force and legal system are very expensive to maintain" 
(Costanza, 1987, 409). Dawes agrees, adding that, "Sometimes, in fact, it is not even 
possible to avoid a dilemma by reward or coercion, because the costs of rewarding 
people for cooperating or effectively coercing them to do so exceed the gain the 
society derives from having everyone cooperate rather than defect 11 (Dawes, 1980, 
175). 
An additional problem is that if control and decision-making are turned over to 
an outside (even if theoretically representative) body, the individuals whose 
cooperation and ingenuity might be required to solve environmental problems may 
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begin to perceive government to be "the problem," and thus changes in governmeQt 
(instead of in citizens' behavior) to be somehow the only potential solution. As H~inen 
and Low put it, "So long as 'government' is considered as a unified, external force to 
solve environmental problems, we will not solve anything. It is only too easy to su~gest 
that 'the government' should raise gasoline prices, for example: but. .. the real probl~m is 
how to make it worth while to individuals to act in ways that will cause and support 
such a governmental response" (Heinen and Low, 1992, 113). 
6. POPULATION CONTROL 
It is well accepted that as long as populations are small with respect to a 
common resource, usage stays far enough below the carrying capacity that the 
commons will not be unsustainably exploited (Hardin, 1993; Low and Heinen, 1993; 
McCay, 1978; Patten and Odum, 1981). As Hardin put it, "The commons, ifjustifiable 
at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-population density. As the human 
population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect aft~r 
another" (Hardin, 1968, 28). Population control is the only solution that Hardin says , 
will work over the long run. If population control were somehow magically achiev~d at 
a sustainable level, the effect would be to change the rules, because if population were 
small enough, relative to the commons regeneration rate, it would not matter what 
people did (Hardin, 1968). Population control can also change the payoffs, howev€;r, 
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because of its effects on supply and de:mand. 
Problems with commonses have become much more pressing as population has 
grown. For example (Hardin, 1968, 2~~): 
The pollution problem .is a consequence of population. It did not 
much matter how a lonely Am~rican fronti1ersman disposed of his 
waste ... But as population beca.me denser, the natural chemical and 
biological recycling processes pecame ove1rloaded, calling for a 
redefinition of property rights.,.Using the c:ommons as a cesspool does 
not harm the general public unoer frontier !conditions, because there is 
no public; the same behavior ir1 a metropolis is unbearable. 
In this view, population grow~:h is the root cause of misery where population is 
growing the fastest. Daly argues that '1No other social or economic index divides the 
world so clearly and consistently into 'developed' and underdeveloped' as does fertility" 
(Daly, 1980, 13). Costanza and Daly worry about 1the widespread belief, particularly 
among mainstream economists, that mowth is not only necessary, but also infinitely 
sustainable (Costanza and Daly, 1992). 
Others argue that more human~ born means more human ingenuity available for 
solving problems; President George BlJsh said "ev'ery human being represents hands to 
work, and not just another mouth to f(!ed" (Cohen, 1995, 343). The most optimistic 
proponents of population growth, such as Ester Bosrup and Julian Simon, may 
"[acknowledge] that population growth and economic growth create increased demand 
for resources. But the resulting perceived or antidpated scarcity is presumed to drive 
technological progress and with it the ~earch for substitutes and increased efficiency. 
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Thus, [according to optimists such as Bosrup and Simon] the net effect of population 
and economic growth .. .is neutral or even positive" (Dietz and Rosa, 1994, 281). 
Dietz describes another popular belief that, although population growth is a 
problem, it is not the problem; to some, he says, poor management, inefficient use of 
resources, and careless lifestyles (particularly in rich countries) are the problem (Dietz 
and Rosa, 1994). Mark Sagoff, for example, argues that problems such as pollution are 
not due to population but to lifestyles (Sagoff, 1995). The effects of population growth 
can thus be managed simply by reducing consumption and improving efficiency. 
Hardin does not agree, of course. His argument is that ultimately, no 
technological, economic, or social solution will work over the long run unless 
population is controlled, and that even if his pejorist perspective is not widely accepted, 
it is still important to ask, "Whom shall we believe: The Technological Optimists, or the 
Limits Lobby? If we are wrong, which way ofbeing wrong is more dangerous? What is 
the proper policy for the true conservatives?" (Hardin, 1971, 15). Ifwe choose the 
cautious path and decide that population growth must be stopped, the problem then is 
how to control population, and how to buy the time necessary to do so. Framed this 
way, all of the above proposals may then be applied to population control, which is a 
TOC problem in its own right (Cohen, 1995). Absent some devastating pandemic or 
nuclear holocaust, slowing, stopping, and even reversing population growth would 
require many generations. It is unlikely that any one approa.-:h to preserving important 
commonses would be adequate, given the current approximately 40-year doubling time 
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for human population, coupled with the increasing per-capit11 rate of consumption of 
natural resources around the world. 
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Chapter V 
SIGNIFICANCE OF WORK 
Biolpgists, economists, psychologists, and other researchers interested in public 
policy agre~ that the root cause of social dilemmas such as the TOC is the fact that 
when imme~liate individual interests appear to coru1ict with long term social and 
ecological interests, our biological heritage dictates that the immediate individual 
interests win out. They <ilo not agree on how best to go about solving this problem, nor 
do they agr~e on what t~1e solution should look like. 
Res~archers from different fields frame and define the problem differently. As 
discussed in Chapter II, ibiologists and ecologists have traditionally focused on linear 
models of equilibrium processes in biotic systems, considering human behavior to be 
little more than a disturbance input. Social scientists have focused on human decision-
making and public policy development, considering the biosphere to be little more than 
a source or jnputs and a1sink for wastes. Because the problem is neither wholly 
biological n~>r wholly so,cial, and the two systems are inextricable linked, both 
perspective11 are needed.1 
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In the best tradition of systems science, this work provides a powerful 
simulation methodblogy which relies on well developed tools from both arenas: 
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EMA V, provided IDy the field of decision theory, is used to model the social and 
economic human 'components; and a stochastic model of a simple natural system, from 
the field of ecology, is used to model the resource. The feedback loops between the 
two are modeled via a genetic algorithm, a tool that developed out of the confluence of 
evolutionary theory and optimization theory. 
The goal of this study is to increase our understanding of how the evolution of 
individual decisioni processes in a social, political, and economic human system 
dependent on a slowly regenerating, commonly held natural resource, might impact 
efforts to solve the TOC. The study contributes to the knowledge base at the levels of 
both theory and practice in four ways: 
1. It develops and demonstrates the usefulness of a powerful new computer 
modeling methodology that can help policy makers and researchers think 
about and. solve this important and complex problem. 
2. It contributes to ecological modeling theory and practice by providing a new 
way to use a computer to investigate the links between DMs and the natural 
systems !they impact, as well as contributing to evolutionary modeling practice 
by demonstrating a new way to use the GA. 
3. It contributes to decision theory by helping shed light on the ways dynamic 
interactioJns of individuals result in the development of, and potential solutions 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to, social dilemmas. 
4. It contributes to decision practice by developing and demonstrating a 
powerful new way to incorporate dynamic processes of feedback and 
interaction to previously static decision analysis methods and optimization. 
1. A NEW COMPUTER MODELING METHODOLOGY 
68 
The single most important tool for enhancing human problem solving is 
probably the digital computer, yet there is currently no satisfactory way to simulate 
social dilemmas using computers. Computer models help people think about complex 
problems like the TOC because they can be used to explore the effects and interactions 
of many variables, whereas humans are limited to thinking of at most a few variables at 
a time. A computer model can help facilitate communication, generate new solutions, 
and define and bound the problem. A good computer model helps researchers to 
determine what factors a problem solution is sensitive to, thus making experimental 
efforts more efficient. Whereas it is very difficult for humans to predict system 
behaviors when there are nonlinearities and variables that interact, computer 
simulations do not necessarily have to make predictions, but can allow previously 
unforeseen behaviors to emerge. 
A computer simulation can help people deal with uncertainty. Using a computer 
simulation to explore interactions between socio-economic and natural processes is 
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new and potentially very powerful. Public policy decision-making is full of uncertainties 
for which little reliable information is available. Experiments can sometimes be 
conducted on a small scale to try to understand the potential outcomes of a particular 
policy, but because political processes operate over time scales that are less than 
decades, while ecosystems operate over time scales that are more like centuries, the 
results of such experiments- even when they are measurable, which they often are not 
-are of limited use. Problems that lend themselves so poorly to empirical 
investigations are often explored by computer simulations. 
Paul Edwards ( 1995) argues that even when models of complex systems are (of 
necessity) based on gross over-simplifications, they can still be powerful heuristic 
guides to understanding complex phenomena. Because complex models often must rely 
on many questionable assumptions and estimates, they can be criticized on the grounds 
that their estimates are predictively useless at statistically significant levels, he says; but 
they can be profoundly important to the development and comparison of policy 
scenarios and forecasting of trends. He cites the "limits to growth" (LTG) models from 
the 1970s as an example: An inter-disciplinary team of scientists developed a very 
complex computer model of world-wide resource consumption, population growth, 
pollution, capital, and agriculture. They concluded that exponential growth rates in 
consumption and population growth were not sustainable on a finite planet, and 
sounded an alarm that got a great deal of attention over the next couple of decades. 
The LTG models were attacked from every quarter for their lack of precision and 
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accuracy, and because there was no real empiric~) va~idation. The models nonetheless 
had an important impact on the growing debate ~bou~ the potential limits to human 
population growth (Edwards, 1995). The impact wa's due primarily to the trends they 
identified and the relative importance of the para111eters and variables they used, 
population growth in particular. 
The computer simulation developed by tnis study shares the LTG models' 
problem of the lack of good data on which to ba~e empirical validation. The validity of 
the model has to be assessed on the basis of reaspnableness of assumptions about 
trends and functional interactions of its parameters, nather than on whether the 
particular parameter values used are consistent with (~mpirical data. The reason for this 
is that there simply are no empirical data that reh.tte stocial and ethical values such as 
those reflected in the EMA V decision models, to the I biological parameters of a 
commons, in the real world - not because this is not an extremely important question, 
but because it is such a difficult one. 
This model uses two primary tools to deql with this lack of data. First is the 
reliance on very simple and widely accepted sub-models of a commons and of decision-
making. Second is the reliance, where necessary, on a "best case" approach. For 
example, humans are not widely believed to mak~ decisions using EMA V, but EMA V 
is the prescriptive method recommended by economists and cognitive psychologists. 
Natural resources are subject to many disturbanc.es aiild generally do not regenerate so 
predictably nor successfully as the simple modellJsed here implies. In tllis approach, the 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
question investigated is whether, given the simplest, optimistic assumptions about 
human decision-making and commons regeneration, it is possible to prevent the 
commons being destroyed, without controlling population growth. The results are 
presented as general relationships among model parameters, and between parameters 
and results, and not as statistically significant numbers which could be compared to 
empirical data, if any were available. 
There is nothing new about any of the methodology of the components ofthe 
model; what is new is the way existing methodologies from diverse fields are used 
together, in order to increase understanding of an important and difficult problem. 
2. CONTRIBUTION TO ECOLOGICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
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Ecosystem modeling has progressed to the point where landscape-wide 
evolutionary and successional processes are beginning to be simulated with 
extraordinary realism. However, despite the fact that human impacts are widely 
acknowledged to play an extremely important role in natural systems, no one has 
found a way yet to effectively incorporate human decision processes into dynamic 
models of natural systems. Although the ecosystem modeled in this study is a very 
simple one, it is solidly grounded in the field of ecology. Most important, it provides an 
innovative way to include evolutionary human decision processes in the study of natural 
biotic systems. 
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A number of researchers have called for integrating decision theory into 
ecological models. Among the first were Fiering and Holling, who in 1974 proposed 
that decision theoretical tools such as pareto analysis and sensitivity analysis should be 
applied to dynamic, nonlinear models of system resilience in order to find optimal 
system management solutions (Fiering and Holling, 1974). Holling and Clark followed 
up by calling for a 11new science of ecological engineering, 11 focusing on the integration 
of ecology and economic modeling, policy analysis, and decision theory (Holling and 
Clark, 1975, 250). Bassett later concluded that his field study of grazing on public 
lands in Africa illustrated the urgent need for more research into the interrelationships 
between local, individual decision processes, and national or international political 
processes (Bassett, 1988). Belyaev and Khudoshina recently argued that there is an 
urgent need for simulation tools that can be used by resource managers to explore the 
interaction between the biosphere and human resource managers in order to develop 
ecologically sound guidelines for economic development (Belyaev and Khudoshina, 
1992). 
Scientists often express frustration with the fact that public policy tends to be 
driven by the short-term forces driving politicians, whereas the biosphere is driven by 
the long-term forces driving nature (Edney and Harper, 1978; Holling, 1969; Low and 
Heinen, 1993 ). The use of discount rates by economists and resource managers to deal 
with future outcomes is particularly repugnant to ecologists, because explicit 
discounting of future outcomes encourages what many see as an ecologically 
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destructive human tendency, and because discount rates cause outcomes more than a 
decade or two in the future to become irrelevant. Because this model relies on an 
evolutionary model of decision-making and its ultimate impacts, it provides an 
innovative way to examine how the short-term, political, socio-economic realities of 
decision processes can ultimately impact the long term constraints of nature- and vice 
versa -without having to rely on discount rates. 
3. CONTRIBUTION TO DECISION THEORY 
Researchers interested in how people make decisions about social dilemmas 
have had to rely almost entirely on empirical work, because there are no computer 
models available that simulate these dilemmas adequately. The only computer models 
that have been developed to explore social dilemmas have been based on the iterated, 
N-person PD. Although these models provide interesting insights into cooperation and 
competition in pairwise interactions between players with known histories, the TOC is 
more complex than can be represented by these simple models. Perhaps most 
important, solutions that have been proposed to the roc in the literature cannot be 
readily modeled with the PD because these solutions involve decision attributes other 
than pure self interest, and take uncertain futures into account, whereas in the PD, 
neither uncertainty nor non-selfish interest is taken into account. 
This work employs the more powerful tool of decision theory to simulate the 
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TOC by including characteristics that simpler game theory models cannot include. In 
particular, the decision model allows explicit DM assessment of multiple objectives and 
uncertainties. Because the commons in this model changes in response to what the 
DMs do, and the GA portion of the model simulates the way people's beliefs and values 
might evolve in response to the dynamics of the commons, a more realistic simulation is 
provided ofthe dynamics of commons decision-making than previous PD-based models 
have been able to do. Psychologists can use this approach to explore potential 
interactions among decision variables such as DM beliefs (probability estimates), social 
values (attribute weights), and payoff structures (value functions). By using computer 
simulations to conduct such sensitivity analyses, researchers can identify variables that 
might be important to explore empirically. This information can then be used to design 
more sophisticated experiments to increase understanding of how people make 
decisions about commonly held resources, and how they respond to the outcomes. 
Despite the fact that there has been an enormous amount of research in this 
area, it is well known that a significant number of people (around a third in most 
experiments (Dawes, 1980)) do not choose the dominant strategy of defecting in PD 
experiments, despite the fact that the definition of "rationality" assumed in game theory 
requires they should. It is hard to believe that thousands of experimental subjects who 
consistently choose the more socially responsible (and in fact, potentially more jointly 
beneficial) course of action are actually not "rational". We might conclude instead 
either that these cooperators are considering attributes (such as morality or social 
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identification) other than the tangible payoffs (usually cash or grade points) offered in 
these experiments, or that they have different beliefs about the utility of the outcomes 
than defectors do. Although the prescriptive, static approach of modeling decision-
making with EMA V has proven to be very useful for helping people make better 
decisions, there are no descriptive computer simulations available that simulate how 
they really do make decisions. There simply is no computer model of decision-making 
that will produce rational cooperators in social dilemma games, but it seems quite 
reasonable to expect that a model such as this one, which includes DMs' beliefs and 
values, could. 
4. CONTRIBUTION TO DECISION PRACTICE 
This study contributes to the field of decision practice by extending the well-
developed, static, prescriptive model of decision-making, EMA V, to a more realistic 
and useful dynamic model of decision-making that incorporates the effects of outcome 
feedback processes. Cybernetic processes such as feedback and control are playing 
increasingly important roles in ecological as well as economic modeling (Jeffers, 1988), 
but the capacity of current decision models to incorporate these processes is primitive. 
Prescriptive decision practice as it exists today is typically a static process that begins 
with a decision-maker evaluating the state of the world and estimating the likely 
outcome ofuncertain events, and ends with the decision-maker's selection of a course 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76 
of action. DMs may improve their decision-making abilities by evaluating the success of 
their past efforts (Russo and Shoemaker, 1989), but the models of the world that DMs 
have to rely on when they evaluate complex decisions are essentially static. 
This is not to say that EMA V does not or cannot take change into account, 
because incorporation ofuncertainty into a decision is one of the main benefits ofush1g 
EMA V; but the only way EMA V can take uncertainty into account is by assigning 
probability estimates to uncertain events and calculating the expected value of the 
outcomes. Decision trees do allow for decision nodes to follow event nodes and, thu~. 
for decisions to be contingent on feedback and external control to some extent. A 
crude model of a feedback loop could be created in a standard decision tree with a 
succession of decision nodes and event nodes, but it would necessarily be very ungair1ly 1 
because the complexity would increase geometrically with the number of iterations 
modeled on a single decision tree. Modeling even a simple choice this way would 
quickly become daunting, and this is most likely a major reason why it is not ordinarily 
done. By providing a straightforward way to model the ongoing interactions- the 
feedback loops- between a DM•s choices and the larger system•s responses to thos~ 
choices, this work provides a very powerful tool for evaluating complex and importar1t 
decisions where feedback may play an important role. 
In its prescriptive mode, decision-making is an optimization process, and it is 
important to note that GAs are already being used for optimization efforts, particularly 
for nonlinear problems (Axelrod, 1987; Ball and Gimblett, 1992; Riolo, 1992). 
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Although Hardin has posited the TOC as a potentially solvable optimization problem 
with multiple, conflicting objectives (Hardin, 1968), he acknowledges that actually 
solving it is probably impossible unless society can agree on priorities and objectives. 
Unfortunately, the TOC, like other social dilemmas, occurs because of conflicting 
objectives on several levels: within-individual, between individuals, between 
generations, and between humans and other species. Because of the hierarchically 
complex relationships among these conflicting objectives, it is difficult to argue that a 
global optimization function could even be defined. 
The GA is a good tool to apply to this kind of problem because its contribution 
is not typically to find the optimal point in a solution space, but rather to identifY a 
relatively better region. lfthe solution space itself is changing, as it is in this work, then 
rather than serving as a global optimization tool, the GA serves as an evolutionary 
simulation tool. It does this by crudely simulating the way evolution acts as a short-
sighted local, rather than a long-term global, optimizing tool itself. 
5. THE TRAGEDY OF MISSING THE POINT 
Hardin's paper, "The Tragedy of the Commons," has been cited over 570 times 
since it was published in 1968 (Trout, 1995). Many, if not most, of the citations, refer 
to his discussion of the difficulties in managing resources that are held in common, and 
they ignore his main point, which was that the difficulties arise because of population 
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growth. It is interesting how reluctant people are to grasp his main point, which he was 
at some pains to make clear (Hardin, 1968, 17): 
The class of "no technical solution problems" has members. My 
thesis is that the "population problem," as conventionally conceived, is a 
member of this class .. .It is fair to say that most people who anguish 
over the population problem are trying to find a way to avoid the evils 
of overpopulation without relinquishing any ofthe privileges they now 
enJoy. 
Yet his essay is often criticized (or praised) by authors who make no mention of 
Hardin's principal thesis, but instead attack (or praise) him for allegedly claiming that 
the tragedy occurs because of common ownership. A typical example is the argument 
that the collapse of ocean fisheries is due not to population pressure, but to common 
ownership: "The current approach to ocean issues has been characterized as a 'tragedy 
ofthe commons' (Hardin 1968). The best way to end the tragedy is to end the 
'commons"' (Jeffreys, 1993, 28). 
Hardin did argue that externalities, and lack of assignable property rights, 
explain why people may overharvest commonses; but he emphasized that this is not a 
problem unless population grows beyond the commons carrying capacity. Hardin did 
not advocate private ownership as a longterm solution, and he did not advocate 
commons ownership either: "Perhaps the simplest summary ofthis analysis of man's 
population problems is this: the commons, if justifiable at all, is only justifiable under 
conditions of low population density" (Hardin, 1968, 28). The solution he advocated 
was limiting population growth, through mutual coercion, mutually agreed on. This 
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point is often completely overlooked; Hardin would probably say it is overlooked 
because of psychological denial: population, he says, is a "taboo" issue. 
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Ecology magazine devoted an entire double issue (March/April, May/June, 
1995) to the problem of overfishing. Included were some lengthy attacks on Hardin's 
"fallacy" of assuming that communal commons management 1could not work and that 
property rights solutions would (Duncan, 1995; Editors, 199i5; Fairlie, Hagler, and 
O'Riordan, 1995). Almost nothing was said in the entire issue about the possibility of 
population growth being the root cause of the problem, nor ~hat population growth 
might interfere with the proposed solutions. Ov€::rfishing was1 held to be a problem of 
distributional equity and overcapitalization. The primary solution advanced was a 
return to simpler technologies and more traditional management based on community 
identification. None of the articles in this double issue mentioned the fact that Hardin 
did not dispute the effectiveness of community-based comm~ms management, as long 
as population is small relative to the commons mgeneration c:apacity; he said that only 
after population grows beyond the commons carrying capacity do problems inevitably 
arise (Hardin, 1968). 
Berkes et al. launched a similar attack 0111 Hardin. They described several 
examples where community identification in tradlitional villages resulted in sustainable 
commons management for centuries, and where commonses 1were destroyed only after 
traditional management was displaced by privati~ation andlot government control 
(Berkes, Feeny, McCay, and Acheson, 1989). A ain, not a word was said about the 
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fact tlu~t in their examples, sustainable management only worked under conditions of 
low population density, and that changes in management occurred simultaneously to, or 
after, population grew beyond the commons carrying capacity. 
In an opinion piece in Scientific American, Monbiot (1994) scathingly 
attacked Hardin's alleged advocacy of privatizing commonses. Monbiotdescribed the 
way a wazing commons in Kenya was destroyed after the commons was privatized, 
again if?noring the role of population growth completely. Responding to Monbiot in a 
letter tq the c~ditor, Hardin argued that the tragedy occurred because the herdsmen 
exceed~d the: commons carrying capacity, not because the commons was privatized: 
Monbiqt, he said, had it "180 degrees the wrong way" (Hardin, 1994, I 0). 
The point here is that any metaphorical model, even one as elegant as Hardin's, 
is in danger of being misunderstood or misapplied, through ignorance, psychological 
denial, pr deliberate intent. Because this research is also metaphorical in a way that is 
similar ·~o Hardin's model, its thesis and its applications could also be misunderstood or 
misapplied. The research question, "Is Hardin right?" is inextricably linked to its logical 
extensi9n: "!light about what?" In the preceding section, for example, methods for 
managing commonses were listed and described at some length, but this work is not 
about how best to manage commonses, any more than Hardin's essay was. The thesis 
of this work iis that Hardin was right in arguing that no social, teclmologica/, or 
econon~ic soJ'ution to natural resource destruction can work over the long run unless 
populal'ion growth is controlled. 
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What this means is that the conclusions of this work only apply to the question 
ofwhether solutions that can be made to work in the best of all possible worlds (i.e., a 
computer simulation of rational decision-making, with a predictable commons, and 
controlled population size), can also be made to work when population is allowed to 
grow. The results say little about the pragmatic aspects of any of the controlled-
population solutions, particularly since the sub-models are based on 11best case, 11 
simplistic, idealized assumptions. The question being investigated is how population 
growth could impact solutions that might work, given a set of idealized assumptions. 
Hardin said that the way population growth will impact any solution is that it will 
eventually make it fail: 11Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all 11 (Hardin, 1968, 29). 
That is also the thesis of this work. 
This concludes the background and problem formulation portions of this 
dissertation. There are two key requirements of a simulation ofthe TOC: (1) it must 
simulate the way individually 11rational11 decision processes of resource managers lead 
to the collectively irrational destruction of a commonly-held resource, and, more 
importantly, (2) it must be capable of simulating the way those decision processes 
might have to change in order to avoid the tragedy. Previous computer simulations 
based on the PD do not meet these requirements because they assume the players 
interact pairwise and know the histories of their interactions, and they do not take into 
account the multiple objectives and considerations of uncertainty as real DMs would 
do. The purpose of this work is to develop a computer simulation that addresses the 
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limitations of previous computer simulations, in order to explore the impacts of 
population growth on existing proposals for solving the TOC, and to provide new 
insights into this important class of problems. 
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The remaining sections of this dissertation describe the methodology and 
findings of the research. In Chapter VI, the methodology of the integrated model is 
described in detail. In Chapter VII, the model development and some results are 
described. In Chapter VIII, the solutions are simulated and discussed. Chapter IX is a 
summary and conclusion. 
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Chapter VI 
MODELING METHODOLOGY 
This simulation models the interactions among the DMs managing a commonly-
held resource and the response of the resource to their actions. The decision processes 
of resource managers are modeled using EMA V from the field of decision theory 
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). The commons is 
modeled using a simple ecological model such as those described by Odum (1969). The 
simulated evolution of decision processes, and the feedback linkage between the DMs 
and the commons, are modeled with artificial life simulation methodology based on 
Holland's (1975) work with GAs. 
This chapter begins with a broad overview of the modeling methodology. In the 
following sections of the chapter, the commons model, GA, decision model, and fitness 
evaluation are described in more detail. 
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1. MODEL OVERVIEW 
In this model, different types ofDMs compete with one another throu~h m1any 
iterations for shares of a regenerating common resource subject to stochastic natural 
disturbances. Hardin's commons was a pasture grazed by cattle, but in this re~earch, the 
commons is a population of fish in a lake, which is fish~d by the people in a nl!arby: 
village. A fishery commons was chosen instead of a grazing commons for thr~e 
reasons: ease of modeling, personal interest, and impontance of the problem. 
Well-developed simple population models offish are readily available, whereas 
it was difficult to know where to begin to model a cattle-and-rangeland comrr)ons 1 
system. Although some cattle are grazed on public lands in the developed wo1·ld, most 
such "commonses" are so tightly regulated that they no longer resemble the kind of 
commons Hardin was discussing. Ocean fisheries, on tlile other hand, are almost 
unavoidably commonses on a world-wide b:asis, because fish move around toq much 
for any one country (let alone any one fishe1r) to mainta.in control over stocks Its 1 
citizens might consider "theirs." In addition, over half the fish eaten today COJ11es fi,-om 
inshore marine commonses locally managed as more Olf less common-access a.rtisanal 
(primitive or subsistence) fisheries (Fairlie, c~t al., 1995). These fisheries typic"lly 1 
provide one-third to one-half of the protein in the parts of the world where p9pulaJtion 
is growing the fastest. The world's fisheries are in an extreme crisis condition: the lJN 
Food and Agriculture Organization rates 7 %of the world's fish stocks as "d(ipleted" 
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or "almost depleted," and total catches have been dropping precipitously all over the 
world (e.g., by a third in the northwest Atlantic over the last 20 years) (Editors, 1995). 
The conceptual model is thus an artisanal fishery: a village and a lake. The DMs are the 
potential fishers in the village, and the commons is the stock of fish in the lake. 
A flowchart of the four interacting model components (the commons model, the 
village model, the decision model, and the GA) is shown in Figure 6.1. At the beginning 
of each iteration i, the state of the commons is x1• The initial population of villagers 
Pop1 consists of a mix of different kinds of decision models. During each iteration of 
time increment L1t, the population grows and changes from Pop; to Pop1+J. and the 
state of the commons changes from x1 to x1+ 1• 
In the "Decision Models" part ofFigure 6.1, the DM genotypes determine how 
each DM will evaluate the current state of the commons and the likely actions by 
others, in order to set up their decision trees. The DMs use those decision trees to 
make choices. ADM who decides to take a unit of the commons is a Taker, and a DM 
who decides not to is a Refrainer. The payoffs received by individual DMs are 
determined by their own choices and their genotypes (their genotypes represent their 
expectations and values), as well as by how many DMs decide to Take, and the new 
state of the commons xi+ 1. 
In the "Commons Model" part ofFigure 6.1, x is decreased by the number of 
Takers, and increased by its regeneration rate, for a net change from the old state x1 to 
the new state of the commons xi+ I· 
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Figure 6.1. Flowchart of the four interacting model components of the TOC 
simulation. 
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In the "GA Model" part ofFigure 6.1, the relative magnitudes of the (>M 
payoffs are used in a simulated lottery to select the genotypes that are used to create 
the population for the next iteration. The selected genotypes are subjected to pmtation 
and recombination to produce the new population Pop1+1, and the cycle starts all over 
again with the next iteration. Because of the probabilistic selection process ofthe GA, 
beliefs and values of DMs that provide relatively higher payoffs in one iterati~>n will 
tend to be relatively more prevalent in the next. However, the commons is chfl.nging 
too, as is the composition of the population, so that DMs who are more succ~ssful 
when the commons is in, say, excellent condition, may not do so well after tht;! 
commons becomes degraded. 
The feedback loops between the DMs and the commons could be stabilizing or 1 
destabilizing, depending on the particular set of conditions and simulation paq1meters. 
For example, ifthe number ofunits of commons harvested is greater than the ~ommons 
regeneration rate, then the state of the commons x will decrease. As x becomes 
increasingly scarce, there is less for the Takers to divide among themselves, bt.lt scarcity 
can increase the price they can get. Pessimists may leave the market but optimists may 
join it. As x declines, some DMs who Refrain for moral reasons may actually get 
more benefit from a lower level of x because they feel more virtuous about nqt Taking 
from a threatened commons than they would about not Taking from an abund11nt 
commons. If potential Takers leave the market (i.e., become Rejrainers) then ;'C can 
again increase, eventually attracting more Takers back into the market, and th~ cycle 
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repeats. This feedback loop does not necessarily lead to stability in this model nor in 
the real world: it could lead instead to an uns~able cycle or an irreversible collapse of 
the commons, depending on the relationship between the rate of change of the numbers 
of Takers, the time lags, and the :stochastic regeneration rate of the commons. 
For example, ifx falls below the Ieveii at which the commons can regenerate 
itself (its Minimum Viable Levellv!VL), the change is irreversible, so even if there are 
no Takers, it cannot recover. On the other hand, if the regeneration rate of the 
commons is faster than the growth rate of Takers, there is little to check extraction 
growth, at least for awhile. As the regeneration rate and/or the extraction growth rate 
changes, then at any one iteration it is impossible to say which way the net feedback 
mechanism will be working. Whether the effect of these interactions is ultimately to 
accelerate or retard any changes depends on how tightly coupled the DM model and 
the commons model are, and the relative magnitude and sign of changes in the 
commons and the DM population composition over any series of iterations. 
Simulated evolution here is not simulated biological evolution, but it is rather a 
mathematical tool used for modelling social cfuange. What "evolves" in this model is the 
values and beliefs of the population that uses lthe commons, not the genetic material 
carried in the cells of human beings. The onl~ biological elements simulated in this 
model are the commons regeneration and the1increase in numbers ofthe human 
population. Population growth is simulated a$ a simple exponential growth function, 
driven by unidentified factors tha have nothimg to do with the GA nor with this model. 
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The GA simulates changes in beliefs and values inside the heads of real people 
as they observe the results of their actions and those of other people. The distribution 
of genotypes in each new population ofDMs at the end of each iteration is not a 
distribution of actual progeny of living decision-making people, but a distribution of 
beliefs and values held by living decision-making people (see the 11Fitness11 section later 
in this chapter). 
The interacting sub-models ofFigure 6.1 represent a simplistic picture of the 
interaction between human decision making and a natural resource. Garrett Hardin's 
formulation of the TOC was even simpler, however. This research is based on an 
argument that his metaphorical model was an inadequate representation of reality, and 
that the proposed model is better. It is not being claimed here that the proposed model 
is an adequate representation of reality, but only that it is an improvement over 
Hardin's. The direction of improvement is defined to be the direction of model 
complexity that helps increase understanding of how this difficult problem may be 
solved. 
In the real world, the commons dilemma is so complex that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to think about unless it is somehow simplified. The great advantage of very 
simple metaphors like Hardin's TOC is that they are easy to understand and intuitively 
appealing. Their simplicity lends them a logical neatness that makes the resulting 
conclusions highly compelling. The danger is that their very simplicity, intuitive appeal, 
and compelling conclusions may in some important cases not be faithful enough to the 
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real world flor th~ condusions to be valid. 
If the simple mC>del is suspected of being not quite faithful enough to the real 
world to solve ar) important problem, then a more complex model may be required. 
Unfortunate:ly, a~ a model becomes more complex it may be even more diflicult to 
assess its validity because the difficulty in thinking about the model increa~es as the 
model complexity incmases. Just because the world is more complex than a siq1ple 
I 
model does not mean tl1mt a more complex model is necessarily any more valid 1 than the 
simple one. 
One way to go :about model development is to start with a very simple model 
(such as the TO~:) that :is believed to be realistic under some simple set of 
circumstances, and add1 one or two new aspects (such as probability estim~tes, I 
consideration of ~onsci1ence, and feedback loops) that are thought to be p~>tentiially 
important. If the~e new: elements change the outcomes under the simple s~t of 
circumstances, and are arguably important in the real world, then further i\westigation 
of the imp011anc~ and impacts of these new elements might be justified. Tpe results 
would not neces~arily nllean that the new, more complex model is making ~orrect 
predictions; they would: only indicate that something important that was le.ft ou1t has 
now been added, and that additional important aspects of the problem are beini~ 
considered. Mor~ lines of inquiry may then be opened, and progress towards a more 
accurate pn dictQr mod1el, and greater depth and breadth of understanding, can:be 
made. If the new elements do not change the outcomes from the simpler model, then 
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this finding should help validate the simpler model; it should not, however, necessarily 
halt the search for more helpful models when the conclusions produced by the simpler 
models are so pessimistic. 
The remaining four sections of this chapter provide more detailed discussions 
about how the commons is modeled, how the GA works, how the DMs make their 
decisions, and how fitness is assessed. 
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2. THE COMMONS 
A simple generic model of a commons is used. The state of the commons is 
expressed as the number of units x available. The nominal regeneration function r(x) is 
based on a logistic population model, where the rate of change of x depends on the 
current state x (Grant, 1986, 248): 
dX(x) 2 (6.1) r(x) = --= r0 x - r0 x IK dt 
where x is the state of the commons, r0 is the regeneration rate constant, K is 
the maximum value x can be, and r(x) is the rate of change of the commons dxldt, at a 
particular commons state x (see Figure 6.2). 
The discrete version ofEq. (6.1) used in the simulation is: 
(6.2) r(xJ = r0 x1 -r0 x/!K 
where r(xJ = x1• 1 - x1• 
The state of the commons is determined not only by its nominal regeneration 
function r(x), but also by the DMs' actions and Nature's stochasticity. Stochastic 
regeneration is represented as a nonnal distribution N with mean r(x) and a standard 
deviation that is proportional to the mean. The parameter Stoch determines the 
proportionality constant (i.e., Stoch is the coefficient of variation, or the standard 
deviation normalized by the mean). 
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Figure 6.2. Nominal common~ regeneration rate curve, for r0 = 0.04. 
The change in state of the cqmmons during any iteration (from "initial state" x1 
to "new state" x1+ 1 in Figure 6.1) is ~ietermined by the initial state of the commons x1, by 
actions of the current population ofDMs ~i.e., the number of Takers 1';), stochasticity 
Stach, and the commons regeneratiqn rate~r(xJ, or: 
(6.3) X;+1= x1 -1i + N{r(x1), Stach * r(.t';)} 
where N{ r(x1), Stach * r(x;)} is a normal distribution with mean r(xJ and 
standard deviation Stach "' r(xJ. 
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3. THE GENETIC ALGORITHM 
GAs work by simulating evolutionary adaptation. In the computer code, each 
individual in an evolving population is represented by a string (the "g~notype") of 
binary variables (the "genes"), each of which assumes a value from the set of possible 
values ("alleles"). 
GAs were developed by researchers interested in simulating life processes. on 
computers (Holland, 1992). In these biological models, genotypes represent individuals 
in a population whose evolution is being simulated. Selection for reproduction in 1each 
successive generation is a function of the "fitness" of each individual relative to the rest 
of the population. "Fitness" is a measure of the relative score an indivjdual gets oirl 
some mathematical function intended to represent natural selection processes. 
When a GA is used as an optimization tool, an optimization problem is defined 
by the objective function, which serves as a selection or "fitness" function. The 1 
potential solutions to the optimization problem are represented as sinwlated genotypes, 
and the "fitness" function is used to select relatively better genotypes ;t1nd discard 1 
poorer ones, until a relatively optimal set of potential solutions is ideQtified. In Nature, 
evolution may be viewed as an ever-changing optimization problem tt.1at requires 
acquiring resources such as food that are necessary for living long enqugh to rear~ viable 
offspring. Because of the growing recognition that nature's optimization methods! can 
be used computationally by humans, GAs are now being widely used ~s extremely 
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powerful global optimization tools for complex nonlinear problems in many fields, 
including business, economics, and engineering. In these applications, a genotype 
represents a point in the domain of a function being optimized. The value of the 
function at that point is treated as the individual's "fitness." The points that correspond 
to higher values of the function being optimized are the most "fit" and thus eventually 
come to dominate the population. 
In this work, the GA is used a computational tool for simulating evolution 
rather than as an optimization tool. The "fitness" function is not some constant function 
being maximized (or minimized) as it would be in an optimization problem, but is 
instead a computational tool for simulating a selection process. Payoffs received by 
the DMs are used as the selection mechanism. Because the actual payoffs depend on 
the state of the commons and the behavior of the DMs, DM characteristics that might 
be optimal when the commons is in one condition may not be as optimal when it is in a 
different condition. The definition of"optimal" changes as the commons changes, and 
so the GA is generating the dynamics of the simulation, rather than solving an 
optimization problem. 
In this GA, each new iteration is formed by a simulated lottery process 
("Lottery selection for reproduction" in the "Genetic Algorithm" part of Figure 6.1 ). In 
this lottery, pairs of genomes2 are randomly selected (with replacement) from the 
2 A geno(vpe is a particular, unique combination of alleles, but a genome could be any genotype. In the 
case where there arc eight possible combinations of alleles, there arc eight genotypes. The number of 
genomes is the population size. 
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current population Pop;, and their payoffs are compared. The genome with the higher 
payoff in each pair has a higher probability TSProb of being copied to the pool of 
genomes from which the new population Pop1+1 will be constructed (Riolo, 1992). If 
TSProb is 1.0, then the higher-"fitness" member of each pair is always copied to the 
next iteration's progenitor pool; if TSProb is less than 1.0, then a larger stock oflower-
"fitness" members is more likely to be retained. Note that these genomes are not the 
new population, but are instead the progenitors of the new population. Genomes are 
selected and discarded in this way until the desired population size is reached. There 
are other ways of forming the progenitor pool which may be better for more complex 
problems (Goldberg, 1989), and this simple method might not have worked so well if 
there were more than three genes with two alleles each (Riolo, 1992). Tltis algorithm 
was simple to use and worked well here, however. In particular, the ability to maintain 
diversity via the TSProb parameter turned out to be very important to the results (see 
Chapter VII). 
In the next step, pairs of genomes from the new progenitor pool are again 
randomly selected, this time without replacement. Each gene in each genome is 
subjected to the possibility of mutation, where the value of the gene is randomly 
"flipped" (i.e., from I to 0 or vice versa), with some low probability mr (e.g., 0.001). 
Next, a crossover site along the binary string representing the genome is randomly 
selected, and the two individuals swap genome segments at this crossover point. For 
example, if the first progenitor of a pair is represented as { 110} and the second 
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progenitor is { 0 II } , and the crossover point is between the second and third positions, 
then the two new indiividuals are { Ill } and { 0 I 0}. The progenitors themselves 
disappear; they are alii replaced with their offspring. 
It is this process of recombination that gives GAs their computational power 
(Holland, 1992). The: croslsover operator creates new combinations of genes each 
iteration, although when there are only three genes to a genome, and two alleles per 
gene, there is not a lot of variety to rearrange. Groups of alleles ("schemata") that are 
particularly advantageous !represent partial solutions to the "fitness" problem, and, 
particularly if the genes are adjacent in the genome, tend to occur more often than less 
advantageous schemata. Fm example, in the example of the previous paragraph, if 
genotypes with the s1;hema {II**} tend to have higher average "fitness" than { 01 *} 
(the* is a wildcard charadter that means the bit could be 0 or 1), then {II*} will tend 
to occur more often iin successive iterations. 
In the computer code, each genotype consists of a binary array in which each 
variable corresponds to some component of the DM's decision function such as a 
probability table or an attribute weight. At each iteration, the algorithm decodes the 
genotype array to obtain tlhe necessary decision variables, which it then uses to form 
multi-attribute value functions (described later in this chapter, in the "Decision Model" 
section) on which tlu~ choice is made. The magnitude ofthe payoff a DM receives, 
relative to the rest o the population, determines the probability that a particular DM 
genotype will be sele ~ted as a progenitor to the next iteration, and thus will be 
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particularly advantageous appear more often in the population. The definition of 
"advantageous" is a moving target, however: genotypes that are relatively successful 
when the commons is in good shape may not be so successful when the commons is 
degraded. 
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This is an important feature of this GA: the "fitness" function itself changes 
over time. The actions of the DMs impact the commons, and the commons provides the 
payoffs. However, the commons also changes because of its stochastic regeneration. 
Payoffs are not fixed by some explicit "fitness" function as when GAs are used for 
optimization. When GAs are used for optimization problems, the "fitness" functions are 
fixed, known, mathematical functions. In contrast, Nature's "fitness" functions are 
implicit; that is, they emerge over time from the interactions among the living members 
of an ecosystem, and between those members and their environment. The selection 
process in this study is more nearly implicit than selection processes used in most 
artificial life simulations, because ofthe feedback loop between the DMs and the 
commons. As a result, the most "fit" genotypes at one iteration may not be the most 
"fit" at a later iteration, because the commons will have changed; in a sense, the 
"fitness" function also evolves. 
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4. THE VILLAGE MODEL 
The village model consists of only one calculation, namely, exponential 
population growth. The exponential growth function for a population Pop at time t, 
with a growth rate of G, is (Gillett, 1981, 361 ): 
(6.4) Pop(l} = Pop(O} * exp(Gt) 
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Exponential population growth is discretized in the simulation by defining the 
population of interest as the maximum total number of potential Takers, at any iteration 
i, to be Tmax; (this assumption is discussed in the 11Decision Model11 section of this 
chapter) and assuming the time elapsed during an iteration is L1t. Then Eq. (6.4) 
becomes: 
(6.5) Tmax i+J = Tmax; + Tmax; * exp(G L1t) 
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5. THE DECISION MODEL 
Seven factors determine a DM's choice: the decision rule, decision attribu~es, 
single-attribute value functions, attribute weights, beliefs, and the multi-attribute value 
function (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). In this model, all DMs use 
maximization of expected multiattribute value (EMA V) as their decision rule. Th~ir 
single-attribute value functions, attribute weights, and beliefs vary according to their 
genotypes. 
The first step in developing an EMA V model is to determine the attribute& that 
best reflect the values of the DMs, and determine the appropriate mathematical fo.rm 
for each single-attribute value function. The next step is to derive weighting factors for 
the attributes in order to make them commensurable. Finally, a combining rule is 4sed 
to compute the total value of the weighted single-attribute functions (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976). Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) recommend starting with the 
simplest possible functions, only adding more complexity if sensitivity analyses reveal a 
need to do so. 
For this research, the decision attributes must represent not only the self-
interested profit motives acknowledged in Hardin's metaphor, but also more socially or 
morally responsible values as well. 
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Pure self interest: profit 
Hardin said that a herdsman's only payoff is the proceeds of sale, and the 
extraction costs are negligible because they are shared by many (Hardin, 1968). The 
pure self-interest or "profit" attribute rc represents Hardin's assumed payoff. rc is a 
simple supply-dependent marginal profit function reflecting declining marginal returns. 
Although Hardin did not include any modifications, in this model the marginal 
profit function can be modified by subtracting extraction costs, taxes, or penalties from 
the sales price. In the base model it is assumed that each Taker is successful and 
catches one unit of fish per iteration, and so the supply T available to consumers is 
always equal to the number of Takers. In the base model, marginal profit dwdT, or rt, 
is a per-unit function that is linearly proportional to the supply T: 
(6.6) Jl'(J) = ff,ax(J- T/ Tmax) 
where Tmax is the maximum possible supply, equal to the maximum possible number of 
Takers. 
Marginal returns are assumed to be declining, and so as the number of fish 
harvested goes up, the price per fish goes down (see Figure 6.3). The slope is 
-rc',ar/T,,,"' where n'ma:cis the maximum possible marginal profit and T,ax is the total 
number of possible fishers. The magnitude ofthis slope is the profit function parameter 
k. 
If the entire population of potential fishers Tmax chooses to Take, the market is 
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assumed to be saturated. Each can then receive only the minimum profit, which is zero: 
n'(F,,cv;) = 0. If none ofthem chooses to Take, the potential profit any ome ofthem 
could get if they did Take (i.e., the marginal pmfit for n'(O')) would be the maximum 
1C'nurc. The maximum per-unit profit is determitned by the slope of the marginal profit 
function and the total population of potential fishers T,,ax. I 
Profit Function 
Max 
SuJpply 
Figure 6.3. Marginal profit as a linear function of supply. The maximum 
supply is equal to the maximum possible number of Takers, T mllX• which 
occurs when all the potential fishers choo:se to Take. 1 I 
Tnnx 
Each DM's total profit per iteration n(l') is the marginal profit n'(f) times the 
number of units taken. Unless otherwise specified, the number of units Taken by a 
particular DM is always assumed to be one. Thus, 1l(T) = tJ)n'(F) := n'(I'). 
The total population consists of potential fishers as1 well as potenttial consumers, 
and so demand for fish grows as population grows. In a re~I village, the pumber of 
potential fishers may or may not increase prop rtionately to the number of consumers, 
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and it is difficult to justifY any particular assumption about their relative growth. In the 
absence of any compelling reason for assuming otherwise, it is simplest to assume that 
the increase in the number of potential fishers is proportionate to th~ increase in 
number of consumers. With this assumption, the requirement that the market is 
saturated when all the potential fishers choose to Take is consistent for aU population 
sizes, and so the marginal price sinks to zero at the right hand side ofthe1graph (Figure 
6.3) for any population size. However, even given this simplifYing a~sumption, there 
are still two questions: what happens to the slope, and what happen~ to they-intercept, 
of the marginal profit function when population increases? 
While it does seem safe to assume that demand increases witn increasing 
population, the question is how increasing demand should be repres~nted1 with the 
marginal profit function. The marginal profit function slopes for diff~rent1population 
sizes do not have to be parallel, or even linear, but it would be difficiJlt to argue that the 
slopes would not be negative (i.e., that marginal price would not deqrease with 
increasing supply). Three possibilities seem most reasonable: (1) a single marginal 
profit function for all population sizes, (2) constant slope but differe11t y-intercepts, or 
(3) constant y-intercept but different slopes. 
1. Single marginal profit function for all populations 
It could be assumed that there is some maximum possible population Pop,ax 
beyond which the potential fisher population could not grow, and thc,lt there is only one 
profit function that covers all possible population sizes. Then at any population size 
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Tma.~ < Pop,ax the requirement that the market be saturated when all potential fishers 
in a particular population decide to Take (n' (ImaJ = 0) would be eliminated. The 
market would only be saturated if all the potential fishers in the maximum possible 
population Pop,~ decided to Take (n' (PopmaJ = 0). Such a marginal profit function 
would look like Figure 6.3, but the equation of the marginal profit function would be 
slightly different because T,ax would be replaced with Pop,~: 
(6.7) n'(I) = n',~(J- Tl Pop,aJ 
2. Constant slope for all population sizes 
Another approach is to assume that as the population grows, the slope remains 
the same, and the market is saturated when all potential fishers Take, for any 
population size. In this case, they-intercept ff111ax must increase as the population of 
potential fishers grows. Each population size would have its own, parallel, profit 
., . 
function with the same slope k = ko but a different y-intercept n'max· In other words, as 
the population grows, the curve moves out, away from the origin, as shown in Figure 
6.4. 
In this case, the equation for the marginal profit function becomes: 
(6.8) n'(I) = ko (T,ax - T) 
;r 
where ko = ___!!1!!!. = constant. 
T nl/lJ( 
In Eq. (6.8), since the slope ko is constant, as the number of potential fishers 
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Tmax increases, so must they-intercept 1!' max . The marginal profit function is a function 
only of the (constant) slope and (1'111ax - T), which is the total number of Refrainers. 
Max 
-!;: e ... 
~ 
Profit functions for different 
populations 
Constant slope 
··········· ... __ Initial Pop 
······ 
Supply 
Figure 6.4. Marginal profit as a linear function of supply, at two population 
sizes, with constant slope. The dashed-line graph Is for the lower, initial 
population size. The higher population size is twice that. The profit is zero 
when the supply is equal to the maximum possible number of Takers for a 
given population size, which occurs when all the potential fishers choose to 
Take. 
3. Constant y-intercept for all population sizes 
A third way to handle profit functions for different population sizes is to allow 
the slope to change so that they-intercept remains a constant ff111ax0 (see Figure 6.5). In 
this case, the maximum marginal price does not change with population size. 
The equation for the marginal profit function is then the same as Eq. (6.6), but 
the difference is that T,,ax increases over time: 
(6.9) Jl'(T) = ffmax0 (J- T/ T,,ax} 
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There are two significant differences between Eq. (6.9) and Eq. (6. 7). First, in 
Eq. (6.9), the maximum possible profit is proportional to the fraction of the current 
population that decides to Take, whereas in Eq. (6. 7), the maximum possible profit is 
proportional to the fraction ofthe maximum possible population that decides to Take. 
Second, in Eq. (6.7) the market is only saturated ifthe village is at its maximum 
population and all potential fishers decide to Take, whereas in Eq. (6.9) the market is 
saturated when all the potential fishers in any size village decide to Take. 
Max 
Profit functions for different populations 
Constant y-intcrccpt 
· .. 
Supply 
Figure 6.5. Marginal profit as a linear function of supply, at two population 
sizes, with maximum marginal profit held constant. The dashed-line graph is 
for the lower population size, and the higher population size Is twice that. The 
profit is zero when the supply is equal to the maximum possible number of 
Takers for a given population size, which occurs when all the potential fishers 
choose to Take. 
The marginal profit functions shown above are essentially demand curves, 
although in an economics text, supply is assumed to be a function of price (Gwartney 
and Stroup, 1980), rather than the other way around as it is here. If the market is 
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always assumed to be at equilibrium, then the distinction does not matter. 
The components of profit - prices and costs - are treated rather cavalierly 
here because it is simply assumed that per-unit (marginal) profit (per-unit price minus 
per-unit costs) increases linearly as supply drops. Extraction costs are not in general a 
direct function of the number of Takers, as price would be, but are more ordinarily a 
function of the state of the commons; there is no simple relationship between profit as a 
function of number of Takers, and extraction costs. Hardin treated extraction costs as 
negligible (Hardin, 1968). Here, costs are assumed to be incorporated into the 
marginal profit function. 
The decreasing slopes in any of the marginal profit functions shown above 
imply that the marginal price that consumers are willing to pay is determined by supply 
(the number offish that are caught). However, the supply and demand relationship in 
this simulation is not quite that straightforward: the number offish that are caught is 
determined by the various fishermen's decision trees, which include speculations about 
how many others will Take, and hence the profit the DMs will be able to get. In that 
sense, supply is determined by anticipated demand. In these decision trees marginal 
profit is not the only attribute, however, because these potential fishers also may 
consider other attributes such as the one called "Conscience", which is not discussed in 
basic economics textbooks. The relationship between profit and supply is thus circular 
in the model, as it generally is in the real world. 
All the marginal profit curves shown above have constant slopes, which means 
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that demand is relatively more elastic in the high price range than in the low end: when 
an already-high price goes up, consumers are more sensitive to unit pric·e changes nnd 
will tend to switch to substitutes or otherwise refrain from consuming that resource. IIf 
there are a lot offish on the market and the price is low, consumers are more accepting 
of unit price changes and will pay the increased price. In general, the more vital a 
resource is perceived to be, relative to consumers' ability to pay (e.g., emergency 
medical care or drinking water), the less elastic its demand (Gwartney and Stroup, 
1980). If fish are the only source of protein in a village, the slope of any of the curve~ 
above will be nearly vertical because the underlying demand curves are relatively 
inelastic; but if lots of substitutes are easily available, the slope of the demand curve, 1 
and also the marginal profit function, will be relatively flae. 
A final complication in the single attribute value function for profit is that 
because subjective marginal value tends, for many people, to decline as 1the objective! 
value increases for most goods (Gwartney and Stroup, 1980; Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976), the subjective value of a particular profit to a particular DM could be different 
from the monetary value. Hardin ignored this effect because he assumed that the value 
of each additional unit was always + 1. If the subjective marginal value of profit were 1 
declining (e.g., the OMs were risk-averse), then the subjective profit functions would 
be as shown in the lower line ofthe graph in Figure 6.6. 
3 
"Flat" to an economist means parallel to the vertical axis; but to everyone else, it n cans parallel to 
the horizontal axis, and tlmt is what it means here. 
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Profit Function 
---Unit price 
··················· Subj. Value 
Supply T1mx 
Figure 6.6. Subjective marginal profit function (dotted line) and objective 
value function (solid line). 
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The subjective marginal profit value function, which includes declining marginal 
value (shown with the dashed line in Figure 6.6) is related to the objective marginal 
profit function by (Keeney, 1992, 143): 
(6.10) SMV(n') =a- p(exp(-yn')) 
where a and p are constants required to normalize the marginal profit function n', and 
y determines the rate of decrease of the subjective value function SMV with increasing 
marginal profit n'. 
Any of the three potential ways of handling the marginal profit function 
discussed above can be modified to account for declining marginal value. The question 
remains, however: Which of the marginal profit functions for growing populations is 
the most realistic? The advantage of assuming constant slope as in Figure 6.4 is the 
consistency of functional form across population sizes. In addition, both a basic 
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economics textbook (Gwartney andl Stroup, 1980) and a handbook on ~conomic 
analysis ofbiodiversity (Pearce and !Moran, 1994) assume the constant ~lope ~ersion 
(Figure 6.4); neither evep discussed· any other possibility for population groW[th. 
Because of this, as well ~s the consistency of form advantage, the assumptiorl of 
constant slope (Figure 6.4) was used in the simulations unless otherwis~ specified. 
Fortunately, as it. turns out, which of the above formulations is 4sed does not 
matter to the ultimate cqnclusion, a10d whether or not declining SMV is included does 
not matter either; all tha~ matters is lthe assumption that demand grows with increasing 
population, and that it is. subject to declining marginal returns. 
Conscience 
The second attri~mte value function in the decision trees is calle~l the 1 
"Conscience" function C'(x). C(x) isla simple linear function that reward!) some OMs for 
Refraining and/or penal\zes them for Taking. It represents concerns for the rights and 
needs of other people aqd/or other species, now and in the future. 
"Conscience" is ~xpressed as a linear per-unit or marginal function C'(x), where 
the conscience paramet~r m determines the slope (see Figure 6. 7): 
(6.11) C'(x) = -mx + C'max 
In each iteration, each OM decides !Whether or not to Take one unit of qommons, and 
so the total "Conscience" payoff per DM C(x) is the per-unit payoff C'(+) times the 
number of units Taken Qr Refrained. Because it is assumed that the decision ns whether 
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Conscience Function 
Commons, x Max 
Figur~ 6.7. Marginal "Conscience" function. The state of the commons is x. 
or not to Takf! one unit of commons, C(x) is simply 1.0 * C'(x) (note that x is the state 
of the comm~ms, not the number of units Taken). This makes the distinction between 
C(x) and C'(JC) computationally irrelevant, and thus for convenience the C' notation will 
\ 
be dropped. The theoretical distinction between a marginal attribute and a nonmarginal 
attribute is si~nifidant, however, because nonmarginal attribute value functions do not 
depend on th~ DM's choice and thus may drop out of decision trees4. If C(x) were 
independent 9f ch~ice (i.e., if it were a nonmarginal attribute), only the profit function 
would be represented in the decision trees and the role of social or moral 
consideratioQs would be overlooked in the simulations. It is also difficult to imagine a 
"Conscience'1 function that rewarded or penalized a person for the ethical elements of a 
decision, but did not depend on that person's choice. 
4 Nonmarginal attributes drop out of decision trees only if the event nodes arc also conditionally 
independent of the choice, as they arc in this work; otherwise they may not. 
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Note in Figure 6.7 that the magnitude ofC(x) increases as the commons 
b~:comes degraded. No DM feels particularly guilty about Taking (or virtuous about 
Refraining) if the commons is in excellent condition; when x is at its maximum, K, then 
the marginal conscience function is assumed to be zero. Thus, since m = Cmax I K: 
(6i.12) C(x) = m(K-x) 
The negative slope of C(x) means that each commons unit becomes more 
important as the total number of them decreases. This is consistent with the way North 
American law and social mores apparently work: more resources are invested in trying 
t01 save or protect species that are perceived to be threatened or endangered, and there 
are often penalties for harming them as well as rewards for helping them. The moral 
and legal implications of killing a sockeye salmon in Idaho, where they are severely 
endangered, are more severe that they would be for killing a sockeye salmon in Alaska, 
where they are still plentiful. 
Modeling conscience as a linear mathematical function that depends only on the 
state of the commons and the DM's choice is a great simplification of the kinds of 
things people take into account that might be grouped under "Conscience," as well as 
of the shapes different people's "Conscience" functions might have. Conscience could 
imclude judgments about distributional equity, both inter- and intra-generational, and 
even judgments about the rights of other organisms. Etzioni urges that economists 
m::knowledge the "I&We" dimension of values, which takes into account the weight 
that people put on responsibilities to others (Etzioni, 1988). Some environmental 
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ethicists hold that human economic activities that lead to species extinctions are 
morally wrong (Ehrenfeld, 1981 ). A religious argument can be made either in favor of 
Taking or in favor of Refraining, depending on which part of the Bible one favors: 
Ehrenfeld, for example, argues that God gave humans the responsibility to care for His 
creation, but the Wise Use movement argues that God gave humans the responsibility 
to exploit His creation for their own ends (Ehrenfeld, 1981). To them, virtue would 
accrue for Taking and guilt for Refraining. Such a possibility is not included in the DM 
typology here: virtue is assigned to Refraining but not to Taking. The discussion about 
conscience-related solutions in the literature indicates that virtue applies to Refraining, 
and that is the assumption here as well. 
Judgments about the morality of an act could also depend on what other people 
do. This would produce a "Conscience" function C(x, T) that is dependent on the state 
of the commons x as well as the number of Takers T. Such a function would be even 
more problematic to construct than the simple one shown in Figure 6. 7, however. For 
example, one kind of person might believe that if most others are going to Take, then it 
is morally acceptable to go along with the crowd even if the commons is endangered; 
but another person might conclude that it is even more important to Refrain if others 
are going to be so irresponsible. Would C(x, T) increase or decrease with the number of 
Takers? Hardin argued that it is the condition of the commons that determines the 
morality of an act: "the morality of an act is a fimction of the state of the system at the 
time it is pe1jormed Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general 
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public under frontier conditions, because there is no public; the same behavior in a 
metropolis is unbearable" (Hardin, 1968, 22, italics in original). To keep the model 
simple, Hardin's assumption is maintained here: the "Conscience" function is only a 
function of the state ofthe commons (and the DM's choice). 
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Because the "Conscience" payoff reflects the moral considerations of a "do not 
Take" decision rule, and the DMs assume that their individual actions have negligible 
effect on the commons, C(x) reflects a deontological principle. To a deontologist, 
killing one of the last Idaho sockeye salmon is morally wrong, and thus so is killing one 
of many Alaska sockeye salmon: the act itself- killing fish - determines the 
morality, not the result of the act or the state of the system. However, there is also a 
rule-based utilitarian aspect to this function because the magnitude of C(x) does depend 
on the state ofthe commons, even ifthat state is independent of a particular DM's 
choice: the magnitude of the "Conscience" penalty (or reward) increases as its relative 
effect on the commons increases. In this sense, killing one of many Alaska sockeye 
salmon would not carry as much moral weight as killing one of the last Idaho sockeye 
salmon because the degree of harm that results from the act depends on the state, and 
vulnerability, ofthe system. 
In addition to factors that might be included in a "Conscience" function, there 
are certainly other assumptions that could be made about its shape. For example, it 
could be argued that if the commons is in very bad condition, some people would feel 
that they may as well Take, since the commons is already ruined. They might also feel 
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that if the commons is in very good condition, Taking a unit would not matter either; 
only somewhere in the middle would conscience matter to them. C(x) might then be 
shaped like an inverted "U," with the peak somewhere near Xmax /2. 
"Conscience" could also be a discontinuous step function, reflecting the idea 
that for x greater than, say, Xmax 12, a DM would not feel any particular guilt about 
Taking (or sense of virtue for Refraining), but below that threshold concerns about 
ruining the commons would increase. It could then increase monotonically over some 
range as x declines, and possibly at the lower end of the commons condition, there 
could be another step (either up or down). The Endangered Species Act, for example, 
"kicks in" at two levels: when a species is classified as "threatened" (a small number of 
individuals remain), and when it is "endangered" (very few individuals remain). Species 
or populations that are in danger of meeting criteria for listing under the Endangered 
Species Act are sometimes classified as "sensitive," and receive increased funding and 
management efforts intended to prevent their falling into the "threatened" or 
"endangered" categories. The levels of funding and effort do not increase smoothly 
along a continuum from "sensitive" to "endangered," and the moral aspects associated 
with Taking or Refraining from Taking may not increase smoothly either. 
Finally, C(x) could be a higher-order or exponential function, either over the 
whole range of x or over any segment of a discontinuous or nonmonotonic function. 
A case could be made for any of these possible formulations of conscience; this 
seems, in fact, to suggest a rich area for further research. For example, government 
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funding levels for restoration efforts for species such as salmon could be analyzed, or 
decision-analytic value function elicitation methods could be used, to derive something 
like "Conscience functions" for a variety of people. Occam's razor as well as 
prescriptive decision theory (e.g., Keeney, 1992; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) 
suggest using the simplest reasonable representation, and evaluating the potential 
effects of using other functional forms via sensitivity analyses (discussed in Chapter 
VIII). The simplest reasonable form would probably be a declining linear function such 
as Eq. (6.11). It is probably impossible to come up with a universal scale for 
"Conscience", let alone to determine how people might trade off greed and guilt. It is 
not the purpose of this research to take on such a task, but only to include a very crude 
approximation of the way "Conscience" might be used to offset greed in Hardin's 
simple metaphor, and to investigate whether it can be used to dispute Hardin's 
argument that no solution, including "appeals to conscience," will work in the face of 
growing human population. 
Whatever form or definition a "Conscience" function might take, to Hardin's 
herdsmen only profit mattered. In effect, their attribute weight for "Conscience" was 0, 
and their attribute weight for profit was 1.0. In tllis model, as in Hardin's metaphor, this 
type of DM always Takes. In contrast, a hard core conservationist would give no 
weight to profit and full weight to "Conscience", thus reversing the attribute weights. 
Tllis kind ofDM always Refrains. Hardin's herdsmen are represented as "Type I" DMs 
(see Table 1), and hard core preservationists are represented as "Type IV" DMs. 
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DM payoffType Payoff for Payoff for 
Tai'cing one Refraining 
uniit one unit 
I. Hard core Taker ;r(T') 0 
II. DM with mild conscience ;r(11) - C(x)) 0 
III. Temptable conservationist ;r(Z)- C(x) C(x) 
IV. Hard core Conservationist 0 I C(x) 
Table I. The four DM payoff Types and their pjayoffs. ;r(T) is the profit payoff, 
and C(x) is "Conscience" payoff ror Taking or Refraining one unit. C(x) 
represents guilt in the "Payoff for Taking'' column, and virtue in the "Payoff 
for Refraining'' column. 
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There are two intermediate DM Types along the continuum from the hard core 
Taker Type I, to the hard core Refrainer Type IV. lA Type II DM feels guilt for Taking 
but feels no particular virtue for RejrQining. This DM's total payoff for Taking is 
decreased by an amount C(x), but the payoff for Refraining is still 0. A Type II will 
Take until the commons declines to a fow enough l.evel that greed is overcome by guilt. 
Like the Type II's, Type III DMs feel guilt in the amount C(x) when Taking, but 
they also feel virtuous for Refraining. Like a Type'IV, a Type III is a preservationist, 
but unlike a Type IV, a Type III will qe tempted away from the "virtuous" choice if the 
commons is in fairly good shape ancl/qr thepotenti<H profit becomes substantial. 
A decision tree would indicate algebraically that Type III DMs place twice the 
weight on C(x) as do Type II's, becau~;e from a decision tree viewpoint it does not 
matter whether the "Conscience" payqff for Refraining is subtracted from the Taking 
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payoff or added to the Refraining payoff. However, if C(x) were reflected only in Type 
III's payoff for Taking, it would mean that the actual payoff for Refraining would be 
the same for Types II and III. Since actual payoffs are used as measures of relative 
fitness by the GA, it does matter to the GA which side of the decision equation C(x) is 
on. 
Note that the numerical value of C(x) at any iteration i is the same for all four 
DM payoff Types; but whether that value C(x) is subtracted from a DM's Take payoff 
and/or is added to the Refrain payoff depends on whether the DM is Type}= I, II, III 
or IV. The DM Type is determined by two genes g1 and g2 in the genome5. The alleles 
for g1 and g2 correspond to the coefficients of C(x) in the payoffs shown in Table I (see 
Table II). The coefficient of 7I(T) is determined by adding g1 and g2 : if the sum is less 
than 1.0, then the coefficient of 7I(T) is 1.0 (Types I, II, and III); otherwise it is 0.0 
(Type IV). 
DM payoffType CI C1 
I. Hard core Taker 0 0 
II. DM with mild conscience -1 0 
III. Temptable conservationist -1 1 
IV. Hard core Conservationist 0 1 
Table II. The four DM payoff Types and the alleles for the two genes g1 and 
g2• The alleles correspond to the coefficients of C(x) in Table I. 
5 There arc three genes in the gcnomcs. go is the gene that determines whcUtcr the DM is an optimist 
(g0 =1) or a pessimist (g0 =0). 
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To put this mathematically, at iteration i the 11Conscience11 payoff Vc can be 
expressed as a function of the state of the commons x, the DM Typej, the OM's alleles 
for genes g1 and g2 and the DM choic~ z: : 
(6.13) 
where z =0 for Refrain, and 1. .. 0 for Take. 
Nonconsumable value N(x) 
There is another attribute that is sometimes included in analyses of natural 
resources that have some intrinsic or nonconsumable value (Pearce and Moran, 1994; 
Stern, Dietz, and Black, 1985-86). A ponc:onsumable attribute could represent 
enjoyment from hiking through an old-gmwth forest or across an ungrazed meadow, or 
from simply knowing there are wild st.eelhead in a river; its magnitude thus depends on 
the state of the commons x, and the single I attribute function could then be designated 
N(x). The value of N(x) is not a functjon (l)fany one OM's choice, but rather of the 
choices made by a great many other OMs,l because of their impacts on the commons. 
N(x) available to a DM is thus the sarr1e, regardless of what that one DM does, and if 
the event nodes are also conditionally independent of the choice (as they are in this 
study) N(x) drops out of the decision ~ree (N(x) is a nonmarginal attribute). How this 
happens will be shown in Chapter VI, along with an extensive discussion about the 
implications of this claim. 
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Aggregation of the single-attribute value functions 
Although it could be argued that there may be a second-order interaction 
between the two attributes (pro(it and !'Conscience") for some DMs, this interaction is 
ignored in order to keep the mo~el simple. The aggregate or total value is a weighted 
additive sum of the single attribt.lte value functions (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 
1986; Keeney, I992). The aggr~gate value function V for each outcome (T;, x1) at 
iteration i for each DM Type} and choice z is: 
(6.14) 
where: 
1i = the number of Tak{!rs in iteration i 
Xt = state of the comml)ns in iteration i 
j = DM Type number I, II, Iill or IV 
w~ =the coefficient of the profit function: I for Type I, II, and III DMs, and 0 
for Type IV 
z = choice: I for Take ~nd 0 fbr Refrain 
g{ and g; = the genes for DM} that correspond to the coefficients for C(x) 
(Table II) 
To illustrate, the results 9fusing Eq. (6.I4) to calculate the total payoffs V are 
shown in Table III. The payoffs are th~ same as shown in Table I. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Type g{ g~ w~ V for Taking V for Refr1aini111g 
(z = 1) (z= 0) 
I 0 0 1 ;r(TJ 0 
II -1 0 1 ;r(TJ- C(xJ 0 
m -1 1 1 ;r(TJ- C(xJ C(xJ I 
' 
IV 0 1 0 0 C(.-cJ I 
' 
Table Ill. Summary table illustrating the total payoffs V that result fr~>m Eq. 
(6.14). g{ and g~ are the genes for DMjthat correspond to the coetnclents 
for C(x). The coefficient for lf(TJ is 1.0 if the sum of g{ and g~ is l~ss than 
1.0 (Types I, II, and Ill), and 0.0 otherwise (Type IV). 
Expected Value 
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Recall from the influence diagram in Figure 3.2 that the payoff~ DM receives 
is determined not only by the OM's choice, but also by events whose ou~comes are 
uncertain when the choice is made. In an EMA V model, the Expected Value: (EV) of 
each decision option is calculated by using the expectation operator froq1 statistics to 
find the expected, or average, result of any course of action. For example, for a given 
current state of the commons x ·, choosing to Take could result in any offour potential 
outcomes, depending on the state of the commons (x• ="Good' or "Bacf') artd what 
other DMs do (1 = "most Take" or "most Refrain") (see Figure 6.8). 
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EXAMPLE DECISION TREE FOR A TYPE I DM 
State of 
Choice, Ot!Jern' actions, conmtons, 
z T• x• Profit CoiiSciencc 
Good 
Most Tnkc ~. 0.2 0.4 0.0 r .. , TAKE 0.8 0.4 0.0 
Good 
lost Refrain ~ 0.8 1.0 0.0 
0.2 Bnd 
0.2 1.0 0.0 
Good 
Most Tnkc ~. 0.2 0.0 0.0 f "'' REFRAIN 0.8 0.0 0.0 Good 
lost Rcfrnin -<> 0.8 0.0 0.0 
0.2 Bnd 
0.2 0.0 0.0 
Figure 6.8. Type I or hard core Taker's decision tree. 
EV 
0,064 
0.256 
0.160 
0.040 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0,000 
EV(Tnkc)= 
0.52 
EV(Rcfrnin)= 
0.00 
The expected value of Taking is the average value of all the outcomes that 
might occur if the DM Takes. This average value is simply the sum of the aggregate 
values f7 for each of the four outcomes, where the number of Takers is T' and the 
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state of the commons is x· (from Eq. (6.14)), each multiplied times the probability that 
it will occur. 
For DM), the expected value EV of choice z is thus: 
(6.15) EV(T', x·,j, z) = LLP(x.li)p(ilz) V(i ,x· j, z) 
X
0 r· 
where: 
p (x •1 T') =probability that the number of Takers will be T', given that the 
state of the commons is x • 
p{T'Iz) = probability that the number of Takers will be T', given that the 
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choice is z 
j = DM Type number I, II, III, or IV 
z = choice: 1 for Take and 0 for ~efr(Jlill 
V = aggregate value function (E~. (6.14)) 
Since the decision rule used by all these DMs is 'I' maximize expected value," the 
DM chooses the option with the greatest EV. 
To see how the value functions, attribute w~ights, and uncertainties are 
incorporated into the decision model, consider first the decision tree shown in Figure 
6.8, which reflects the values and beliefs ofthe Type I DM, who is a hard core Taker 
described by Hardin in the TOC (Hardin, 1968). 
The oval event nodes from the influence dia,gram (Figure 3.2) have been 
replaced with circular event nodes in the branches qn the left side of the decision tree in 
Figure 6.8. For the sake of simplicity, each event nqde is partitioned into two 
probability estimates, rather than being represented by a 1continuous distribution. DMs 
thus have to judge whether most DMs will Take or Rejrhin, and whether the state of 
the commons will be Good or Bad. They also have Jo define what they mean by 
"Good'' or "Bad." Optimists expect fewer DMs to Take than do pessimists, and they 
expect the state of the commons to be better than p~ssimists do, regardless of whether 
it is Good or Bad. 
The optimism or pessimism of these probability a.nd outcome judgments is 
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coded in the genotypes. If the vatu~ for tlhe first gene in the genotype array go is 1.0, 
the DM is an optimist; if go is 0, th~ DM
1 
is a pessimist. Optimists and pessimists believe 
there are different probabilities asspciated with the event nodes shown in Figure 6.8, as 
well as different outcomes [1'", xl A variety of levels for the magnitudes of the 
probabilities and the values used for rand x· was investigated with the factorial 
experiments (see Chapter VII). 
DMs base their estimates ofwha1t others will do (r} on beliefs about how most 
people behave, and estimates about the state of the commons (x} on the state of the 
commons of the last iteration. WhiJe it might have been more consistent to base 
expectations about how many others will Take on the last iteration, rather than on 
general beliefs about how people tt;nd to; act, doing so caused the simulations to 
oscillate too wildly. Basing estimates for1 T* on a more stable number (Tmax and a 
proportionality constant that varie~l with1 the genotypes) provided the 11damping11 
necessary to solve the oscillation problerh. Tlus implies that, rather than having perfect 
knowledge about what others hav~ done, and basing expectations on that, DMs stick to 
preconceived beliefs about how otl1er people will act in the future, regardless of how 
they actually behaved recently. Some le'-1el of learning is provided by the selection 
mechanism of the GA because it eliminates genotypes that are unreasonably optimistic 
or pessimistic. 
Probability and outcome taples f<l>r optimists and pessimists in a typical 
simulation are shown in Table IV. For example, optimists believe that there is an 80% 
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Choice, 
z 
TAKE 
z=l 
REFRAIN 
::= 0 
Choice, 
z 
TAKE 
::.-1 
REFRAIN 
::-0 
OPTIMISTS' PROBABILITY ANI) OUTCOME TABLE 
State of 
Othen;' actions, conunons, 
T* 
"" Good 
Most Take ~ 0.20 0.8 Bnd 
0.80 
Good 
Most Refrain ~ 0.80 0.2 Bad 
0.20 
Good 
MostTnke 9 0.20 0.8 Bnd 
0.80 
~tost Refrain Good ~ 0.80 0.2 Dad 
0.20 
T• assumed i11 profit 
cnlculati\)n 
Tmax•Q.5 
TnmK 0 (/.5 
TmaK • (/.I 
Tmnx•Q.J 
Tmax•Q.5 
Tmax•q.5 
Tmax•Q.l 
TmnK 0 (/.I 
K0 assumc:d in conscience 
cnlculntion 
,, • 1.2 
ic • 0.8 
,, • 1.2 
j(. 0.8 
l(. 1.2 
ic • 0.8 
ic • 1.2 
ic •o.8 
K = state at preVIOUS 
iteration 
PESSIMISTS' PROBABILITY ANP OUTCOME TABLE 
Othen;' actions, 
T* 
Most Take 9 0.9 
ttost Refrain 
-¢ 0.1 
MostTnkc Q 0.9 
Most Refrain 
-¢ 0.1 
State of 
COIIIDIOilS, 
x• 
Good 
0.05 
Bad 
0.95 
Good 
0.50 
Bad 
0.50 
Good 
0.05 
Bad 
0.95 
Good 
0.50 
Bad 
0.50 
T* assumed il,1 profit 
calculatil)n 
Tmnx • (/.9 
Tmax 0 (/.9 
Tmax • (/.5 
Tmax• Q.5 
Tmax•Q.9 
Tmax • Q.9 
Tmax 0 Q.5 
Tmax • Q.5 
K0 nssumc:d in conscience 
calculation 
,,. 0.8 
,, • 0.5 
". 0.8 
,, • 0.5 
". 0.8 
"•o.5 
". 0.8 
". 0.5 
x = stale at prev1ous 
iteration 
Table IV. Probability estimates and outcomes [r, x 1 assumed by optimists 
and pessimists in the simulations. A variety of values for the probabilities and 
r and x· were used in different simulations, bu,t the tables shown here are 
typical. 
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probability that the number of DMs who will Take will be 50% of the potential Takers 
(i.e., 1 = 0.5 *Tmax, see the first row at the top of the Optimists' table in Table IV). 
They believe that there is a 20% chance that even if most others Take, the state ofthe 
commons will still be 20% better than th~ last !iteration (i.e., x· = X; * 1.2). If instead 
most others Refrain, an optimist believe$ them to be an 80% probability that the state 
of the commons will be only 80% ofthe state at the last iteration (i.e., x· = x1 * 0.8). 
As discussed previously, these probabilities and outcomes are the same if the DM 
Takes or Refrains, because one ofthe fundamental nature of a commons dilemma is 
that actions by others, and the state of tQe commons, are negligibly affected by a 
particular DM's actions. 
In contrast to optimists, in a typi9al simulation pessimists believe there is a 
better chance most people will Take: the:r estiinate a 90% probability that 90% of the 
potential Takers will Take (1 = Tmax * ().9; S(~e the lower table in Table IV), and a 
10% probability that 1 will be Tmax * 0.5. Ifimost Take, a pessimist believes there is 
only a 5% chance that the commons will be in 1 Good condition, where Good is only 
80% of its previous condition ( x· =X;* 0.8)-+- in contrast to optimists, who think 
there is a 20% chance that the commons will be in "Good'' condition, where they define 
"Good'' to be x· = x1 * 1.2. 
An arbitrary normalized value function for profit Vrr is shown in the first 
column on the right side of the table in Figure 16.8. For this Type I DM, the highest Vrr, 
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1.0, is expected for choice Take, when the other DMs Refrain cr = Tmax * 0.1 ). The 
state of the commons is irrelevant in this case because profit is only a function ofthe 
number of Takers and C(x) is always zero for Type I's. Their worst payoff is if they 
Refrain, regardless of the state of the commons, because Type I's represent Hardin's 
herdsmen, who perceive no value in Refraining (Hardin, 1968). 
The normalized value function for "Conscience" Vc reflects what Type I DMs 
believe about right and wrong. The hard core Takers shown in Figure 6.8 have no 
"Conscience" and so Vc is always zero (another way to put this, consistent with the 
earlier discussion, is that for Type l's, the coefficient for C(x), as shown in Table ITI, is 
0). As for the rest of their decision model, the Type I's shown in Figure 6.8 happen to 
be optimists, and so their probability and outcome estimates are as shown in the 
optimists' table in Table IV. 
Eq. 6.14 is used to calculate the EV for each possible outcome/, where the 
profit function 1l(T) and "Conscience" function C(x) are replaced with their normalized 
versions V ll'and Vc. For example, theE~ in Figure 6.8 when this optimistic Type I DM 
decides to Take, and expects most others to Take, and the state of the commons to be 
Good (first row in the EV column), is: 
(6.16) E~ = Pr(Others Take)* Pr( Commons is GoodiOthers Take)* (V 7l' + 
Vc) 
= 0.8 * 0.2 * (0.4 + 0) 
= 0.064 
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The calculation shown in Eq. (6.16) is performed for each of the four possible 
outcomes that could result for this DM if the choice is to Take. The results (lre added, 
to yield an expected value EV(Take) of 0.52 (Figure 6.8). An equivalent calqulation is 
performed for the choice to Refrain, to yield an EV(Refrain) ofO.O. Given a Type II's 
emphasis on profit, and lack of interest in 11Conscience11 , as Hardin predicted, this DM 
has no choice but to Take a unit of the commons (EV(Take) = 0.52) rather tpan to 1 
Refrain (EV(Refrain) = 0.0). 
As a contrasting example, consider the Type IV DM shown in Figur~ 6.9, who 
perceives no value in Taking (w~r= 0), but bases the decision instead only on the 1 
11Conscience11 function. The Type IV shown in Figure 6.9 happens to be a p~ssimist. A 
pessimistic Type IV DM is more representative of a hard core preservationi~t, i.e.,' a 
pejorist in Hardin's terms (Hardin, 1977), and hard core preservationists always pri~fer 
to Refrain (EV(Refrain) = 0.28 in Figure 6.9) rather than to Take (EV(Take) = 0). i 
To complete these examples, recall that where a DM falls along the ~:ontinuum 
between the extremes illustrated by these two DMs is determined by that DM's 
genotype. One gene (go) determines the OM's level of pessimism or optimisrn; each 
allele corresponds to a different table of probability estimates and expected ~mtcon;tes 
(Table IV). The other two genes, g1 and g2, determine their profit and 11Con~;ciencet11 
value functions (Table III). Just as was done in these two examples, decisior1 trees for 
the remaining six DM genotypes are created by using the probability and outcome 
tables of Table IV, which depend on the allele for g0; and the profit and 11Co;nscience11 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
payoffs of Table III, which depend on the alleles for g1 and g2. 
EXAMPLE DECISION TREE FOR A TYPE IV DM 
Choice, Others' actions, I 
1 
Stntc of 
z T" conmtons, K0 Profit Conscience 
Good 
Take I 0.05 0.00 0.00 
0.9 I Bad 
TAKE 0.95 0.00 0.00 
~cfrnin Good I 0.50 0.00 0.00 
0.1 I Bad 
0.50 0.00 0.00 
Good 
Take J 0.05 0.00 1.00 
0.9 I Bad 
REFRAIN 0.95 0.00 0.20 
~efrnin Good I 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.1 I Bad 
0.50 0.00 0.20 
Figure 6.9. Type IV or hard core Refrainer's decision tree. 
EV 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.17 
0.05 
O.Dl 
EV(fake)= 
0.00 
EV(Refrain) = 
0.28 
The contrast between the two DM extremes described above is particularly 
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important because according to decision theory, both may be defined as "rational," in 
that they select the actions that they believe have the best chance of providing the most 
of what they value. Yet Hardin argued that only the self-interested herdsman meets the 
criteria of "rationality" (Hardin, 1968). If Hardin's simple model is indeed a realistic 
representation of common resource decision making, then the TOC is an inescapable 
dilemma with no solution. However, if including the impacts of beliefs about likely 
outcomes, or the importance of"Conscience", makes a model more faithful to the real 
world, then it may be that under some circumstances solutions are possible. The point 
is that when a more complete model of decision making is considered than can be 
represented by the archetype TOC, it may be possible for rational DMs to avoid 
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destroying the commons. In that case, Hardin would be wrong. 
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6. FITNESS 
The meaning of fitness 
The function that is used to measme relative "goodness" of the genotypes is the 
cornerstone of any evolutionary model amd is usually called the "fitness function." In 
biology, fitness is the basis for repr9ducti.ve selection and thus evolution. In this model, 
the only aspects of biology that are mode:led are the regeneration rate of the commons 
and the population growth of the villagers. Nothing is implied about the genetics or 
biological evolution of the vil/ager.'j; what "evolves" in this model is the distribution of 
beliefs and values of the villagers. 
The simulated mechanisms 9f evolution in tllis GA are no more than 
mathematical devices for simulating social change. "Genes," which are used by the GA 
to represent beliefs and values, are ~imply binary elements ofthe computer code. What 
they represent is more like Richard PawRins' "memes" (Dawkins, 1978) than like 
biological genes. Dawkins coined tqe word "meme" to represent a transmissible unit of 
social evolution analogous to a gen~ in biiological evolution. To Dawkins, memes are 
ideas. They can be transmitted fro~ one JPerson to the next, they can mutate in the 
process, and they are subject to something like recombination: in "memetic" evolution, 
mutation would be something like what happens in the game of"gossip," where the 
message received has some probability of being different from the message transnlitted. 
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In "memetic" evolution, recombination would be the means whereby new ideas are 
developed from combinations of elements from old ideas, or where people learn, or 
change their minds; mutation would be where they fail to communicate accurately. 
Thomas Dietz has recently developed an idea of social evolution that fits the 
evolutionary framework ofthis model quite well (Dietz and Burns, 1992, 187): 
By [social] evolution we mean models of the generation of 
variety, transmission ofinformation and the action of selection and other 
processes (drift, migration, etc.) on the distribution of information 
within a population over time. When the information is contained in 
genes, this general model becomes the nco-Darwinian synthetic theory 
of evolution. When the information consists of social rules, the general 
scheme becomes a theory of sociocultural evolution. Macro or 
population-level phenomena and structures are shaped by micro-level 
processes and in turn are the selective environment for the micro-level 
process. 
What Dietz means by "rules" is similar to what Dawkins means by "memes," 
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and corresponds to what this work means by "genes" -i.e., beliefs and values used for 
making decisions and evaluating their outcomes (Dietz and Burns, 1992, note 3, 197): 
Such rules specifY what exists and, as a corollary, what does not 
exist, what nature, society, men and women are like. They shape images 
of what is real and true, what factors to take into account, and what to 
ignore (Czarniawska-Joerges 1988). Evaluative rules assign values to 
things, people, deeds, events and states of the world, defining what is 
'good' or 'bad,' what is acceptable and unacceptable, what is right, just, 
beautiful, attractive, enjoyable as well as their opposites -- in general 
what people should strive for or avoid. 
Dietz says that social evolution is a kind of learning process, in which an 
individual tries a rule, "assesses the results and retains, modifies or rejects the rule 
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based on the outcome" (Dietz and Rosa, 1994, 190). Further, (Dietz and Rosa;, 1994, 
190): 
Social learning is the cultural analog of the genetic transmission 
process. Processes of transmission, selection, migration, drift, 
recombination and mutation will lead to changes over time in prevalence 
of rules in a culture ... such changes are social evolution. 
To Dietz, the selection process that drives social evolution is subje;.ctive:. He 
envisions a selection process for these "rules," or beliefs and values, that i~ virtually the 
same as the GA selection process used in this work (Dietz and Rosa, 1994, 1910): 
Actions that implement rules produce responses from other 
actors and the ecosystem. Such responses, once perceived (using rules 1 
of interpretation) may cause an actor to modifY or discard some f4le orl 
set of rules. In addition to direct experience in trying out rules, act.ors 1 
use the observed behavior of others and social discourse ... to deternline. 
rules that arc likely to produce desirable outcomes. 
In a similar way, to Dawkins, the fitness of a "memotype," like the fitne:ss of a 
genotype, is a measure of how prevalent it is in a population and thus how suc<=essful it 
is in taking hold within a population. Dawkins argues that memes that are evolutionarily 
successful, like genes that are evolutionarily successful, tend to propagate throJUgh a 
population more vigorously than memes that are less successful (Dawkins, 197.8). 
Evolutionary success or "fitness" for a meme thus reflects the popularity qf an 'dea in a 
population. 
What "evolves" in this work is memotypes -those sets ofvalues and beliefs, 
or what Dietz would call rules -that individual people might hold at an:r one time 
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step. At the next time step, a real-world optimist might become a pe~simist~ or 
someone who had no "Conscience" might become concerned a~lout the moral aspects 
of an action. These changes are represented by the "evolutionary" m~tchanism provided 
by the GA. It is not the human species that evolves in this modtll; it js beliefs and 
values held by a population of humans in a small village. 
Evolutionary change in this model is driven by the actu~l val4e ofthe 
outcomes, measured on two attributes: profit, and "Conscience1'6• The same profit and 
"Conscience" functions are used to calculate the payoffs as are j.lsed jn the decision 
trees (see Table I or III). However, whereas in the decision treqs, th~ expectation 
operator from statistics (Eq. (6.15)) is used to estimate profit a11d "Conscience" payoffs 
by multiplying the estimated values of potential outcomes [1, x:1 by the pr:obabilities of 
their occurrence, the actual payoffs are calculated by using the actu(Il numbers of 
Takers and the actual state of the commons [T;, x;] instead of the estimated numbers 
[1, xl No probability estimates are needed for the actual paypff ca.lculatiiOns because 
the outcomes are known (examples of "fitness" calculations are given belm.v). 
The actual payoffs are used as the selection mechanism ("fitn~ss furnction") in 
the GA. Alleles that provide relatively greater payoffs become rpore prevalent than 
those that provide relatively lower payoffs at any particular tim~. If optimis1ts get better 
6 It is important to emphasize that these idealized DMs usc the most widely accqpted to1ol of 
prescriptive decision making, rather than the apparently haphazard appro11ch orqinary humans 
ordinarily use. Assuming tltat everyone uses a prescriptive metl10d for rnal<)ng dqcisionsl is a "best 
case" approach, and thus tends to bias the model towards showing tltat Ha1·din is wrong:· if even such 
careful DMs as these cannot escape the commons tragedy, it tends to supp9rt ~·din's tl~esis. 
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payoffs than pessimists, there will be more optimists in the next iteration: more 
genotypes will have g0 = I than go= 0; ifDMs who include a "Conscience" penalty for 
Taking (g1 = -1) get better payoffs than those who do not ( g, = 0), more genotypes 
will have g1 = -1. The more popular decision models are thus the ones that are found to 
be more "fit" by the GA, by virtue of their resulting in greater payoffs. The selection 
process of the GA causes decision trees that provide greater payoffs to be more 
prevalent in successive iterations. 
The state of the social ecosystem in this metaphorical fishing village is 
represented by the distribution of memes (per Dawkins) or rules (per Dietz): that is, the 
distribution of values and beliefs. Social evolution is then represented by the change in 
distiibution over time of what is called genotypes in a GA. Here, evolutionary time is 
not measured by generations, as it would be in biology, but rather by an unspecified 
measure used as the iteration time unit L1t of the discrete computer simulation. This 
simulation discretizes what are in reality three continuous processes: exponential 
population growth of the village, logistic regeneration of the commons, and the social 
evolution of beliefs and values in the village. The time step used by the discretization of 
the (continuous) logistic and exponential functions is simply one arbitrary non-
dimensional unit that is equivalent to the period of time between one discrete set of 
decisions by the villagers, and the next. 
Using subjective rewards and penalties to drive an evolutionary model has a 
potential difficulty that arises from the problem of interpersonal comparison ofvalue. 
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No satisfactory way to compare one person's utiles to another has yet been established 
in decision theory. It is a great simplification to assume that, because a Type I DM's 
choice produces a net normalized payoff of0.7, while a Type III DM's choice yields 
0.3, that the Type I will b(:come more popular in the next time step. A payoffof0.7 on 
one person's scale might be less than 0.3 on someone else's scale, unless it is somehow 
known how much one unit is worth, on one person's scale, to someone else with a 
different scale. It is well established in decision theory that even as apparently objective 
a unit as a dollar is generally worth more to a person who already has only ten dollars, 
than to a person who already has a thousand dollars (c. f., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
This was not a problem for Hardin's herdsmen, because Hardin simply assumed that 
each cow is worth "+I", on a scale he did not specify. In the real world, the relative 
value of a "cow-unit" would certainly be different for different people, and even for the 
same person in different circumstances. No such scale has ever been established. This is 
the source of the problem of interpersonal value comparisons. 
For lack of any better approach available, the approach taken here is to assume 
interpersonal comparability, where the units are units of profit: consistent with Hardin, 
it is assumed that a unit of profit, for number of Takers T, is worth the same amount to 
anyone who values profit at all (i.e., Types I, II, and III DMs; to Type IV's, profit is 
worthless). However, inconsistent with Hardin, but consistent with simple economic 
models, the value of the profit function is not always "+I'', but is ;r(TJ: it depends on 
how many units are on the market (i.e., the number of Takers 1). Because the value of 
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TC(T) is the same for all Type I, II, and III DMs, it means interpersonal comparability is 
assumed. 
Similarly, interpersonal comparability also means that the value of the 
"Conscience" payoff C(x) is also the same for all. The difference among the four DM 
Types is due to the coefficients associated with the profit and "Conscience" functions 
(Table IV). These coefficients can only be 0, -1, and 1, and so there are only a very 
few, limited, and primitive kinds of payoffs represented. However, Hardin assumed all 
villagers had exactly the same payoff function, with a value of+ 1 under all conditions, 
and he discounted any considerations but profit. Wlule far from a perfect representation 
of real decision-makers, this model is still a step towards reality - albeit an idealized 
and simplistic reality - from Hardin's. 
Calculation of fitness 
The payoff received by each DM at the end of each iteration is determined by 
the actual number of Takers T;, the actual state of the commons x1 resulting from all the 
other DMs' actions, and by that DM's "Conscience" and profit function coefficients. 
The actual payoff a DM receives, relative to the payoffs received by the rest ofthe 
population, is used as the DM's "fitness function" for the evolutionary part of the 
model. The actual payoff is called the Realized Value RV Recall that the decision trees 
use the expectation operator from statistics (Eq. (6.15)) to calculate Expected Value 
EV- i.e., the estimated outcomes based on judgments about how many Takers there 
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might be 7", and what the state of the commons might be x·. 
In contract to the EV calculatio11S used in the decision trees, the actual payoff 
calculations RV do not use probabilitie~ and judgments because the actual number of 
Takers and the actual state of the commons are known: rand x· are replaced with T1 
and x1, and RVis calculated by using th~ agg1regate value function V ofEq. (6.14). 
To illustrate, consider the payoffrecdved by a DM who is a "temptable 
preserver" or a Type III from Table I. Recalll that for a Type III DM, profit is important 
but is diminished by a "Conscience" penalty for Taking; a Type III also gets a 
"Conscience" bonus for Refraining. Eq. (6.114) is shown again here for convenience, 
applied to a Type III DM: 
V(Tt. X;,j, z) = [ w~ ;r(T~) + g{ C(xt)] z + [g; C(x1)](g;- z) 
where: j = DM Type Ill 
z = Choice, 1 forr Tak~ng and 0 for Refraining 
g: =coefficient for G'(x) for Taking for DMj = -1 
g~ = coefficient of C(x) for Refraining for DMj = 1 
Using these values in Eq. (6.14) give:s the Type III's actual payoff for outcome 
(T;, X;): 
(6.17a) 
(6.17b) 
V (1'1, X;, III, 1) = ll(TJ ·,· C(xtJ 
V ( T;, X;, III, 0) = C(xJ 
for Taking: z = 1 
for Refraining: z = 0 
If this Type III DM had decideq to Take, the actual payoff RV would be Eq. 
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(6.17a); if this DM had decided to Refrain, the actual payoff RV would be Eq. (6.17b ). 
Equivalent calculations are used for the other three Types of DMs. The payoffs 
received by all the DMs are used in the selection, mutation, and recombination steps of 
the GA discussed previously; thus, RV is used as the 11fitness 11 function in the GA. 
To summarize the fitness calculation, the "fitness" function" used by the GA is: 
(6.18) 
where f7 is the aggregate value function (Eq. (6.14)), applied for DMj in 
iteration i, who makes choice z (z = 1 for Take and 0 for Refrain) when the actual 
number of Takers is T;and the actual state of the commons is X;. FiJ= R~1 is used in 
the GA to select the progenitors for the population of the next iteration. 
Now that all the components of the "fitness" function have been derived, it is 
possible to express the probability Pr of a particular genotype j, in iteration i, being a 
progenitor to iteration i+ 1 (and hence subject to mutation and recombination). This 
probability is a function/ of two things: the probability TSProb (see Section 3, earlier 
in this chapter) that the more fit member of a pair of genotypes will be selected to go 
through mutation and recombination; and the "fitness" function FiJ: 
(6.19) Pr(j, i+ 1) = f [ TSProb, (FiJI r..:.. L F;i ] 
j 
where T,uax is the effective population size or number of potential Takers. 
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7. MATHEMATICP..L SUMMARY OF MODEL 
Figure 6.1, at the beginning of this chapter, provided an overview of the way 
the four components of this model (the .commons model, the decisior1 models, the 
village model, and the GA) interact. The discussion that followed developed the model 
components of more rigorously, and it may be useful here to summadze the sub-models 
mathematically. The equation refer~ncelnumbers are the same as in the text above~. 
• Commons model 
Nominal regeneration 
(6.2) r(xJ = rox; - rox1 2 /K ' 
Nominal regeneration rate at iteration i =logistic growth equation. r0 is. the regeneration rate 
constant, x is the state of the coq1mons, and K is the commons carrying capacity or X11!= 
State of the commons 
(6.3) X;+}= X;- T; + N{r(~:;). s:toch * r(X; )} 
State of the commons at iteratio1.1 i + 11 = state at iteration i - depletion by Takers+ stoclhastic 
regeneration. N{r(x1), Stach ., r~'C1)} =' sample from the normal distribut.ion with mean r(x1) 
and standard deviation Stocl1•(xl). 
• Village model 
Population growth 
(6.5) Tmax i+J = Tmax 1 + Tmax; * exp(G Lit) 
Number of potential Takers at it~ration i+ 1 =Number of potential Takers at iteration 6 + 
exponential growth equation, wi.th growth rate G, over time increment ~11. 1 
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• Decision model 
Aggregate Value of payoff 
(6.14) 
Aggregate weighted payoff= weighted Profit and weighted "Conscience" (guilt) payoffs for 
Taking (z = I) or weighted "Conscience" (virtue) payoff for Refraining (z = 0). w~ = I for all 
Types except IV, for whom w~ = 0. gt is the gene that determines the coefficient (-1 or 0) 
for C(x) for DMj for Taking; g~ is the gene that detennines the coefficient (0 or I) for C(x) 
for DMj for Refraining. 
Expected Value of payoff 
(6.15) EV(~. x·,j, z) = LLP(x"ji)p(ijz) V(r,x· j, z) 
x· r· 
Expected payoff for DM Type j =sum of e~~pected payoffs for each potential outcome (r, x·) 
for choice z. r is the number ofDMs expected to Tak~ and x· is the state of the commons, 
assumed in a particular outcome of the decision trees. V(T;, X;, j, z) is Eq. (6.I4). 
• Genetic algorithm 
Fitness 
(6.18) 
Fitness of genotypej at iteration i =realized value RViJ which is calculated as V;i (Eq. 6.14). 
Genotype fractions 
(6.21) PrU, i+l) = f[ TSProb, (FiJI r~ l:.F;i] 
i 
Probability of genotypej being a progenitor genotype to the population ofDMs in iteration 
i +I is a function of the parameter TSProb and the payoff received by genotype j, compared to 
the average payoff received by the effective population of potential Takers, T max , in iteration 
i. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
A computer model of the Tragedy of the Commons will be most useful if it 
simplifies the complexities of this social dilemma enough to help think it through more 
effectively, without eliminating or fatally altering aspects that are critical to the 
definition of, or solution to, the problem. One of the major challenges of this work is 
that, to be valid, such a model has to integrate knowledge and understanding from the 
fields ofbiology, evolution, ecology, psychology, political science, and economics (not 
to mention computer science), and it must do so in a way that is acceptable and 
comprehensible to people in all these fields. 
Because this model relies on well-established methodologies from each of these 
fields, the methods for each component of the model should be straightforward to 
evaluate. The DMs use particularly simple versions ofthe workhorse of prescriptive 
decision making, expected multiple attribute value (EMA V) decision trees. The 
commons model is an uncomplicated, uniform ecological system with an ordinary 
logistic regeneration function, a simple stochastic disturbance generator, and single 
species whose value to humans is represented by simple continuous functions. The 
process of social change is simulated with a GA that is relatively unsophisticated 
compared to other more complex GAs being used by artificial life researchers today 
(Riolo, 1992). 
It is, of course, not just the components, but the linkages, that are important. 
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The feedback loop that links the commons with the DMs provides the mechanism that 
ties these components together. The idea that the actions of human decision makers 
(represented by the choices of the DM genotypes) may have effects on a public 
resource (represented by the change of state ofthe commons in response to the DM 
actions), and that the state of the common resource may in turn have effects on the 
human decision makers (via the payoff they receive as a result of their actions), is 
hardly novel. What is novel is including these linkages in a model in which the linkages 
are not only relatively simple, but more important, reasonably believable as well. 
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Chapter VII 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This study was conducted in three phases. In the first phase, the computer 
simulation was developed and used to simulate Garrett Hardin's formulation of the 
TOC. The objective of this phase was to develop and validate the simulation by 
applying it to a case where there is broad agreement as to what the results should be. 
In the second phase, an analysis of the simulation parameters was performed via 
a series of factorial experiments. The objectives ofthis phase were to refine the model 
and to determine the relative impacts of the model parameters. These first two phases, 
which are discussed in this chapter, were somewhat iterative because the basic 
formulation of the model and the computer code were revised as more was learned 
from initial experiments. 
In the third phase (discussed in the next chapter), potential solutions to the 
TOC were further investigated, by running simulations and by analyzing the decision 
models using game theory. The objective of this phase was to investigate the answer to 
two questions: "Under what conditions could the TOC be solved?" and, "Was Hardin 
right?" 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145 
1. PHASE I: MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Hardin's TOC 
Hardin described two situations for his villagers. In the first, historical, phase, 
population growth was held in check by factors such as disease and war. Villagers 
harvested as much as they wanted from the commons, and because the equilibrium 
population was relatively low, their harvest rate remained below a sustainable 
equilibrium value. In the second, modern, phase, the "happy day" came when disease 
and war no longer checked population growth, and harvest levels grew to exceed the 
commons capacity for regeneration. Eventually the villagers destroyed the commons 
(Hardin, 1968). 
In Hardin's TOC, the community was populated only by herdsmen: there were 
no Rejrainers, only Takers. Hardin had no Refrainers in his TOC because, as he 
argued, the "remorseless logic" ofthe commons dictates that DMs have no choice but 
to Take: Refrainers receive no payoff, since tllle only payoff Hardin considered was 
from Taking. Because it provides no payoff, Refraining would not be what Axelrod 
calls an Evolutionarily Stable Strat•egy (Axelmd, 1984) and thus would be 
evolutionarily self-eliminating. 
To simulate Hardin's histor"cal situation, the population growth rate would be 
zero. The commons regeneration r 1te need only be greater than or equal to the number 
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of potential Takers. The population si~e is1 thus determined by the setting for the 
regeneration rate constant '• (or vice-versa:). For this case, the simulation would be 
expected to produce a long-term equiJibritllm where all OMs choose to Take and the 
commons hovers around some constant n(])n-zero level. 
To simulate Hardin's modern ~itua1tion, the only change is that the population 
growth rate would be greater than zer·o. For this case, the number of Takers would be 
expected to grow to exceed the commons ability to regenerate, and the commons to 
then be destroyed. 
These assumptions about Har~lin's ltwo village situations were used to determine 
r0 and the population growth rate G. The maximum number of potential Takers, and 
thus the equilibrium harvest level for Hardin's historical situation, was set to 100 in 
order to leave plenty of computer memoryj for growing populations, while still allowing 
a large enough population ofDMs so the GA would work properly. It was assumed 
that the equilibrium harvest level would ecj1ual the maximum sustainable yield MSY. 
Recall that the (non-stochastic) regen~ration rate equation is (Grant, 1986, 248): 
where r(x) is the regeneration rate ofthe1commons, xis the state of the commons, r0 
is the regeneration rate constant, and /(7 isl the maximum possible state of the commons 
7 K is ordinarily used in biology to indicate qarrying capacity, which is what Xmcu means here. 
"Carrying capacity" means the number of CD/IIIIIDUS units that the commons can support, rather than 
the number of humans the commons can support. I It would be "cleaner" to dispense with K and simply 
usc Xmcu. but the Grant equation is such a fur1damental of biology that it was preferred to usc the usual 
form. 
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Xmax· MSYis assumed to be the maximum possible regeneriltion',rate, which occurs at 
K/2 for Grant's Equation. Thus, for x = K/2 and r(x) = 100, r0 is!0.04. 
The regeneration rate of a real commons is never as, deterministic as Eq. (7 .I) 
implies, however, and so stochasticity is added, in a simple way, by sampling from a 
normal distribution with a mean of r(x) and some desired st.andard deviation. In 
fisheries populations the actual regeneration rate often vari~s within a range that is at 
least ± two or three times the nominal rate (Huntington, 1994). :Assuming that this 
approximation represents ± one standard deviation, then th~ distribution for the actual 
regeneration rate would be normally distributed with a mea11 of r(x) and a standard 
deviation of 2r(x) or 3r(x). 
As for the profit function, all that is really necessary for Hardin's TOC 
simulations is that profit be greater than zero, since the payoff for Refraining is zero. 
However, it was argued previously that a more realistic representation than Hardin's 
would have profit as a moderately steep function of supply. Thus, a moderately steep 
slope (Gwartney and Stroup, 1980) of -1.5 was chosen initially. 1The result for the 
situation where the population of the village is constant, an~ all choose to Take, is 
shown in Figure 7 .1. 
For the "modern" situation where population is no longer held in check by 
disease and war, the ordinary exponential population growth eq~Jation (Eq. (6.5)) is 
used to simulate population growth. The population growth equation is in terms of the 
time increment L1t and the time increment in the simulation is defined only as the time 
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between decision iterations. A reasonable assumption would be that this time increment 
would be on the order ofwee~s or months- probably not days or years. The exact 
val11e is not very important, b~causa any growth rate greater than zero should produce 
Hardin's: expected result. Hmr1an population growth is currently 1.5% per year, 
worldwide (Brown, Lenssen, find ~ane, 1995), so as an approximation (based on the 
deqision increment being abo4t oneitenth of a year), a growth rate of about one tenth of 
the cument annual rate was used. 
Hanllin's Initial State 
Takers Pop ... - Conm:ms 
200 10000 
~ ~'f"Y~~II-;.'4t"'........_l\~ tAt\\_ ~"f!\l 8000 "' = II) 6000 Q N 1oo 8 . ,. ~· {" 4000 8 ~ •• Q C' u 2000 
0 0 
.... .... .... .... .... .... 
c c c c c lters N ..,. 1,0 00 c 
.... 
Figure 7.1. Hardin's roc where the population is held constant, OMs do not 
take "Conscience" into flccount, and the commons is moderately stochastic 
(coefficient of variation;= 2.0 )'.This simulation ran 1001 iterations lters. 
Because the entire pop4lation 1of potential Takers chooses to Take, the two 
lines for Pop and Taker~ are imdistinguishable from each other. 
The result is shown in Figure 7.2: as Hardin predicted, harvest levels that were 
sus~ainalble for limited population prove inadequate to satisfy a growing population, 
and as a result the commons i~ destmyed. 
Regardless of which of the three possibilities is used for how the profit function 
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varies with growing populations (discussed in the "Decision Model" section of the 
previous chapter), Figure 7.2 is the result. This is because there is no payoff for 
Refraining, only for Taking. Similarly, assuming declining marginal value for the profit 
function also has no effect, as long as there is no payoff for Refraining. 
"Conscience" 
Although Hardin made no allowance for conscience, the "Conscience" function 
is an important element in this work because something like conscience is an important 
component of some of the proposed solutions. "Conscience" needed to be included m 
the experiments ofthe next phase, and so preliminary values for the slope andy-
intercept for the "Conscience" function were determined in this first phase. 
Hanlin's TOC 
Takers Pop Cornmns 
200 10000 
r! 8000 ., c 
Col ~ Growth rate= 0.0015 6000 c ~ 100 8 4000 8 -. c > 
'\ u 2000 
\ 
0 0 
.... .... .... .... .... .... 0 0 0 0 0 Iters N ...,. IQ 00 0 
.... 
Figure 7.2. Hardin's TOC where the population, made up only of Type I OMs, 
grows at G = 0.0015 per time increment. OMs do not take "Conscience" into 
account, so the number of Takers is the same as the population of potential 
Takers, and the commons is moderately stochastic (coefficient of variation = 
2.0 ). The entire population chooses to Take, and so the lines for Pop and 
Takers are indistinguishable from each other. 
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The slope andy-intercept were determined by assuming two things: 
1. "Conscience" would produce a solution for a population that is twice the I 
sustainable population without "Conscience": since the sustai11able population 
for Hardin's historical equilibrium case is 100, "Conscience" i~; required to 
offset profit enough that a population of200 DMs would only harvest 100 or 
fewer units of commons, on average. 
2. "Conscience" would cause some DMs to switch to Refrainint; once the 
commons dropped below K/2. This requirement means that s9me of the 
DMs, such as Types I and II, could always Take, but that oth~rs, such as 
Types III and IV, would Refrain; and that there would be enqugh Refraim~rs 
to keep the harvest level below the regeneration rate. Stochasticity is 
assumed to be zero, initially. 
The Type III DMs were used for this calculation. The aggregate, value of 
Taking was set equal to the value of Refraining, for x = K/2 = 5000, and the number of 
Takers was set to the sustainable number, 100: 
(7.2) if;11 (Take)= wrr1l(T) - C(x) = if;11 (Refrain)= C(x) (from Eq. (6.17)) r 
ll(JOO) = 2C(x) 
k (1;,ax - T) =2 m(K- x) (from Eq. (6.8) and (6.12)) 
3.0(200-100) = 2m(5000) 
For a profit function 1l(T) with a moderately steep slope k of3.0, the slope n' 
for C(x) was found to be 0.03. 
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The exact values used for these assumptions are not very important, because 
the question is not what the slope has to be, but rather, once a slope is identified that 
meets the two criteria, can it be made to work for growing populations? All that is 
needed is a "Conscience" function that increases as the commons declines, that impacts 
some of the DMs (e.g., at least the Type III's and IV's) some of the time, and causes 
enough of them to Refrain so that the commons can survive at twice the initial 
sustainable population (Hardin's historical equilibrium situation). If a particular m 
proved inadequate to solve the TOC for twice the initial sustainable population, it could 
be increased. The impacts of different values for this slope were examined with the 
factorial experiments ofPhase II. 
The results of including "Conscience", for a population that grows only to twice 
the initial sustainable population, are shown in Figure 7.3 (compare to Figure 7.2, 
where the simulation parameters were the same but none of the DMs had a 
"Conscience"). 
The difference between Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 is that including "Conscience" 
for Type II, III, and IV DMs is enough to cause the villagers to harvest sustainably, as 
long as the population of potential fishers remains below twice the original sustainable 
size (or 2 * 100). Unfortunately, ifthe population ofpotential fishers is allowed to 
grow beyond 200, eventually the temptation of increased profits (due to increased 
demand) outweighs the costs of "Conscience" for enough of the villagers that they still 
end up destroying the commons, as shown in Figure 7.4- even though less than half 
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of them are Taking. The simulation in Figure 7.4 is the same as that in Figure 7.3, 
except that there is no limit on population growth. 
Conscience works for Pop= 200 
Takers Pop Co lllllD ns 
Growth rate= 0.0015 
400 10000 
~ 8000 "' c 
u 6000 0 ~ 200 8 
4000 8 ~ 0 100 u 2000 
0 0 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q lters N ..,. \Q 00 Q 
..... 
Figure 7 .3. "Conscience" prevents the destruction of the commons, for a 
moderate, maximum population of potential fishers of twice the initial 
sustainable size (Figure 7.1 ). Stochasticity is moderate: the coefficient of 
variation = 2.0. 
1~2 
The solution fails if the population of potential fishers exceeds 200 (twice the 
historical sustainable population) because the "Conscience" function parameter m was 
derived with an arbitrary assumption that "Conscience" would work up to about doubje 
the initial population. The "Conscience" function can be given a steeper slope such as ?11 
= 0.06, so that the village will harvest sustainably at a potential fisher population of, 
say, 300, but then as the population grows beyond that, the solution will fail again (sev 
the solution simulations in Chapter VIII). 
Solutions based on this simple "Conscience" function may be found to work for 
any maximum population size, but as long as demand increases with increasing 
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population, and "Conscience" increases as the state of the commons declines, 
eventually these solutions all must fail. Hardin ( 1968) said that conscience could not 
Conscience fails for unlimited growth 
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0 
oc 
·6000 
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.... 
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Figure 7.4. "Conscience" solution fails for unlimited population growth. 
Stochasticity is moderate: the coefficient of variation = 2.0. 
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solve the TOC, mainly because people would feel like fools if they Refrained so that 
others could Take. He did not allow for the possibility that there might be some DMs 
whose "Consciences" never permitted them to Take, as there are here; nor even that 
"Consciences"might work up to a point, as it did here. Nonetheless, he did say that no 
voluntary solutions could work over the long run if population were allowed to grow. 
In this first phase of this work, under the simplest of assumptions, his argument is 
supported, and the simulation performs consistently with Hardin's predictions. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154 
2. PHASE II: FACTORIAL EXPERIMENTS 
The objectives of the second phase of the study were to further refine the 
simulation and to determine the re:ative impacts of the model parameters. It is 
important to emphasize that these experiments were conducted only to gain a geperal, 
understanding of how the parameters in the simulation interact, which simulation. 
parameters are the most important, and what the most useful settings might be fqr the 
solution simulations that follow. These experiments were not as rigorous, theref~tre, as 
they might have been if the dissertation were primarily an empirical, rather than q 
theoretical, investigation: in an empirical dissertation, the data would have to be 
rigorously analyzed in order to confirm or disconfirm a particular hypothesis. In lhis . 
theoretical investigation, the factorial experiments are used as a convenient way to heilp 
develop a theoretical model. 
This approach is based on Lenore Fahrig's (1991) work using factorial 
experimental methods to analyze population dynamics in stochastic ecological 
simulations. Fahrig used factorial experiments to make the sensitivity analysis for 
multiple variables more efficient. She had to use statistical analysis methods beqtuse I 
the simulations she was interested in were stochastic. The work here is also stochastic 
because GAs are not deterministic, and thus the factorial sensitivity studies also t1ave Ito 
be analyzed statistically. Each simulation run is a sample from the effectively infinite , 
number of simulations that could be run, because the stochastic elements of the 
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simulation are determined by the random number generator, which is initialized with a 
random number seed set by the user. 
Fahrig argued that a major problem with simulations in general, and stochastic 
simulations in particular, is that the outcomes of such simulations often depend on the 
particular parameter values chosen. She pointed out that it is crucial to the validity of 
any simulation to formulate relationships between the parameters chosen and the 
output. In order to demonstrate the method she was advocating, she used factorial 
experiments to analyze some existing stochastic simulations of ecosystem population 
dynamics, and then used statistical analysis to determine the functional relationships 
between the parameter ranges and the output. 
In this work, all the major components are essentially created from scratch 
because there are no empirical data that can be directly used. For example, the 
regeneration function of the commons is loosely based on a fisheries regeneration 
model. Its stochasticity is modeled with a normal probability distribution (see Chapter 
VI, Section 2). The DMs' decision models are based on a distillation from a very broad 
review of the literature on decision making and economics, but the assumptions used 
for the profit and "Conscience" functions are simplistic (see Chapter VI, Section 5). 
The mutation rate and reproduction control parameters of the G!:.. are arbitrary (see 
Chapter VI, Section 3). Since the particular values used for these important parameters 
determine the results, it is important to be able to characterize the output as a function 
of the input ranges selected. Only in this way can the results be extended to wider 
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applicability than to just this particular model. 
The variables in the model which were examined with the factorial experiments 
are: the range of alleles included for each of the genes representing the DMs' beliefs 
and values, the parameters in the profit and "Conscience" functions, the stochasticity of 
the commons, and the mutation rate and reproduction control parameters of the GA. 
A series of four factorial experiments and numerous trial-and-error explorations 
were conducted during the model and computer code development work. Results of 
these were used to refine the computer code and the model, to determine the 
appropriate levels for experimental parameters, and to determine what the response 
variables should be. The fifth factorial experiment was performed on the final model, 
and is a synthesis of all the earlier explorations. This last experiment is the only one that 
is discussed in detail here. 
Methods 
The preliminary four experiments indicated that the variables that might be 
important were: the slopes of the profit and "Conscience" functions (variables k and m, 
respectively), stochasticity of the commons Stoch, mutation rate mr of the GA, and the 
probability TSProb that relatively higher-fitness genotypes from one iteration would be 
subjected to mutation and recombination and thus become "parents" or progenitors8 to 
8 
"Parents" implies biological reproduction, and because this is a model of social evolution, not 
biological evolution, another word was needed that did not seem so closely tied to tl1e biological 
notions of parents and children. 
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the nex.t iteration. 
The probability tables (Table IV) used in the decision trees were not found to 
be significant by any of the four preliminary experiments (p > 0.2), even when they 
were varied to an unreasonable extent (e.g., optimists thought there was only a 10% 
probability that the commons would be in Good condition if most DMs Refrained, 
instead ofthe nomina! SO% shown in Table IV). This finding was a surprise, because it 
seemed! reasonable that people's choices might be sensitive to how certain they were 
about what others would do and what the state of the commons might be. The reason 
the estimates turned out to be insignificant is that the decision trees were set up so that 
the Type I and IV DMs both have dominant strategies (Type I's always Take and Type 
IV's always Refrain), Type II's almost always Take, and only Type III's change their 
minds when the commons becomes degraded. Probability estimates are thus only really 
important to Type III's, who did not have enough of an impact on the factorial 
experiments to indicate statistical significance for the probability estimates. The 
simulations were sensitive to probability estimates insofar as the GA selected the 
optimism or pessimism allele for gene go when some of the solution mechansims were 
simulated (see the "Solution Simulations" section of Chapter VIII), but this effect was 
not detected by the factorial experiments. 
All of these experiments were run with a constant population size of200, which 
was the "cutoff' value used to define the "Conscience" function (the default 
"Consc:ience" function can preserve the commons up to a population of about 200). In 
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the preliminary experiments, the commons state was initialized at x0 = K *0.25, K* 0.5, 
or K * 0. 75 (recall that K is the maxirrmm X1can be). There was no significant difference 
in results for x0 of K * 0.5 and K * 0. 75, but the commons tended to quickly go extinct 
if it was initialized at K * 0.25. It was decid1ed to assume that the simulation began at 
the equilibrium point assumed for Hardin's sustainable population, which was Xco:::J K * 
0.5. The settings used in the fifth fact~>rial a1re shown in Table V. 
Earlier experiments were replit;ated three to five times, and acceptable (defined 
below) models were easily achieved with three replications. With two levels for each of 
five variables, and three replications, t.he number of runs was thus 96. All other 
assignable parameters required in the t;:omputer code were held constant for all 96 runs, 
except for the random number seed. The random number generator is what drives all 
the stochastic components of the sim~lationls. The random number generator is used by 
the GA to create the initial genotypes, and to simulate the stochastic processes of 
progenitor selection, mutation, and ret;:ombination (see Chapter VI, Section 3). It is 
also used in the commons model to simulate stochastic variation in the regeneration 
rate via the normal distribution sampling function (see Chapter VI, Section 2). The 
sequence of numbers generated by thQ random number generator is determined by the 
random number seed. In the first simu.lation1run for any of the experiments, the seed 
was selected from a random number tiible in a statistics text. For each run thereafter, 
the random number generator printed out a random number at the end of each trial, and 
this was used as a seed for the next tri.al. 
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Parameter Low level High level 
Slope of profit function, k 1.5 3.0 
Slope of "Conscience" function, m 0.02 0.04 
Stochasticity, Stach 0 2.0 
Mutation rate, mr 0.001 0.01 
Probability of selection for 0.5 0.9 
mutation and recombination, 
TSProb 
Initial state of the commons, Xo 5000 5000 
Population (potential fisher~ 200 200 
Commons regeneration rate, r0 0.04 0.04 
Table V. Settings for fifth factorial experiment. 
Although a variety of response variables (average state of the commons over 
time, average number of Takers, pattern of long-term behavior, and iterations to 
extinction) was recorded in the earlier experiments, by the fifth experiment it was clear 
that iterations to extinction Iter was the only one that provided consistently useful 
ANOV As. The simulations were run up to 1800 iterations, because in earlier 
experiments extinction never occurred beyond about 1200 iterations and otherwise, 
stable patterns were established by the SOOth or 600th iteration. For the statistical 
analysis, the trials that exceeded 1800 iterations were coded as 3600, in order to ensure 
that the difference between trials that led to extinction and trials that did not were 
adequately differentiated. Significantly different results, particularly R;,g and mean 
square error MSE, were not achieved by increasing 3600 to 7200, and the ANOVAs 
for the 3600 codings produced no outliers nor high leverage cases. Results became 
ambiguous for codings below about 2500. 
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Regressions and ANOVAs were conducted using Systat® (1992) The objectives 
for the model development were: 
• Reasonableness: find a model that makes intuitive sense, i.e., one for which it 
is possible to explain why some factors are included and others are not. 
• Explanatory power: find the minimum number of variables that explain the 
maximum amount of variation in the data, as indicated by p < 0.015, R;df, 
and mean square error MSE. 
• Validity: find a model that is statistically defensible, as indicated by plots of 
the residuals versus the regression estimates, normal probability plots of the 
residuals, and absence of high leverage or outlier cases. 
The models were developed by performing regressions and ANOV As on all 
variables and all two- and three-factor interactions, and then manually adding or 
deleting variables, including interactions; as well as by having Systat® perform 
backwards and forwards stepping. 
ANOV A: Iterations to Extinction 
The regression and ANOV A for the model that fits the objectives the best, for 
the response variable "iterations to extinction" Iters, are shown in Table VI. 
Table VI shows a model in which all five factors are statistically significant, as 
main effects or in interactions. It is important to note that the regression is not 
intended to be used to predict continuous system response for settings between the two 
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levels of each parameter, but rather as a relatively easy way to conduct a sensitivity 
analysis. Regression is a convenient way to evaluate the relative importance and 
direction of effect of several parameters at once, by perf9rming /-tests on the main 
effects a.nd lower le:vel interactions. 
These experiments were not conducted in order to es•tablish predictive 
relation~hips, but rather to evaluate the relative impacts 9fpa.rameters that drive a 
R;dJ ~0.812 Standard error = 628.4 Depcnder1t variable = lters 
I 
Variatile b Standard b t p (2-tail) 
error standardized 
Constapt -899.1 624.9 0 -1.4 0.154 
Stochasticity s -:748.9 242.5 -0.5 -3.1 0.003 
Mutatilm rate 39581.4 4891.0 1.4 8.1 0.000 
mr 
Profit slope k 6o76.2 208.7 -0.4 3.2 0.002 
Sclecti1;>n -il699.0 618.5 -0.4 -4.4 0.000 
Probabjlity I 
TSProb I 
S•TSP1·ob to12.3 320.7 0.5 3.2 0.002 
S"Jnr -3326.2 i295.7 -0.2 -2.6 0.012 
TSProb11J11r -139791.7 6478.3 -1.0 -6.1 0.000 
TSProb"JII 268003.9 22216.4 1.8 12.1 0.000 
TSProb•k"111 -(15764.7 9064.5 -1.4 -8.4 0.000 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Source Sum of Degrees of mcan-sqi,Jarc F-ratio p 
squares freedom 
Rcgres~ion 0.1657 E+09 9 0.1841 E;H>8 46.6 0.000 
Residu~l 0.3396 E+08 86 0.3949 E;t06 
Table VI. Re1gression and ANOVA for the response ~ariable indicating 
number of itE~ralions to extinction /ters. 
simulatiC,Jn model amd to get an idea of what the range of settings ought to be for the 
solution simulations in Phase III. If the regression were tp be· used to develop 
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predictive relationslh.ips, it would imply that the regression fu111ction that relates each of 
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the independent variables with the dependent variable is monotonic: i.e:., that if the 
dependent variable were vari1:::d continuously from the low to the high level, then th~~ 
response would also either increase or de<trease continuously, with no hump or valley in 
between. In a rigorous exploration, if there were any doubts, it would be advisable 1to 
conduct at least a three-level factorial in order to be able to look at the response 
surfaces and to check for non-monotonicity. This exploration is simply a convenient. 
way to conduct a rough sensitivity analysis as part of model developm<mt, and it would 
thus be hard to justifY going to such extremes. 
The single factor with the most important impact on how long 1the commons; 
survives is the mutation rate mr (standardiized beta b = 1.4, p <0.0005). Since b is', 
positive, it indicates that lters increases with mr: the commons lasts longer when mr is 
at its higher level. The mutation rate is important because it constantly (re)introduc~s 
variety into the evolutionary model by randomly, with some small probability mr, 
switching alleles at a gene loc:us (only one1 mutation is allowed per genome, per 
iteration). A mutation means that a DM genome could be changed from an optimist: to 
a pessimist, or from a Type I who will always Take to, say, a Type IV who will alwi:~.ys 
Refrain. 
There are only three, dichotomous genes in this GA: go, the 
optimism/pessimism gene; g~, the gene thajt determines the coefficient for the 
"Conscience" penalty C(x) fo Taking, and g2, the gene that determines the coefficient 
for the "Conscience" reward or Refraining. Since three dichotomous l'enes means 
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there are only eight (23) genotypes possible, the simulation tends to converge quickly. 
When it does, there is no variety in the population to allow the DMs to adapt to 
changing conditions. For example, if the simulation converges quickly and consists of 
all Type I's, they always Take, even when the commons is almost completely gone. 
There are then no Type Ill's or IV's left who could become more prevalent with the 
changing conditions, thus perhaps preventing the over-harvesting soon enough to avoid 
destroying the commons. 
One parameter that helps prevent premature convergence is mr; TSProb is the 
other (standardized b = -0.4, p <0.0005). TSProb is the probability that higher-fitness 
genotypes in one iteration will be selected as progenitors for the next iteration (see 
Chapter V, Section 3). The standardized regression coefficient b is negative for 
TSProb, indicating that the commons survives longer when TSProb is lower. 
If TSProb is relatively low, then a relatively high proportion of less fit 
genotypes persists in the population. The variety that is maintained in the population by 
high mr and low TSProb is important for allowing the villagers to respond to changing 
conditions. TSProb and mr preserve a healthy contingent of "crackpots" in the 
population: DMs who persist in doing the "irrational" thing at one time often tum out 
to be "rational" later. The fitness function acts as enough of a gatekeeper to prevent 
too many "crackpots" from taking over the population. 
Figures 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 illustrate typical simulation response patterns for the 
two diversity parameters. In these three figures, the other experimental variables are 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164 
held constant (profit function parameter k, "Conscience" fun~:tion parameter 111, and 
stochasticity Stoch - discussed below - are all low; effective population size Tmax 
is held at 200, which is twice the sustainable size). In Figure '7.5, the mutation rate is 
low and the progenitor diversity is also low; the commons q~ickly crashes ,at 172 
iterations. Although the DMs do alter their behavior as the c~>mmons declines, there is 
not enough diversity for an adequate number of Refrainers t~> take over in1 time to 
prevent the commons crash. 
In Figure 7 .6, the only difference is that the progenitpr diversity is high (i.e., 
TSProb is low); the commons lasts longer (486 iterations), bt,Jt still crashes. This 
indicates that lowering TSProb in order to maintain progenit9r diversity helps, but not 
enough. The simulation exhibits fairly erratic behavior becau~e the behavior of the DMs 
is more erratic: with TSProb only at 0.5, approximately halfthe progenitmts selected 
for each new iteration are lower-scoring genotypes. The GA is doing an inefficient job 
of "optimizing" each new iteration, which is why there is more diversity; but it is also 
why the behavior tends to be more erratic. It is not unusual, in fact, for simulations 
with high TSProb settings to exhibit patterns that look like undamped oscillations. 
In Figure 7. 7, both diversity parameters support high diversity and the 
commons lasts forever. Note too that the erratic behavior typical of high progenitor 
diversity and low mutation rate has been replaced with a fairly smooth, steiady-state 
oscillation. This is a typical pattern when both diversity paraq1eters are high: apparently 
the higher mutation rate acts as a damper to counteract the wilder swings that high 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TSProb setting causes. 
200 
Low progenitor diversity and mutation rate 
Population 
Takers 
..... 
Q 
N 
10000 
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
..... 
Q Iters \Q 
..... 
Figure 7.5. Simulation with low population diversity on I both diversity 
parameters: TSProb is 0.9 (low progenitor diversity) and mr is 0.001 (low 
mutation rate). 
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Figure 7.6. Simulation with high progenitJr diversity (TiSProb = 0.5) but low 
mutation rate (mr= 0.1). 
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Figure 7.7. Simulation with high population diversity on both diversity 
parameters: TSProb is 0.5 (high progenitor diversity) and mr is 0.1 (high 
mutation rate). 
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Commons stochasticity is also important as a main effect (standardized b = 
-0.5, p = 0.003) because the more erratic the commons regeneration rate, the more 
difficult it is for the DMs to respond appropriately. In other words, the negative 
b indicates that as stochasticity increases, the number of iterations the commons 
persists decreases. For example, Figure 7.8 shows the same simulation as Figure 7. 7 
except that stochasticity is high in Figure 7.8 whereas it is zero in Figure 7.7. 
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In Figure 7.8 the commons crashes, even though the number of Takers hover·s 
around the sustainable number (100). This is an example of why the traditional fisheries 
harvest management method of maintaining harvest levels at a theoretical maximum 
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sustainable yield (MSY) is sometimes criticized (Holling, 1978; Ludwig, Hilborn, and 
Walters, 1993): MSY management is based on an assumption that the regeneration rate 
of the commons can be reliably estimated. When stochasticity is high, however, more 
margin needs to be built into the harvesting level, because there is some unknown 
probability that the true MSY is considerably less than the theoretical one at any time. 
In Figure 7.8, MSY is theoretically 100, but the stochasticity ofthe commons 
regeneration rate makes the real MSY something less than the assumed MSY. 
Overharvesting results, and the commons is not able to recover. 
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Figure 7.8. Simulation with high population diversity on both diversity 
parameters: TSProb is 0.5 (high progenitor diversity) and mr is 0.1 (high 
mutation rate) (the same as the simulation in Figure 7.7), but with high 
stochasticity (Stach= 2.0) 
lters 
~ 
c 
Q 
e 
e 
Q 
u 
The profit function parameter k is the last important main effect (standardized 
b = 0.4, p = 0.002) because k determines the slope andy-intercept of the profit 
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function. b is negative, meaning that extinction happens faster with greater k. This is 
because increasing k increases the slope and magnitude of the profit function (i.e., 
increases demand) and thus, profit becomes more tempting (k is discussed at length, 
and plots of simulations illustrating the impacts of k are shown, in the solutions 
discussion of Chapter VIII). 
The interaction plots illustrate the implications of interactions among 
parameters. For example, the interaction Stoch>~<mr (standardized b = -0.2, p = 0.012) 
is shown in Figure 7.9. This is an interaction between the stochasticity ofthe commons 
and the mutation rate of the DMs. Figure 7.9 shows that the commons persists longer 
(on average) when mr is high (0.1), regardless of whether Stoch is low (Stoch = 0, the 
dashed line) or high (Stoch = 2, the bold line). 
Q 
.... = 
., Q 
c ·-Q 't 
·-= = C": ·-a.. .... ~ 1'1 
.... ~ 
~ 
Stochasticity *Mutation rate 
-- -o--- Stoch=O -••- Stoch=2 
:~~L-~-:~-~--~--~---=--=---=--=-------=--=-: 
0.001 0.100 
Mutation rate 
Figure 7.9. Interaction plot for stochastlcity of the commons Stach and 
mutation rate mr, illustrating how low stochasticity and high mutation rate 
contribute an effect that is in addition to their single-factor effects. 
However, there is more of a difference in performance between the high and 
low Stoch trials at high mr than at low mr. This means that Stoch and mr terms not 
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only have the single-factor effects described above, but they also interact to add an 
additional synergistic "bonus" for low Stoch and high mr. Although the two lines are 
not parallel, they both have positive upwards slopes and thus act more or less as 
complements. In other words, low commons stochasticity is beneficial on its own 
because it makes the commons behave more predictably, and a high DM mutation rate 
is beneficial on its own because it keeps a variety of types ofDMs in the population; 
but the two parameter settings are even more beneficial in combination. 
TSProb also interacts with mr (standardized b = -1.0, p < 0.0005), as shown 
in Figure 7.1 0. 
TSProb"' Mutation rate 
-- -o-- TSProb=.5 II TSProb=.9 
: § 2000 
= ·-0 't 1500 ------
__ -0 
---
0 25001 
; C c-----~ ·- 1000._-----_----~-~--~------------------------------------: ~ ~ 500 ---
- Cl) ~ 0+-------------------------------~ 
0.001 0.100 
Mutation rate 
Figure 7.10. Interaction plot for TSProb and mr, illustrating a "crossing" 
interaction that can tend to hide single-factor effects. When population 
diversity is low (TSProb is high), the effect of the mutation rate is canceled 
out. When diversity is high, the beneficial effect of high mr is amplified, but 
so is the harmful effect of low mr. 
Figure 7.10 shows a different kind of interaction, called a "crossing" interaction. 
Recall that when the parameter that controls progenitor diversity TSProb is high, DM 
diversity tends to be low because higher-fitness individuals have a higher probability of 
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being progenitors to the next iteration ofDMs. For low-diversity populations (high 
TSPrab, shown bold in Figure 7.1 0), the average number of iterations to extinction is 
essentially the same for high and low mr (i.e., the bold line is flat); but when high 
diversity is maintained by a low TSPrab, mr does make a difference: the beneficial 
effect oflow TSPrab amplifies the beneficial effect of high mr: the dashed line slopes 
upward (this is also illustrated in Figure 7.7, above). At the low mr end ofthe graph, 
however, the harmful effects of high TSPrab and low mr also act together, this time to 
produce worse results than either factor would have done alone. TSPrab maintains 
diversity by keeping less "fit" progenitors in the population from one iteration to the 
next, and mr maintains diversity by randomly changing alleles. When TSPrab is low, 
selection pressures rapidly destroy whatever diversity mr occasionally (re)introduces 
into the population. 
The Stach*TSPrab interaction (standardized b = 0.5,p = 0.002) shown in 
Figure 7.11 is another crossing interaction. When Stach is high, the effect of TSPrab 
tends to be canceled out (the bold line in Figure 7.11 is nearly horizontal); but when 
Stach is low, the beneficial effect of increased population diversity (low TSPrab) can be 
seen. 
The TSPrab*m interaction (standardized b = 1.8, p < 0.0005) is also crossing 
in nature, although t~e slopes of the high diversity (TSPrab = 0.5) and low diversity 
(TSProb = 0.9) lines are both upward (see Figure 7.12). 
Similarly to the profit function parameter k, the "Conscience" function 
parameter 111 sets the slope andy-intercept for the "Conscience" function: when 111 is 
relatively low (0.02), "Conscience" is not as important to DMs as when 111 is high, and 
the commons tends to go extinct faster. For low 111 trials such as those shown in 
Figures 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 at the beginning ofthis section, high-diversity (low TSPrab, 
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dashed line) populations do ~Jetter than Jo,w-diversity populations. But when 111 is 
relatively large, the commorw lasts longen on average regardless of TSProb, and the 
effect of TSProb disappears. This means 1that when "Conscience" becomes more 
important to most DMs, they show more 1of a tendency to Refrain. Diversity in the 
population is then not as important as wh;en some DMs are less driven by 
"Conscience." 
Stoclnas ticity "' TSProb 
-- -o-- Sltoch=O -••- Stoch=2 
~=t=---.,. ________ . ____________ _ 
1000 ---
500· 
0 ,-,-----------------i 
0.500 0.900 
TSProb 
'-------.. -----------------' 
Figure 7 .11. lnteractiqp plot for TSR'rob and Stach, showing how when 
TSPrab is high (diversity is low), the I beneficial effect of low Stach is canceled 
out. 
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The three-factor interaction TSProb*k*m (standardized b == -1.4, p < 0.0005) 
cannot be shown in a two-faj:ttor plot. Thrree-way interactions are harder to visualize or 
interpret than two-factor int~ractions, but1 the general idea of how they work is the 
same: whenever a regressioQ involves sig111ificant interaction terms, it means that 
combinations of settings for·~ e variables .involved produce synergistic contributions 
beyond the contributions oflpwer-order e:ffects alone. For simplicity's sake, it is 
generally preferable to find ax acceptable imodel that does not include interactions 
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Figure 7.12. m •TSProb interaction, illustrating the somewhat-crossing 
interaction betwee111 the parameter controlling most of the DM population 
diversity TSProb, and the parameter that determines the magnitude and 
slope of the "t,:ons1~ience" function m. When "Conscience" is relatively 
important (m F0.04), population diversity TSProb has little effect on 
commons persiste111ce; but when "Conscience" is less important (m = 0.02), 
the higher diversity populations (lower TSProb, dashed line) last longer than 
the lower div~rsity !populations. 
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beyond two factors (note that since there are five single factors, interactions could 
involve as many as five variables). However, the best regression that could be found 
without a three-way interlaction produced R;dJ of only 0.66. The AN OVA shown in 
Table VI was the be~t that could be found, according to the objectives outlined above: 
• Reasonabl~ness: the contributions of Stoch, TSProb, mr, and k are consistent 
with intuitjve expectations: the commons lasts longer when stochasticity is 
low, diver~ity is high, and the profit function is less steep and lower in 
maximum magmitude. Although the "Conscience" function parameter 111 is 
included ir, twa ofthe significant interaction terms (TSProb*m and TSProb*k 
*111), it is ~ot significant as a main effect, probably because it is involved in 
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crossing interactions (crossing interactions tend to "cancel out" or hide main 
effects). 
• Explanatory power: The rr.1odel chosen has the maximum R;df (0.81) and 
minimum MSE (628.4) fot any models that include only variables withp 
values less than 0.01~, and\ no interaction terms greater than third-order. 
• Validity: the plots (n9t shown) of residual terms, versus estimates, exhibit 
good uniform scatter with I no obvious patterns that could indicate inequality 
of variance, and the qormal probability plot (not shown) is quite straight. No 
outliers (studentized residual > 2.5) were identified for the model chosen. 
Cqnclusion 
The simulations in the qext chapter will further explore what this model 
suggests about TOC solutions, but the experimental findings discussed above already 
suggest that the following elem.ents are necessary for a commons management system 
to ~le workable, at least in the hypothetical system modeled by this simulation: 
• Stochasticity of the (/Ommpns (Stoch) must be low enough, and/or 
forecasting accurate enough, to allow planning and decision making to be 
effective. Technologjcal means of reducing stochasticity sometimes yield the 
hoped-for results, b~t in general, healthier ecosystems tend to not be as 
sensitive to disturbar1ces as weakened systems. The most effective means for 
dealing with the pos~ibility of erroneous forecasting is to make sure the 
system being forecasted i~ as healthy as possible. Even if the forecasts are 
wrong, the system then has enough resilience to recover. 
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• There must be enough diversity ofbeliefs and values that the population can 
respond in time to surprises. Diversity is maintained when a society protects 
and perhaps even encourages contrary viewpoints (via TSProb in the 
simulations), and when it chooses to invest in efforts such as funding 
research and higher education, that work to constantly (re)introduce 
diversity (via mr in the simulations). 
• Some kind of payoff must provide enough of a benefit that some people will 
choose to Refrain because they receive more from Refraining than profit 
provides them for Taking. This payoff could be something like the 
"Conscience" function C(x) in the simulations; it could also be a monetary 
payoff such as a tax credit or payment. 
• Demand must be elastic enough (low profit function slope k in the 
simulations) that, in contrast to what Hardin claimed, people feel they have a 
choice, and do not feel compelled to Take regardless of the temptation from 
profit. 
Although the factorial experiments were all run with constant population sizes, 
the importance of the profit function parameter k implies a rather discouraging 
conclusion about the impacts of increasing population. Increasing kin the experiments 
leads to commons destruction, regardless of the settings for other variables. Recall 
from the previous chapter that the slope and magnitude of the profit function increase 
with increasing population; thus, if population increases, so does k. Parameters that 
help prevent commons destruction (the "Conscience" function parameter m, and the 
diversity components TSProb and mr) are not affected by increasing population size. 
Since the impact of profit increases while the impacts from other parameters do not, 
there is little to counteract human greed as it grows with human population. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175 
The fat;::t that demand grows with population is built into the mathematical 
model and thus actually dictates this outcome - but demand increasing with 
population is (\II so consistent with the real world: profit is a function of supply and 
demand, which are functions of absolute as well as relative scarcity. As population 
grows, a resot:Jrce becomes not only scarcer in an absolute sense because of 
consumption, but also relatively scarcer because of increased numbers of would-be 
consumers. There are more DMs choosing to Take with increasing population for two 
re.asons: there1are more people making decisions because there are more of them, and 
Taking becom:es relatively more attractive to almost all DMs as the population grows 
(due to increa$ed k). 
Perhaps the most interesting, and unexpected, finding of these experiments was 
th'e importance of population diversity. This finding suggests that Ashby's (1956) Law 
of Requisite V;'ariety (LR V) might apply to these simulations. Ashby argued that, in 
order to be effective, the controller for a cybernetic system must be able to absorb at 
least as much ~variety9 as the system can produce: only variety can absorb (or "control") 
variety. Ashb}l' was concerned with cybernetic systems with feedback control in a very 
general sense, 1 and his LRV can be applied to many kinds of real systems. In this model, 
the GA "feedsl back" to the DMs the effects of their actions on the commons. The DMs 
act as the controller, and the commons is the system being controlled. Consistent with 
Ashby's law, only by maintaining a high enough level of variety themselves (via mr and 
TSProb) can tlhe DMs respond effectively to changes in the commons. When 
stochasticity is higher in the commons, it means the variety of the system being 
c ntrolled is higher, at least over a particular time period. Then the DMs require higher 
9 hby used "variety" to indicate Ute number of states a system could exhibit. 
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mr and/or TSProb in order to respond effectively: hence the significance of the 
interaction terms Stoch * mr and Stoch * TSProb. 
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The importance ofvariety in these experiments is also consistent with the 
Fundamental Theorem ofNatural Selection in real evolutionary systems. This theorem 
states that (Meffe & Ehrlich, 1993, p. 9): 
.. .'the rate of increase in fitness of any organism at any time is 
equal to its additive genetic variance in fitness at that time.' This means 
that the ability to adapt to changing circumstances is directly 
proportional to the amount of genetic diversity carried in a population. 
Loss of diversity is equated with loss of adaptability. A good working 
guideline, then, is that maintenance of genetic diversity in populations is 
good, and losses of diversity through drift, inbreeding, or other means, 
is bad. 
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Chapter VIII 
PHASE III: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
1. GAME THEORY ANALYSIS 
EMA V decision trees and game theory matrices provide different insights into 
decision processes. In decision trees, actions by others (including Nature) are 
represented by probabilistic event nodes, and the outcomes of these event nodes are 
only important insofar as they determine the payoffs received by the DM. In game 
theory, payoffs others will receive are important in their own right because they 
promote an understanding of the competitive and cooperative characteristics of the 
situation. Probabilities appear only if it is assumed that a player is using a mixed 
strategy. Although both game theory and decision theory rely on a strict definition of 
11rationality11 on the part of all decision-makers, in game theory assumptions must be 
made about what kind of decision rule other players are following (e.g., maximin, 
minimax regret, difference maximization, or mixed maximin). EMA V decision theory 
generally seeks to maximize expected utility; game theory seeks to identity the best 
strategy for a particular decision rule. 
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This analysis was motivated by Henry Hamburger's (1973) argument that 
commons dilemmas may not always be PDs. He argued that while many social 
dilemmas could be modeled as N-person PDs, conservation dilemmas may better be 
modeled as N-person games with elements of Chicken, or as "compound" games where 
different players play different games against one another (Hamburger, 1973). 
Discussions of environmental issues in the literature and in casual conversation suggest 
that some people do express preferences consistent with theN-person PD. However, 
others sound more like they perceive a game of Chicken because they see total 
destruction as being the worst possible outcome, instead of the second-worst outcome 
(see Figure 8.1). lfthis is so, it has important implications for solutions to 
environmental commons dilemmas, because Chicken, and its variations, do not have the 
non-pareto-optimal, dominant strategy of the PD, and are thus theoretically easier to 
solve. 
DMRefrains 
DMTakes 
OU1er player 
Refrain Take 
rn b 1 
Prisoner's dilemma 
c>a>d>b 
Oilier player 
Refrain Take 
DMRefrains ~ 
CEJ DM Takes 
Chicken 
c>a>b>d 
Figure 8.1. Two-person PO and Chicken, showing ordinal payoffs to row 
player (where "3" is best and "0" is worst). Cells are labeled a, b, c, d. "OM" is 
Decision Maker. PO and Chicken are symmetric by definition, and thus 
payoffs are the same to the column player. 
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Kinds of games 
There are two fundamental differences between the PD and Chicken: (I) the PD 
has a strongly dominant, non-pareto optimal strategy (always Take), whereas in 
Chicken, a player's optimal choice is to do the opposite of what other players do; and 
(2) if the outcome is total destruction of the commons, a PD player will still prefer 
Taking over Refraining, whereas a Chicken player's preference will be the reverse 
(see Figure 8.1). 
The preference orders for the two games are: 
PD: c>a>d> b 
Chicken: c > a > b > d 
Since Taking is dominant in the PD, any ordinary decision rule will produce the 
same result. However, with no dominant strategy, a Chicken player must pick a 
decision rule. In the absence of knowledge about what the other player will do, the 
most conservative choice would be to adopt a maximin strategy. A player who uses 
maximin would choose to Refrain because that way, the least bad "worst case" 
possibility would be chosen. In contrast, an optimist using an expected value decision 
rule would Take, because of an expectation that others would Refrain. A pessimist 
would Refrain. Maximin is consistent with the pessimists' choice, but not with the 
optimists' choice, and so ifthere is some rational reason for expecting a favorable 
situation, maximin could be an irrationally cautious rule for optimists. There are other 
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decision rules that coulcl be used, such as minimax regret, or difference maximizing, but 
a typical game theorist's recommendation would be to pick the dominant strategy, 
where possible, and use maximin if necessa1y (Hamburger, 1979). The other workhorse 
of decision-making is EMA V's expected value rul~e. Only the three most commonly 
recommended rules are ~xamined h~:re (pic~ the dominant alternative, maximin, and 
maximize EMA V). 
The games shown in Figure 8.1 are two person games, whereas there are so 
many DMs in the TOC that any underlying ~ames may be considered N-person games. 
It is customary to illustr;1te the payoffs in symmetric N-person games with graphs, 
where the payoffs for Tqking (usuallly calleq "Deflecting") and Refraining (usually 
called "Cooperating") d~pend on th(~ numb~r of total Refrainers Rand the maximum 
possible number of Takers T,11a.r; the I number of Takers is then T,11ax minus R. Although 
only ordinal payoffs such as those in Figure 8.1 alie required to define the two-person 
PD and Chicken, at leas1: interval payoffs ar~ required to create the graphs. Two-person 
symmetric interval game payoffs can be converted to N-person compound game 
payoffs as (Hamburger, 1973): 
(8.1) V (Refrain) = (q-b)R + b Tmax -a 
V (Take) = (c-d)R + d T,11a;d - d 
' 
where a, b, c, and d (se~ Figure 8.1) are int~rval payoffs, V (Refrain) is the payoff for 
Refraining, and V (Takq) is the payoff for Takin~. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181 
For example, ifthe ordinal payoffs 0, 1,2, 3 shown in Figure 8.1 were actually 
interval payoffs 0, I, 2, 3, and T,,ax were 100, then the payoff graphs for anN-person 
PD and an N-person Chicken game would look like the graphs in Figure 8.2. Note that 
V (Refrain) is undefined if there are no Rejrainers, and V (Take) is undefined ifthere 
are no Takers. 
NiJCrsonPD 
c Refrain Take 300 Refrain 2 0 
c 200 
.... - .. a Take 3 1 Q 1;' .. .. - 2-personPD 
~ 100 
"'"' Rcfmin .. -.. 
0 
b ..... - Refrain Take 
0 20 40 60 80 100 Refrain a b 
Rcfraincrs Take c d 
Template 
N-JlCrson Otickcn 
300 c 
c 200 Refrain Take Q 
Refrain I .... 2 I CIS 
~ 100 3 0 Take 
2-person Chicken 
20 40 60 80 100 
Rcfraincrs 
Figure 8.2. Payoff graphs of PD and Chicken. The vertical axes show the 
payoffs to a particular player for Taking or Refraining, given the total number 
of Refrainers shown on the horizontal axis. The payoffs to each player are 
calculated using Eq. (8.1 ). The matrices show the interval payoffs from the 
two-person games that underlie the N-person payoff calculations. The labels 
a,b,c,d on the graphs correspoJ}d to the cells in the matrices,_ as shown In the 
"Template" matrix. Note that V (Refrain, 0 Refrainers) and V (Take, 0 
Takers) are undefined. 
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The two most important characteristics that define an N-person PD graph are 
(Hamburger, 1979}: 
• V (Ta,ke) > V (Refrain): the Taking graph is always above Refraining graph: 
c > a and d > b: Taking is the dominant strategy. 
• V (R~frain), when: all Refrain> V (Take), when none Refrain: the right end 
ofth~ Refrain grar>h is higher than the left end of the Take graph: a> d: The 
domi1.1ant strategylproduces a deficient outcome. 
The mo~t important characteristics that define anN-person Chicken payoff 
graph are: 
• V (Refrain), whenlmost Take> V (Take), when most Take: b > d, opposite 
of PD. 
o V (T~ke), when most Refrain> V (Refrain), when most Refrain: c >a, 
same as PD. 
o V (Refrain), when1all Refrain> V (Take), when none Refrain: a> d, same 
•, 
as PD. 
The mai~1 indicator that distinguishes the two graphs is the fact that in the PD, 
the V (Take) anp V (Refrailll) graphs never cross, and V (Take) is always above 
V (Refrain). In Chicken, the 1graphs must cross somewhere because in Chicken, a 
player's prefereqce depends on how many other players Refrain. This is equivalent to 
saying that ther~ is no dominant strategy in Chicken, whereas there is in the PD, just as 
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is the case for two-player games. The crossing point of the Chicken graphs indicates a 
point of theoretically globally stable equilibrium becm.1se Taking is favored when the 
number of Refrainers is more than those at the crossqver point, and Refraining is 
favored when the number of Refrainers is less than tl)ose at the crossing point. If this 
equilibrium point could be identified, and everyone equid agree on who the Takers and 
Refrainers were to be, then this equilibrium would represent a themetical solution to an 
N-person game of Chicken. Unfortunately, the requir~ment that the crossover point be 
known, and that everyone must agree on who Takes ~nd who Refrains, is exactly why 
this kind of solution is so problematic in the real worlp. 
Two other games that are similar to Chicken, in that they have the same two 
stable equilibria, are Hero and Benevolent Chicken (aC) (see Figure 8.3). 
In Chicken, Benevolent Chicken, and Hero, if all players dd the same thing, 
they all receive either the worst or next-to-worst outQome. In Benevolent Chicken, the 
"I" and "2" mid-range payoffs of Chicken are swapp~d. In Benevolent and ordinary 
Chicken, a player's first choice is to Take and have the; others Refrain. In Chicken, the 
payoff for Refraining is greater if others Refrain than if they Take ~:a > b). In 
Benevolent Chicken, a player who Refrains magnaniQ1ously prefers. that the opponents 
Take: presumably the player is benevolent enough to prefer that at Ueast some players 
get the maximum payoff, even if that player is not in the more fortunate group. 
In Hero, the "2" and "3" payoffs ofBenevoleQt Chicken arel swapped. A Hero 
player's first choice is to be the only Refrainer. Hero is the game played by a certain 
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type of member of a crowd watching a person drowning. If everyone (iise stands 
around watching (i.e., Taking the ef}sy way out), then a player who jumps in to rescue 
the drowning victim gets to be a he
1
ro (i.e., by Refraining from taking the easy way 
out). If someone else jumps in ;first, this player would prefer not to juQlp in the water 
after all, so that, as in Chicken, b and c are both stable equilibria. 
300 
IS 200 
1;' 
l:lot IOO 
d 
20 
NiJCrson Hero 
40 60 
Rcfraincrs 
! c 
...-
:--
' a 
80 I IOO 
~~ IS 200 b 1;' __;n 
~:~otiOO~Rcf~ 
0 ' 
0 20 40 60 80 I IOO 
Rcfraincrs 
Refrain Take 1 
Refrain! I ·.Elo Taket-. -~2::---t--
2-person Hero 
Refrain T.ake 
Refrain! I ·a• 
Take. 3 'o 
2-person Benevolfnl Chi~:ken 
Figure 8.3. Payoff graphiS ami two-person games of Hero and Ben(,lvolentl 
Chicken. 
Hero, Chicken, and Benevolent Chicken are tricky dilemmas b~causel if 
everyone tries to get their best pay<llffs, they will all get their worst (Chicken land 
Benevolent Chicken) or next-t9-wmst (Hero) payoffs. In order to ac~eve one of the 
two pareto-optimal outcomes, f}ll players cannot make the same choic<;. It is 1interesting 
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that a worse outcome would result for these three games if all the players were 
following such idealistic guidelines as Kant's imperative (act 1so that if everyone's 
actions reflected the rule underlying your act, everyone would be better off) or the 
Golden Rule, than if there were a good mix of~elfish opportunists and virtuous 
idealists. Communication can help resolve thes~ games, unlike the PD (because of its 
dominant strategy), although the situation is alsp sensitive to threats and lies. 
Although symmetry is assumed to apply by definition in the games named above, 
Hamburger (1973) points out that inN-person ~ames, a player could be simultaneously 
playing several different games against other in~lividual players. Then the payoffs 
illustrated by the graphs for a particular player would be the sums of payoffs of multiple 
two-person games. If symmetry is assumed, then all players have the same payoffs and 
the calculations are straightforward; but there i~ no straightf<Orward way of representing 
N-person games where each player is simultaneously playing different games against 
other players, let alone ifthe game is a Hobbesi~n "Warre ofiAII against All" (Hobbes, 
1649). As argued earlier, assuming pairwise int~ractions in drder to represent N-person 
games becomes meaningless if there is a large n.umber of players. 
It is difficult to imagine that all the play~rs in the TOC could have the same 
payoff graphs, or be expecting that others had t.he same payoff graphs, let alone 
interacting pairwise. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that any1 player in the TOC in 
general knows what the rules are perceived to Qe by the othdr players, let alone what 
their payoffs might be. Any DM's payoffs, base~ on the calculations of the previous 
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assumed, no assumption can be made about any g&mes that might underlie those 
graphs. 
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Hamburger deals with this problem by showing how one player playing different 
pairwise games simultaneously against other playt~rs can have payoff graphs that look 
likeN-person PD or Chicken graphs (Hamburger, 1973)). While it is difficult to know 
what to call such graphs, Hamburger acknowledges that. it is nonetheless important to 
recognize the character of the resulting graphs. He thus 1he calls any graphs 11PD-Iike11 if 
they exhibit the typical c >a> d > bordering oftpe PD, or 11Chicken-like11 if they 
exhibit the c > a > b > d ordering of Chicken. ThC~ orde'ring of the endpoints a, b, c, 
and d of the payoff graphs could result from one player jplaying the same game pairwise 
against all other players, using Eq. (8.1), or from one plmyer playing different games 
pairwise against all other players, or simply from IOJ.ltCOil)le calculations based on how 
many Take and how many Refrain, without makin~ any !assumptions about other 
players' payoff graphs. Each player's payoff graph may in fact be unique, and ifthe 
ordering is c >a> d > b, consistent with the PD,, Jt would be called 11PD-Iike11 ; if it is 
c > a > b > d, consistent with Chicken, it would lb~ call~ed 11Chicken-like11 • 
The same approach is followed here. That is, if tlhe payoff orderings in a payoff 
graph are consistent with the ordering of, say, the ~1D, tine graph may be referred to as 
11PD-Iike. 11 It is impossible to tell from the graph Hpethew the DM is actually playing the 
PD, because the PD is defined by pairwise, symm lric p11yoffmatrices and any one 
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DM's graph reflects only that OM's payoffs, given the range of potential numbers of 
Refrainers \lSed to calculate the outcome. It only means that the payoffs for that DM 
are ordered in such a way that if the game were completely symmetric (all players "see" 
the same gr~ph), then it would be anN-person PD. The implication then is that Taking 
will be dom.inant for that I player, and that if most players Take, then players with the 
PD-Iike ontering will be worse off than they would have been if most had Refrained. 
Note that if other players! have different payoff graphs, so that, say, Taking is dominant 
for them but is also pareto optimal, everyone would still Take - but the players with 
the PD-Iike graphs would feel worse off than they would have if all had Refrained (a 
deficient outcome), while: the other kind of players would not (not a deficient 
outcome). The difference! in optimality of outcomes for players with different payoff 
orderings c<.m easily be shown in 2 X 2 game matrices, because the "We both Take" cell 
can be compared to the "We both Refrain" cell. N-player graphs only show the 
optimality of outcomes for players whose payoffs are represented by those graphs. 
TOC game~ 
In order to answer the question, "What kinds of games are people playing in the 
TOC?" it is helpful to simplifY the decision trees used in the EMA V simulations (see 
Chapter VI1 Section 4). Since the condition of the commons is strongly dependent on 
actions by t~e population as a whole10, the double event nodes from the decision trees 
10 The commqns condition is also detennined by its stochastic regeneration function, but in Ute game 
Uteory analysis stochasticity is ignored. 
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in the decision model section ("Number of Takers" and "Condition of commons") are 
combined into the single event nodes shown in Figure 8.4. 
p 
1 ==many, x· == Xmany l" '"""'1/la/li\Jl+ g/' C(;x J 
"rr "I' 'J'/ many 
1-p 
p 
1 ==many, x• == Xmany 
g/C(Xman;J 1-p 
Figure 8.4. Simplified decision tree for OM j. The choice (Take or Refrain) is 
indicated by the box on the left, and the event nodes are indicated with 
circles: either r ="few" (few Take, with probability p) and the commons will 
be in condition x· = Xrew. or many will Take (with probability 1-p) and the 
commons will be in condition x· = Xmany· XteW> Xmany· The payoffs are listed 
on the right hand side (see Chapter VI, Section 5), and they correspond to the 
payoff graph points labeled a, b, c, d. W;ris the profit function coefficient. The 
genes g, i and g2 i determine the coefficients of the "Conscience" C(x) 
penalty (for Taking) or reward (for Refraining) for DM j (see Table Ill). ;r(few) 
is the profit when few Take, and ;r(many) is the profit when many Take. 
One of the fundamental characteristics of a commons dilemma is that any 
c 
d 
a 
b 
individual DM's actions have negligible effect on the commons or on the choices made 
by others. This means that the probability estimates in Figure 8.4 are the same for 
Taking and Refraining. 
Because of the conditional independence of the event nodes from the decision, 
any attribute that has the same value for Taking as for Refraining will cancel out of the 
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decision. For example, in ~:cologkal economics it is not uncommon for a monotonically 
increasing, nonconsumabl~: value: attribute N(x) to be added to resource management 
decision trees (Pearce and Mora1n, 1994). N(x) is dependent on the state ofthe 
commons x and represents nonctj>nsumptive activities such as snorkeling to look at fish 
in a fishing commons, hiki1ng through a grazing commons, or saving a commons for 
later; existence values such as enjoying knowing that there are wolves in Yellowstone 
without expecting ever to see one; or saving the commons for later. As a very crude 
approximation, N(.'C) is assumed here to be linear, with slope n > 0 and y-intercept of 
0. N(O) is assumed to be zt~ro. Nma.~ corresponds to x = X111ax = K. Thus: 
(8.2) N(x) = llX + Nmax 
It is well beyond the scope of this work to determine what values should be 
used for Nma.t, and thus fo1r 11. As a first approximation, n is set proportional to -m 
(the slope ofC(x)) and Nmax is s1et proportional to Cmax· The impacts ofthe 
proportionality constants are discussed later. As was mentioned earlier, N(x) was left 
out of the decision tree, b1ecause it is independent of the choice. Any DM can enjoy the 
same non-use value regardless of whether that DM Takes or Refrains. 
The expected valu~: EVofthe nonconsumable value N(x) is a constant on both 
sides of the decision equat on, and hence is irrelevant to the decision (see Figure 8.5): 
(8.3) EV{N(x•), Take}== EV{N(x"), Refrain}= pw,/V(X[e .. ) + (1-p)w,/V(xman>) 
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l =jew, x•= Xftw 
ll'" 1I(few) + g/ C(XJC!<) + w,N(xprw) c 
p 
l = many, X • = Xman>' W:r ll(many)+ g/ C(Xman)) + w,N(Xman) cl 
1-p 
T' =jew x·= x.fi 
' ... gj C{XjCJ<) + WnN{Xfm•) a 
p 
l =many, x• = Xmany 
g/ C(Xman)) + w,N(Xman) b 1-p 
Figure 8.5. Decision tree including nonconsumable use value N(x). 
N(x) is far from irrelevant to a game theory analysis, as will be shown below, 
because only when it, or something like it, is included, can the PD or Chicken arise. 
The payoffs shown in Figure 8.5 are the same as those of Type ill DMs, with 
the addition of N(x). Recall that the DM Types are ranked in order of relative 
importance of "Conscience": 
• Type I's have no "Conscience" and always Take; 
• Type Il's usually Take but pay a "Conscience" penalty for Taking that 
becomes important when the commons becomes badly degraded; 
• Type III's not only pay a "Conscience" penalty for Taking but also receive a 
"Conscience" reward for Refraining, and so they Refrain more readily than 
Type II's; and 
• Type IV's always Refrain because they receive no reward for Taking. 
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Type III payoffs ar·e used as the base case in the analysis that follows. Types I, 
II, and IV DMs result whe11 terms are dropped from the Type III model. This fact will 
be used to evaluate what kjnds of gameis the different OM Types are playing. 
The payoffs corresponding to the decision tree of Figure 8.5 are shown in the 
matrix form ofFigure 8.6. 
Most DMs choose: 
Refrain Take 
DMRefrains C(xj)+N(xj) 'r:(x,J+N(x,J 
DM Takes 1r()'ew}-C(xj) 1f(many)-C(xrn.~ 
+N(xj) +N(x,J 
Figure 8.6. Base ca.se payoffs for Type Ill OMs. The state of the commons 
when most OMs Refrain Is x,ow• and the state when most Take is xmanr· Thus, 
the "Conscience" pa¥off when most Refrain is C(x,0 j, and when mos Take it 
is C(xman/ The nonconsumable payoff when most Refrain is N(x,0 j, and 
when most Take it is N(xmanJ· Profit when most Take is n(many), and profit 
when most Refrain 15? n(few}. w" and the C(x) coefficients g1 and g2, though 
not shown, are impli£1d. I 
For a homogeneou~ population iWith the payoffs of Figure 8.6 to be playing an 
N-person PO, the weighteq payoffs must be such that the preference order is c > a > d 
> b: 
(8.4) ll(feu~- C(xfc11) +N(x1n) > C(x1J) + N(x1nJ > 
ll(many)- C(xman)+ N(xman) > C(xman)+N{xman) 
The inequalities of:j:!q. (8.4) will be considered one by one. 
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Last inequality ofEq. (8.4): tl > b 
Starting with the last inequality in Eq. (8.4), note that N(xman) can be subtracted 
from both sides of the inequality, and so it becomes: 
(8.5) 1l(many)- C(xman) > C(xman) 
Now, ;r(many) is a minimum whereas C(xman) is a maximum. This inequality 
will hold only ifthe weighted profit payoff when most Take, 1l(many), is greater than 
the "Conscience" payoff when most Take. Unless Eq. (8.5) holds, the game cannot be 
a PD: as long as the other inequalities hold, the game will instead be Chicken (c >a> 
b >d). 
Impacts from "Conscience" increase because of a higher attribute weight, higher 
C,ax, or because x is low (the commons is endangered). This means that the inequality 
will always hold for Type I's because their weight for C(x) is zero; and it will never hold 
for Type IV DMs, because their weight for 1C(1) is zero. Type III DM payoff graphs 
(see Figure 8. 7 ) are unlikely to show a PD-Iike ordering because ;r(many) approaches 
zero while 2C(xman) approaches a maximum; for them, b > d. Their payoff graphs can 
look like theN-person Chicken payoff graphs ofFigure 8.2 (c >a> b >d), but not 
like the PD graphs (c >a> d >b). For Type II DMs, it is possible ford> bas well as 
b > d. Their graphs can thus exhibit both PD-Iike and Chicken-like characteristics (as 
long as the other inequalities hold). 
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Type m payoffs, x=7500, with N(x) 
--V(Takc) ···················· V(Rcfrain) 
800 c 
c > a > b > d : Chicken 
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"' 
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Rcfraincrs 
Figure ~.7. Type Ill payoff g1raphs, including an appropriate N(x) (discussed 
below), showing Chic~en-like~ preference ordering (c >a > b >d). Although 
the dashed gnaph for t,he Ret,'raining payoff (line b-a) looks flat, it a~tually 
slopes liPWardls to the right (<~ > b). The condition of the commons is good 
(xrow = 7500). As the ~:ommons declines, the intersection of the twp lines 1 
would move towards t~e right, indicating a greater tendency to Refrain as the 
commons declines. 
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The pr(>fit and "Com,cienc{l" functions described earlier are us~d to areate these 
payoff graphs. The noncons1,1mabh~ value function N(x) was not inclucJed in tthe decision 
models, but is ~dded1 here. As a simplification, the regeneration of the commons is 
ignored and th~ state of the commons xis decreased by the number of units 1Taken in 
the calculation;; for G:(x) anc\ N(x) by replacing x with x - T. Thus, for' a Type III DM, 
the payoff gratlhs an; calcul<,tted m;ing Eq. (8.6) (see Figure 8. 7): 
(8.6) i7;11 {«1ke) = 1I(T) - C(x- T) + N(x- T) 
il;II (R~frain) = C(x -,· T) + N(x - T) 
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The payoff graphs for Type II DMs are calculated using the same Eq. (8.6) 
except that the coefficient for C(x-T) is 0.0 for V u(Rejrain) (see Figure 8.8). 
Type II payoffs, x=9800, with 
N(x) 
---V(Tnke) ··················· V(Refrnin) 
900 c>a>d>b:PD .....! ~ 600~ 1;······ .. ······ .. ······································· .. ··············· j:l., 300 b a 
0 I I I I I 
IC 
0 
.... 
~ j:l., 
0 60 120 180 240 300 
Refrainers 
Type II payoffs, x=2500, with 
N(x) 
---V(Tnke) ··················· V(Rcfrnin) 
300 
ISO 
0 
-ISO 
-300 
d Refrainers 
Figure 8.8. Type II payoff graphs, illustrating PD-Iike graphs when the 
commons is in good shape (x = 9800) but Chicken-like graphs when the 
commons Is in bad shape (x = 2500). In the upper graph, although it looks 
like the two graphs cross, they actually do not, because the payoff to 
Refrainers when none Refrain (labeled b) is undefined. 
When an appropriate N(x) is included (discussed below) and xis high, the 
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payoff graphs for Type II DMs exhibit the same characteristics as the PD payoff graphs 
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of Figure 8.2 (c > a> d > b); but when x is low, the payoff graphs exhibit the same 
characteristics as the Chicken graphs of Figure 8.2 (c >a> b >d). If N(x) is not 
included, Type II payoff graphs cannot be PD-li~e or Ghicken-like, but are instead like 
the graphs of Benevolent Chicken or Hero. 
Recall that the only difference between Chicken and the PD is that in the PD, a 
player prefers to Take even if everyone else is Tqking (d > b) but in Chicken, a player 
prefers to Refrain if everyone else is Taking (b ;>d). A.s long as the worst case 
outcome is still apparently not too bad, Type II payoff'graphs show the same ordering 
as the PD: they will always Take. However, if the wors:t case outcome approaches 
disaster, they "chicken out" and their payoff graphs are consistent instead with a game 
of Chicken: they have no dominant strategy. 
This is an intriguing result, because the perceived "disastrousness" of the worst 
case outcome determines whether Type II DMs nave a dominant choice or not. The 
PD-like graph in Figure 8.8 indicates a DM who will always Take, regardless of what 
others are expected to do. The Chicken-like grat>h in Figure 8.8 indicates a DM who 
prefers to do the opposite of what most others dp. Thus, in order to decide what to do, 
a person with the payoffs shown in the bottom graph of Figure 8.8 will need to guess 
what most other people's graphs look like, and/or will have to pick a decision rule. In 
contrast, a person with the payoffs of the PD-lik~ graph will not need to guess, and 
regardless of decision rule, can automatically Take. This is also true for Type I DMs, 
but neither of the more preservationist Type III'~ or Type IV's can get into PD games 
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because their "Consci~nce" functions provide a payoff for Refraining. 
Middle inequality ofEq~ (8.4): a> tl 
Returning now to the inequalities required for a PD in Eq. (8.4), the next 
inequality to the left iQ Eq. (8.4) is a little more complex (a> d): 
(8.7) C(X[eu)+ N(xfe\~ > 7f{many)- C(Xmanl + N(Xman)J or: 
C(xre\\J + C(XmanJJ > tr(many) + N(XmanJJ - N(X[ew) 
tr(many) is a minimum, and N(Xman) - N(XfimJ is always less than zero. As long 
as the weighted "Con11cienoe" function has some value, this inequality will probably 
hold, particularly for tpe more preservationist Types III and IV. This inequality is 
required for all four gc~mes !discussed above, and what it means is that the payoff to 
each Refrainer if all Rf.!frain is greater than the payoff to each Taker if all Take. This is 
the source of the dile~1ma 6fthe PD: Taking is domimmt in the PD, and so all will 
Take; but everyone w~mld be better off if all Refrained. 
A PD-Iike paypff gr·aph is more likely for larger populations made up of Type 
I's or Type II's becaus~ the 1more such Takers there are, the larger the difference 
between Xfew and XmanJ'(see Figure 8.9) For smaller populations, it is more likely that 
the inequality ofEq. (~.7) will not hold. IfEq. (8.7) does not hold, while the other 
inequalities do hold, T(:lking will still be dominant for Types I and II, but it will now be 
pareto-optimal (d > a). This calls to mind Hardin's historical equilibrium state, where 
everyone who wanted to could Take, with no problem, because there were few enough 
villagers that their totfj.l harvest remained below the commons ability to regenerate. 
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Figure 8.9. Payoff graphs for Type I OMs, including N(x). The upper graph is 
for a relatively large population (the maximum number of Refrainers = 
400), and the payoff ordering is PD-Iike (c>a>d>b). Taking is dominant but 
not pareto-optimal. The graph on the bottom is for a relatively small 
population (the maximum number of Refrainers = 100), and the payoff 
ordering is not PD-Iike: Taking is dominant, but because d > a, it is also 
pareto-optimal (P/0). 
First inequality of Eq. (8.4): c > a 
N(xreu) appears on both sides of the first inequality ofEq. (8.4), and so that 
197 
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inequality (c >a) becomes: 
(8.8) 1t(few) > 2 C(xrcw) 
11(few) is a maximum, while C(Xfew) is a minimum. As long as the weighted 
profit payoff is greater than the weighted "Conscience" payoff, then c >a, consistent 
with the PD as well as Chicken. If the DM discounts profit compared to "Conscience", 
so that a< c, neither the PD nor Chicken can occur. Refraining may then be 
dominant. This inequality thus will not apply for Type IV DMs, would be more likely 
for Type II's than for Type III's, and would always apply for Type ll's. 
An additional important inequality of Eq. (8.4): a > b 
The part of the inequality ofEq. (8.4) that may be the most interesting is the 
requirement that a > b for both PD and Chicken: 
(8.9) C(X[ew) + N(xfoJ > C(Xman;J + N(Xman;J or: 
N(x[e1.J - N(Xman;J > C(Xman;J - C(xre,J 
Unless a function that increases with x, such as N(x), is included, neither the PD 
nor Chicken can develop because without such a function, it is impossible for a > b: 
C(xrew) cannot be greater than C(xman;J Recall that N(x) represents the stake in the 
commons that players might have regardless of whether they Take or Refrain. There 
are four possibilities that allow a> b: (I) players may already be Taking, so that the 
value of their current investments will be diminished by others Taking (Muhsam, 1977); 
(2) they may hope to Take sometime in the future; (3) they may place a higher current 
and future nonconsumable value on a commons in good condition than one in bad 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199 
condition; or (4) they may feel foolish for Refraining if 9thers Take (but not if others 
Refrain). Feeling foolish is not represented by any ofthf(se three attmbutes, but it could 
be included if the game were shown as a regret matrix. 
Hardin's description of his herdsmen implied that they cared only for profit, and 
not at all about any nonconsumable value of the commo11s. Without iN(x), it is 
impossible for a > b for any DM. Does this mean they cpuld not be playing the PD? 
The answer to that question is fundamental to the differ~nce between game theory and 
decision theory. 
Hardin framed the herdsman's choice as whether or not he should add a cow to 
his herd, thus implying some stake in the commons eveq if the herdsman chose to 
Refrain. H.V. Muhsam (1977) argued that the TOC is algebraically :a PD when the 
herdsmen already have herds grazing on the commons. 1'he herdsman's existing herd 
will be negatively impacted if others add cattle, no maw~r what he does. This significant 
detail does not appear in an EMA V decision tree becaus~ it is independent of choice. If 
this decision is posed in the prescriptive decision theoretical way (as1 it is in the TOC 
simulations), then only the marginal attributes 7l{1) and (7(x) should lbe included. 
Including N(x) does no harm, because it has no effect; bt.lt it does mstke the calculations 
more complicated, without adding anything to the effica~y of the decision outcome. 
However, if only marginal attributes are carried 9ver into the! game theoretical 
representation, then N(x) would not be included there eit.her. Games I of Benevolent 
Chicken and Hero could then develop, but never PD or <,:hicken. Ihhe DM's total 
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welfare is represented, however, then N(x) would be included in the payoff calculations. 
Representing the decision "at the margin," as an economist might say, leads to a 
different game theoretical analysis than representing non-marginal aspects of the 
decision. "At the margin," the dilemma of the PD is invisible. 
A final requirement for the inequality ofEq. (8.9) to hold is that the slope 11 of 
the N(x) function must be steeper than the slope 111 of the "Conscience" function; i.e., 
dividing both sides ofEq. (8.9) by (x2 - x1) and taking the limit as t:.x approaches zero 
yields: 
(8.1 0} N(xn) - N(xr) > C(xr) - C(xn) 
dN dC 
->--
dx dx 
11 > -111 
It is thus necessary (though not sufficient) that the slope for the N(x) function 
be steeper than the slope for C(x), for Chicken or PD to develop. lfEq. (8.1 0) is 
reversed, the less dangerous games of Hero or Benevolent Chicken are more likely (as 
long as the other inequalities ofEq. (8.4) apply). What tllis means is that Chicken and 
the PD can only arise when ( 1) players receive a payoff that increases with x (such as 
N(x)) even if they Refrain, and (2} players' nonconsumable valuations of the commons 
are more sensitive to changes in the commons than their "Consciences" are. 
Intuition might suggest that it would make no sense for a person to actually 
prefer that others Take (b >a), regardless of one's own actions. However, that is why 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
201 
Benevolent Chicken and Hero are such interesting games: in Hero, the· player does not 
get to be a hero unless other people do the 11wrong11 thing (i.e., let the drowning victim 
drown). In Hero, players prefer that others Take so that they can get the glory of 
Refraining. This is analogous, for example, to a type of environmental activist who 
enjoys the spotlight and the "glory11 ofbeing more righteous than others, and would be 
disappointed if others actually did what the activist told them they should do (Dowie, 
1995). In Benevolent Chicken, players are more generous or community-minded than 
in Chicken (or the PD), because they prefer that at least some people get their first 
choice. 
Conclusion 
A long-term solution to the TOC requires that enough players prefer to Refrain 
that the commons does not get destroyed. If players have a dominant strategy, it does 
not matter what decision rule they follow or what they think others will do: Type I's 
always Take, and Type IV's always Refrain. For the less hard-line DM Types, the 
choice is more problematic. 
Types II and III Take when N(x) is included and the commons is not in too bad 
condition, but they do not have a dominant strategy when either N(x) is left out, or the 
commons is in bad condition (see Figure 8.10). If N(x) is left out, Types II and III 
payoff graphs look like Benevolent Chicken or Hero. If N(x) is included, Type II payoff 
graphs look like the PD when the commons is in good condition, but like Chicken if the 
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commons is in bad condition. With N(x), Type III graphs look like Chicken, Benevolent 
Chicken or Hero. Recall that Type III's are more like environmentalists than Type II's. 
N(:c:) included 
Type II 
Type III 
N(x) not included 
x =good 
PD 
BC 
BC 
x =bad 
Chicken 
Hero, BC, Chicken 
Hero 
Figure 8.1 0. Summary of payoff graph game types, for Type II and Ill OMs. 
"BC" indicates Benevolent Chicken. 
When these DMs do not have a dominant choice, their payoff graphs look like 
the N-person Chicken, Benevolent Chicken, or Hero graphs, and their preferences are 
then to do the opposite of what they think others will do. If they have some reason to 
believe that most other players' payoff graphs favor Taking, then they will Refrain 
because they expect others to Take. If they believe that other players' graphs are like 
Chicken, Benevolent Chicken, or Hero, then they have to estimate the condition of the 
commons and/or pick a decision rule. For example, if they use an expected value rule, 
pessimists will Refrain and optimists will Take. If they use a maximin rule, they will act 
like pessimists in that they will Refrain because it is the most conservative choice. 
Thus, a solution to the TOC requires a healthy contingent of pessimists because 
pessimistic players with no dominant choice prefer Refraining. This suggests that 
increasing the sense of fear or caution could help solve the TOC; this is consistent with 
the approach of educating people about the disasters looming if humans do not change 
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their ways. Interestingly, however, increasing people's appreciation for the 
nonconsumable value of the commons can only influence their preferences regarding 
other people's actions, because each person's own action has negligible effect on their 
own utilization of the nonconsumable commons value. That is the essence of commons 
dilemmas, of course: an individual's actions do not seem to matter; it is the actions of 
everyone together that matters. The fact that concern about what other people do is 
often what drives lobbying for governmental action is consistent with Hardin's 
argument that mutual coercion, mutually agreed on is the only feasible approach to 
solving social dilemmas (Hardin, 1968), although he was referring specifically to how 
to achieve population control. 
The game theory analysis indicates that is not just pessimists that are required, 
but diversity in general, to solve the TOC. If everyone has the same payoff graphs, and 
follows the same decision rule, then all will either Refrain or Take. The only exception 
to this claim is that if everyone is a Type IV, then all will Refrain, which could be 
considered an extreme case of a solution to the TOC. For Type IV's, doing without 
consumable commons products such as lumber, beef, or fish presents no problem. 
However, although no definition of a TOC solution was found in the literature review, 
it seems reasonable to assume that a solution implies some kind of optimal utilization of 
the commons, and not just abandoning any kind of extractive activities altogether. 
In contrast, if everyone is a Type I, then all will Take, and ifthey have no use 
for any kind of N(x), again the outcome is theoretically acceptable to them; but it is not 
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really a solution to the TOC because the commons would eventually be destroyed if the 
population grew. If instead the population is all Typei II's, and everyone has a payoff 
I 
graph like Chicken, and follows, say, a maximin rule, then all will Refrain, which is not 
a pareto-optimal outcome. Similarly, if everyone has a graph like Hero, is pessimistic, 
I 
and follows an expected value rule, then all will! also Refrain, and all will receive their 
I 
next-to-worst outcome. And so on: conformity leads: to ruin. 
I 
Unfortunately, even ifthere is enough diversi1ty and sense of caution for a 
particular population size, the solution still will! not be stable if population grows: once 
I 
the maximum sustainable number of allowable: Take1rs is reached, the population 
I 
increase must consist primarily of cautious pessimists who prefer to Refrain. If the 
I 
population grows, the profit function increases. in magnitude, and so Refraining 
I 
becomes less appealing as population, and thus demand, grows. 
I 
These major conclusions from the game theo~y analysis (that diversity is 
I 
important and that population growth threatens the stability of any solution) were also 
I 
important findings from the EMA V-based simulation! experiments of the last section. 
I 
Hardin said nothing about population diversity, but his thesis about the futility of any 
solutions that do not include population control appears to be robust from both a game 
I 
theory and a decision theory perspective. It is interes1ting that Hardin's formulation does 
i 
not produce a PD-Iike game unless it is assumed that the herdsmen have a stake in the 
I 
commons even if they choose to Refrain. Rela:ted to lthis is the implication that an 
I 
attribute N(x) that is pivotal to the game theory results, is irrelevant to an EMA V 
I 
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analysis1 1• 
The importance of C (x) in the EMA Y simulations and game theory analysis 
conflicts to some extent with Hardin's dismi~sal of solutions based on "appeals to 
conscience." In the game theory analysis anq the EMA V simulations, "Conscience" is 
an important factor in diminishing the inevit~bility of Taking. "Conscience" helps payoff 
graphs to conform to more tractable preferepce stmctures consistent with Hero or 
Benevolent Chicken, rather than more threatening preference stmctures consistent with 
the PD. A factor that game theory highlight&, but is hidden in the EMA V simulations, is 
the role ofbeliefs about the state of the co111JI1ons: the probability estimates in the 
EMA V decision trees that reflected DMs' b~:~liefs labout the state of the commons were 
not found to be significant in any of the fact9rial experiments, implying that 
expectations about the state of the common~ or number of Takers would not affect the 
dominance of a choice12. Yet the game theon• analysis showed how expectations about 
the state of the commons could turn a game ofPD into a game of Chicken, at least for 
the Type II DMs. Because PD has a dominant stJ:rategy whereas Chicken does not, this 
is an important finding that the EMA V analysis missed. 
11 Although N(x) drops out of the decision trees, if 11 DM 1includes N(x), then N(x) contributes to the 
"fitness" calculation used in tlte GA. This effect is e1ffimined in t11c solution simulations of tltc next 
chapter. 
12 As noted before, tl1is was because oftlte rigidity o.fmost oftlle DM Types, in tltat only tlte Type III's 
arc likely to change tlteir choices when expectation~ change. The optimism/pessimism alleles for t11e 
ga gene do sometimes turn out to be important, in ~c solution simulations. 
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2. SOLUTION SIMULATIONS I 
Six overlapping categories of solutions to the TOC were discussed in Chapter 
IV: technology, community identification and moral considerations, financial incentives, 
property rights, regulatory control, and population control. A seventh possibility, 
nonconsumable value N(x), was found to be important by the game theory analysis. In 
this third, and final, phase of the work, the results of the factorial experiments from 
Phase II (Chapter VII) were used to select a baseline simulation, which was then 
modified in order to simulate important charact~lristics of these potential solutions. A 
summary of the solution categories, how they were simulated, and a brief explanation 
for each, is given in Table VII. 
Solutions based on privatizing the commons ca111not be represented with the 
simulation, because the simulation is based on an assumption! of common access; in 
effect, the private property solution to the TOC means eliminating the commons, which 
is not assumed to be a solution. Population control is included in the analysis of each 
solution approach rather than explicitly as a separate category, because the question 
investigated was whether any of the solutions could be made:to work without 
population control. Also, it was assumed and demonstrated in Phase I that population 
control could solve the TOC (see Figures 7.1 and 7.3), becaUJse as long as the number 
of Takers is kept below the sustainable harvest I eve! ( 100 commons units per iteration), 
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Solution <;.n,cgorly Paramc*cr(s) or functions ExaJianation 
used to simulnt·c 
I. Tcclmolo~ I Ia. Profit functi,on parameter k Tcclmology decreases 
demand for the commons by 
providing substitutes and/or 
increasing cfficiensr. 
lb. Com'mons r<~gcneration rate Tcclmology increases supply 
constant r0 by increasing the 
regeneration rate. 
2. Commtl~hY id!entification "Consci~ncc" function Responsibility to others is 
paramett;r m represented by increasing 
tlte sense of guilt for Taking 
and/or virtue for Refraining. 
3. Noncmistmmblle value Noncon~umablc: attribute N(x) drops out of decision 
function I function N(x} trees but was shown to be 
potentially important in tlte 
4. Financial incclntivcs Penal tie~ or bonuses modifying 
game theory analysis. 
Taxes, credits, and fines arc 
the profit function 11(1') used to reward potential 
Takers for Refraining or 
5. Property right$ Not sim\Jiatcd 
penalize them for Taking. 
If tlte commons is 
liquidated, or othcnvise 
divided up among users, the 
TOC no longer applies and 
tlte simulation does not well 
represent the situation. 
6. Rcgulaiob· comtrol Penalty function for Taking if A maximum allowable 
more th<1n tltc harvest limit harvest level MaxTakers is 
MaxTak~rs is exceeded enforced witlt a penalty 
function imposed on illegal 
7. Popula\i~ln cmhtrol Exponer,tial population growth 
Takers who get caught. 
Included in each solution 
parametpr G, upper limit to analysis rather than as a 
populatipn size Popmax. and/or separate section, eitlter by 
profit fupction parameter k, controlling population, or by 
"Conscit;ncc" flllnction demonstrating how any 
paramctpr m. regeneration rate solution has to clmngc if 
constant r0 , and population is allowed to 
noncons.umablc attribute grow. 
function N(x} 
Table VII. ~~~lutioln categories, methods for simulating, and brief explanations. 
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the commons is assumed to be able to regenerate. Thus, this chapter consists of 
simulations to explore the technology, community identification, financial incentives, 
nonconsumable value, and regulatory control approaches to solving the TOC. Each 
approach is examined in the light of the effects of population growth. 
Unless otherwise indicated, "Conscience" is included in all the simulations, 
because it is difficult to imagine that any real village could not have some people who 
take some degree of community or moral considerations into account. With the 
"Conscience" function at a fairly low level (m = 0.02), and profit at a fairly high level (k 
= 3.0), "Conscience" has enough of an effect to allow a population ofup to about 150 
potential Takers to harvest at or below the sustainable level (100 units) indefinitely. If 
the population grows, demand increases to the point that the effects from "Conscience" 
are overwhelmed. Then, unless some other solution mechanism is implemented, the 
commons will be destroyed. 
Technological solutions 
One of the abiding hopes of many people in the world is that scientists and 
engineers can find ways to mitigate if not solve the growing problems with commonses 
in the world. Fish farming, for example, now provides 14% of the fish sold in the 
world, and the percentage is increasing rapidly (Brown, Lenssen, and Kane, 1995). 
Most of the wild salmon runs in the Columbia River basin have been replaced with 
declining populations of hatchery fish (Huntington, Nehlsen, and Bowers, 1996). Air 
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pollution has been decreased in many places by automobile exhaust cleaning technology 
such as catalytic converters and increased efficiency of internal combustion engines, 
and by "scrubbers" installed in factory exhaust pipes (Brown, Lenssen, and Kane, 
1995). Sewage treatment plants remove much ofthe pollutfon thlat cities would 
otherwise pump into rivers. And so on. 
Technology is often viewed not as the hero but as t~1e villain, however. For 
example, in Atlantic as well as Pacific ocean fisheries, inte111atiomal fleets of huge 
factory trawler ships using sophisticated technologies for fipding and catching fish have 
decimated the once-abundant cod, mackerel, herring, anclwvy, haddock, halibut, and 
other stocks that were sustainably fished for centuries by srnall-scale artisanal fishers. 
As the stocks declined, technology provided ever-more-eff~ctive tools for finding and 
catching the smaller, younger, and more widely dispersed fi,sh that remained as the 
fisheries declined. The fish populations collapsed, and trawlers switched to other 
species. Artisanal fishers, out-competed and out-maneuvered by the international 
fleets, appealed to their governments for help, and many w~nt out of business (Fairlie, 
Hagler, and O'Riordan, 1995). None ofthe decimated stoc~cs have ever recovered. 
Whether the net effects of technology are beneficial or harmful is not the 
question here, however. The question is whether it makes ~ense to assume that 
technology can make it possible for the human population t.o continue growing and 
consuming at the current rate: can the TOC be averted by techniDlogy? 
These simulations investigate, in a very simple way, what might be required for 
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technology to solve the TOC, given a growing population. The simulations rely on 
"best case" assumptions about human rationality and the regeneration of the commons. 
The baseline simulation (see Figure 8.11) is essentially the second simulation ofPhase 
I, where potential fishers trade off profit and "Conscience" in making their decisions. In 
this baseline case, as long as the number of potential Takers stays below about 150, the 
village harvests sustainably enough to allow the commons to regenerate itself. If the 
population grows, however, demand increases, and the harvest level exceeds the ability 
ofthe commons to regenerate (Figure 8.11) 13• Then the commons is destroyed. 
Baseline simulation 
200 k =3.0, m=0.02 10000 
Pop 8000 
6000 
.., 
~ = 0 
u 100 Takers 8 ~ 8 E-o 4000 0 u 
. 
' 2000 
\commons 
I 
0 0 
.-4 .-4 .-4 .-4 .-4 .-4 
-c::> c::> c::> c::> c::> c::> Iters N ..,. \Q 00 c::> N 
.-4 
-
Figure 8.11. TOC with population growth Gat 0.001 per iteration, profit 
function paramter k of 3.0, and "Conscience" function parameter m = 0.02. 
The same simulation with G of 0 produces sustainable harvesting forever, 
but with a growth rate of 0.1% per iteration, the commons is destroyed by 
about 550 iterations. 
13 The graphs shown in tllis section were chosen because tltey were typical of the results for multiple 
runs using diJTerent mndom number seeds. 
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Technology can theoretically help in three ways: 1) increasing the effective 
regeneration rate of the commons via, for example, hatcheries; 2) providing substitutes 
via, for example, fish farms or providing alternate food sources; and 3) increasing the 
efficiency of use, so that one fi,sh, for example, feeds more people. The later two 
approaches (providing substitutes and increasing efficiency) work to decrease demand, 
which is represe[lted in the code by the marginal profit function parameter k. The first 
approach (increa~ing supply) can be represented in the simulations by increasing the 
effective regenerfltion rate constant r0. 
Decreasi~g demand I 
It was shpwn in the faatorial experiments of Phase II that decreasing k is indeed 
an important fac(:or in allowing the commons to survive. However, as long as demand 
otherwise tends (:o increase with population, technology must work to decrease k at 
least as much as population tends to increase it. For example, cutting kin half in the 
simulation permiJs the commons to last another couple of hundred iterations, but 
eventually the pqpulation grows to the point that the commons is demolished (Figure 
8.12). 
In order tor the populaltion to continue growing without destroying the 
commons, k wm.jld have to continue declining, due to improving either efficiency or the 
availability of attractive substitutes. To simulate this, the code was modified so that 
whenever the COinmons falls below some critical value, such as Xma.t /4 (xma.t is the 
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maximum level that the commons can be), k is decreased by an arbitrarily chosen value 
of I 0%. The result is shown in Figure 8.13. 
Decreasing k 
300 10000 
X 
Pop 7500 
"' 200 "' ... c 
~ Q 5000 8 :a 8 
;> 100 
Q 
u 
Takers 2500 
0 0 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
0 0 0 0 0 0 lters N ...,. \Q 00 0 N 
.... .... 
Figure 8.12. The baseline simulation (Figure 8.11 ), but with demand 
parameter k decreased by half. The commons survives longer than before, 
but still is harvested to extinction. 
The stepwise reduction in k reflects a decrease in the slope andy-intercept of the 
marginal profit function (k is essentially the slope of the demand curve). Recall that in 
the base simulation, demand increases proportional to population. Technology's 
challenge is to counteract this growing demand by providing substitutes or efficiencies 
that decrease demand. In Figure 8.13, as population grows, the initial slope k0 = 3.0 
remains constant up to the point that the increasing number of Takers has depleted the 
commons down to Xma-c /4 (at about iteration 98). Then technology decreases k by 10%, 
but x is still below X111a-c /4 and so k is immediately decreased again, and again -until 
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x gets the chance to climb back above Xmax /4 (k = 0.9). k remains constant at the new 
value while the population continues to grow, until x drops too far again, and so on 
until the end of this run, when kfi the final value fork, drops to 0.3. 
~ 
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500 
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100 
0 
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c. 300 Q 
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................... Takers Co11111Dns 
.... .... .... .... .... .... 
0 0 0 0 0 
N ..,. \Q QO 0 
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···················Pop k 
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0 
N 
.... 
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Figure 8.13. Simulation results when the profit function parameter k Is 
decreased by 10% if the commons falls below Xmax14. The upper graph 
shows the number of Takers and the state of the commons over 1200 
iterations; the lower graph shows the total population and k over the same 
period. 
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Demand is thus torn between two forces: growing population driving it up, and 
technology driving it down. At the beginning of the simulation in Figure 8.13, the ratio 
ofthe profit parameter and the 11Conscience11 parameter is kim= 150; but by the end of 
the simulation, the ratio is only 14.8. 11Conscience11 is then relatively much more 
important compared to profit, simply because demand for the commons product has 
dropped dramatically, while no change has been made in the 11Conscience11 function. 
In order for the commons to survive in this simulation, technology has to 
continually increase the availability of attractive substitutes, or increase efficiency of 
use. In order to sustain about a tripling of population, technology has to decrease 
demand by a factor often (k01kr= 3.0 I 0.3). To allow population to continue growing, 
it would be necessary for technology to continue decreasing demand, at an exponential 
rate, at the same time that there are exponential increases in demand due to growing 
population. Harrison points out that it is not only growing population but also growing 
per-person consumption that creates the challenge for technology today. He says that 
even using the U.N.'s lowest projections, by 2050, per-person consumption of natural 
resources will have doubled. In order to maintain to day's destructive rate of impact on 
the environment, let alone to decrease it, Harrison says that technology would have to 
cut the damage done by each unit of consumption by 72 percent (Harrison, 1994). 
Unfortunately, there is good evidence that the law of declining marginal returns, 
and not the law of exponential growth, tends to apply to technological progress with 
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respect to natural resources. For example, the technological wonders that created the 
"green revolution" in agriculture initially developed at an exponential rate. The green 
revolution at first caused food prices to drop and supplies to increase, not only because 
of increased efficiency but also because of the ongoing introduction of new and 
improved products. In recent years, however, the rate of increase has fallen off in a 
way that looks very much like a typical graph of a function exhibiting declining 
marginal returns (Brown, Lenssen, and Kane, 1995). The decline is attributed primarily 
to increasing degradation of commonses world wide: growing populations have 
replaced former farmland with cities, grazing areas have become severely degraded due 
to overgrazing and desertification, groundwater supplies have become diminished, and 
the biodiversity of important bacteriological and insect "friends" has declined, while the 
pesticide-resistence ofbacteriological and insect "foes" has increased. Technology, 
which often has actually helped exacerbate these relatively new problems, has had little 
success solving them. 
Scientists have also had little success developing substitutes for any vital 
commonses. This is a particular concern in poor countries. For example, much of the 
"third world" depends on local fisheries for most of their protein, and can neither turn 
to increased imports (because of relative poverty) nor to new local food sources such 
as farming, since environmental degradation tends to be particularly acute in these 
areas. In ironic contrast to the difficulties poor countries have in finding suhstitutes for 
the fish on which they are so dependent, rich countries have actually increased their 
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rate of substitution offish for other meats: in 1988-1989, consumers in rich countries 
ate nearly three times as much fish per person as did people in poor countries (Kent, 
1995). Not only do we in the north eat more fish (much ofwhich comes from poor 
countries), we use more fish to feed the poultry and pork that we are increasingly 
substituting for beef: 30% of the world's fish catch is converted to fishmeal, and half of 
that is exported to developed nations to feed poultry and pigs (Kent, 1995). 
Technology is certainly playing a role in this conversion, but so far it has hurt, not 
helped, the destruction of the world's fishing commonses. 
Increasing supply 
If cutting demand is not enough, then perhaps increasing supply will work. For 
example, technology could increase the regeneration rate constant r 0 when a commons 
becomes depleted to some level, say X111ax /4. In the simulation shown in Figure 8.14, the 
regeneration rate increases by 20% whenever the commons falls below X111ax /4. 
Technology saves the day. However, r0 has to increase tenfold -from 0.04 to 0.4 -
in order to sustain a little more than a threefold population increase. Since population 
increases exponentially, r0 has to increase exponentially as well. The increase in r0 is 
guaranteed in the simulation, as is the determination of the critical commons level at 
which the increase is needed. This is not the case in the real world. Furthermore, the 
real world is stochastic. Stochasticity of the commons was held low in the above 
examples (Stoch = 0.8), but increasing it slightly (to 1.0) leads to the results shown in 
Figure 8.15. 
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Figure 8.14. Baseline simulation (Figure 8.11), but with a 20% increase in r0 
whenever the commons falls below Xmax 14. The upper graph shows the 
number of Takers and the state of the commons over 1200 iterations, while 
the population grows from 150 to 500. The lower graph shows r0 and the total 
population over the same period. 
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Figure 8.15. Baseline simulation (Figure 8.14), but with a more stochastic 
commons (Stach = 1.0, compan~d to 0.8 in previous examples). Increasing 
r0 by 20% is adequate to save the commons with relatively low stochasticity, 
but not when it is increased sligmly. 1 
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Hardin's (1968) main thesis WllS that population growth belongs to the class of 
problems for which there is no technological soluti.on. The simulations suggest that if 
supply could be reliably increased and/or demand reliably decreased, technology can 
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help solve the TOC. However, for population to continue growing exponentially 
indefinitely, technology must also grow exponentially indefinitely, with some margin to 
allow for stochasticity. That is, engineers and scientists must find new substitutes, 
increase efficiency, and/or increase commons production, at an exponentiallly increasing 
rate. 
If this seems reasonable to expect, then Hardin's thesis would not be supported. 
However, the evidence of the "green revolution," let alone the world's fisHeries, is not 
encouraging. Technology's response to depleted ocean fisheries has been to fish more 
efficiently and voraciously, thus accelerating, not mitigating, the~ destruction. In 
agriculture, the initial miraculous efficiency improvements and new product 
developments ofthe green revolution have more recently exhibited a clearldependence 
on the law of declining marginal returns. If the law of declining marginal n~turns and 
not the law of exponential growth applies to increasing the supply of, or decreasing the 
demand for, natural resources, then Hardin's thesis is supported. 
Community identification and moral concerns 
Commons management by small, close-knit communities has a long and mostly 
successful history, at least until the current century. In the simulations, the1 
"Conscience" function C(x) is used to represent the major driving force behind 
successful community-based management, as well as the effects of (other) moral 
considerations. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
220 
"Conscience" adds a penalty for Taking and/or a reward for Refraining to some 
of the OMs' decision trees and game matrices. The simulation outcome for a relatively 
low "Conscience" parameter 111 is shown above in the baseline simulation ofFigure 
8.11: the profit parameter k is 3.0 and the "Conscience" parameter 111 is 0.02. kim= 
150, and "Conscience" is inadequate to prevent the destruction of the commons. 
Doubling m permits the commons to survive up to a maximum population of about 200 
(see Figure 7.3, Chapter VII). What would it take form to allow indefinite population 
growth? 
To answer this question, a similar approach was taken to that used for 
decreasing k or increasing r0• In the computer code, 111 is increased by an arbitrarily 
chosen 10% whenever the commons falls below X111ax /4. Nothing else is changed: there 
are still the same four DM Types, each of which has a pessimist version and an optimist 
version, stochasticity is relatively low (Stoch = 0.8), and k= 3.0. The result is shown 
in Figure 8.16. 
The initial ratio kim in the simulation shown in Figure 8.16 is 3.0/0.02 or 150, 
and the final rat~o, after the population increases by a factor of3.3 (to 500), is 15.2. 
The conclusion that could be drawn here is that increasing the relative importance of 
OMs' "Consciences" whenever the commons becomes depleted does allow the 
commons to survive. Those who still decide to Take and are unaffected by their 
"Consciences" (Type l's ) still receive the same profit payoff, but when the 
"Conscience" function becomes relatively more important, those who are affected by 
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their "Consciences" (Types II, III and IV) receive higher p<;tyoffs.1The selection 
mechanism of the GA tends to help them prevail, and thus to save the commons. 
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Figure 8.16. Simulation results for increasing "Conscience" function 
parameter m by 10% whenever the commons falls below Xmaxl/4. Population 
more than triples while m increases tenfold. 
What this might represent in the real world is increa~ed power for the 
conservationist movement, as more people become concerned about the social and 
221 
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ethical implications of degrading a natural resource. Increasing m represents decreased 
social approval of commercial activities that harm the commons, leading perhaps to the 
enactment of stronger environmental laws. A smaller portion of the population would 
be engaged in harvesting the commons, and would receive higher profits because of the 
drop in supply; but because of the decreased supply and higher prices, consumers 
would have to pay higher prices, do without, or switch to substitutes. It is difficult to 
imagine a growing population being able to simply give up an important food source or 
source of income unless something else becomes available; hence, for this solution to 
work, technology would probably also have to be developing substitutes so that people 
have jobs and resources to switch to. Otherwise, decreased supply and higher prices 
would eventually counteract the effects of increased m, and the 11Conscience11 solution 
would fail. 
For example, environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act cancelled 
most public timber sales in the Pacific Northwest in the late 1980's, just when a 
population and building boom began in the region. Demand for lumber increased at the 
same time that supplies decreased. The outcry from the affected public eventually led to 
a suspension of environmental laws so that logging could resume. The same kind of 
thing has happened repeatedly during the past century in countless small towns 
dependent on fisheries all over the world: at the same time that supplies are decreasing, 
demand is increasing. In the simulations, as X declines, the value of 11Conscience11 C(x) 
increases stepwise - but if increasing population causes demand to increase, it will 
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always eventually outstrip the effects of "Conscience," unless the C(x) function itself 
increases, via increasing m. 
This suggests a potential cyclic pattern to increases in demand and 
"Conscience". For example, having m increase by 10% whenever the commons falls 
below, say, X111oxl4, while demand is steadily increasing leads to a kind of accelerating 
arms race between the conservationists and the fishers. Whenever the commons 
becomes too depleted, conservationists raise the "Conscience" level, , and lobbying for 
stricter controls or laws. If they are successful, unemployment may increase, and 
consumers may begin to object to lower supplies and higher prices. Extractors and 
consumers increase demand to the point that potential profit again exceeds the impacts 
of "Conscience". And so on, as the cycle repeats. 
It is hard to imagine this contest continuing indefinitely in the real world, as it 
could in the simulation. One side or the other could get tired of the battle. Extractors 
could stay in power long enough to destroy the commons, or conservationists could 
eventually cause extractors to give up and switch to another profession. Technology 
could provide substitutes or efficiency measures that reduce demand. 
How long the contest continues depends on how long the commons survives: 
once the commons is gone, the contest is over. The extractors can end the battle any 
time by either giving up or by destroying the commons. If they give up, and the 
commons recovers, the contest could start all over again. The effect of the 
conservationists is actually to prolong the fight by conserving the commons. The only 
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way they can end the contest is by giving up so that the extractors destroy the 
commons, or by somehow reducing demand to the point that extractors choose, or are 
forced, to give up themselves. In a game theory matrix, this contest might look like 
Figure 8.17. 
Takers Refrain 
Takers Take 
Environ1nenta/ists 
Give up Fight 
1,3 0,2 
3,0 2,1 
Figure 8.17. Game between conservationist and extractor pressure groups, 
showing ordinal payoffs where the maximum = 3 and the minimum = 0. 
Takers have a dominant strategy (always Take), whereas conservationists 
prefer to fight if the Takers Take ive up if Takers Refrain. 
In the game ofFigure 8.17, Takers will always Take, regardless of what the 
conservationists do. Conservationists do not have a dominant strategy, but prefer to 
fight if Takers Take give up if Takers Refrain. They know Takers have a dominant 
strategy, and so they must continue fighting: they end up in the lower right hand cell of 
the matrix in Figure 8.17. This is a stable outcome, as well as pareto optimal, at least in 
theory. In this formulation, the game goes on as long as the commons survives. For the 
game to change, the rules or payoffs would have to change as well. 
When there was a rush to enact new environmental laws in the 1960s and 
1970s, the conservationists were winning. Takers did not give up, however, and by the 
mid-1990s, attacks on those laws by Congress implied that the Takers were winning for 
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the moment, although conservationists had not given up either. If the relaxation in 
environmental laws leads to increased commons destruction, then the level of public 
alarm may rise again. Neither side has shown any inclination to give up, consistent with 
the payoffs shown in Figure 8.17. 
It is worth considering briefly what the effects might be of different 
formulations for the "Conscience" function discussed in Chapter VI. Although C(x) is 
modeled here as a linearly decreasing function of x, a case could be made for it being 
something different, particularly a higher order or exponential function, a 
nonmonotonic but still continuous "humped" function, or a step function. 
For example, instead of increasing linearly as x declines, C(x) could increase at 
an increasing rate as the commons declines, in the form of a higher order or exponential 
function (see Figure 8.18). 
Then, when the commons becomes severely endangered, C(x) might be more 
effective at getting DMs to Refrain because its worth, relative to the profit function, 
would be greater than it is as an equivalent linear function. This would appear to 
enhance its potential for solving the TOC, because the impacts of an exponential C(x) 
would be greater at lower x, when they are most needed, than they are for an 
equivalent linear C(x). It does not seem unreasonable to believe that at least some 
people become much more alarmed about threatened commonses than a linear C(x) 
implies, and for them an exponential C(x) would appear to be more reasonable. 
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There is not as much difference between an exponential C(x) and an equivalent 
linear C(x) as it might seem, because the exponential form is essentially equivalen~ in 
effect to a series of linear functions whose slopes increase as x declines. In the 
simulations described above, a 11Conscience11 solution can always be found for any 
population size as long as the 11Conscience11 function parame~er m ~can increase as 
needed. The slope of C(x) that really matters is the slope wh~n x drops low enou~h to 
be endangered, because as long as x remains adequate, ther~ is enough self-restra,int in 
the population that the DMs can avoid destroying the commpns. 1 
There are three main difficulties that the exponential tiJnction approach ha~ in 
common with the linear formulation: (1) Just as with the lineflr C();~, as long as profit is 
proportional to population while C(x) is a function of the cornmons, increased depmnd 
due to increased population will still eventually outstrip the ~ffects of the 11Consci~nce11 
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function. At what point that occurs depends on the slope andy-intercept, regardless of 
whether the function is linear or exponential. (2) As species become threatened or 
endangered, their ability to recover is increasingly sensitive to environmental 
stochasticity. There is a threshold value for x below which a species or population 
cannot recover, and any form of C(x) would have to stop the harvesting before the 
commons falls below that threshold value, or the commons cannot recover. No one 
knows what that threshold value is for any species, and the problem is exacerbated 
because environmental and species demographic stochasticity increases as habitats 
become degraded. (3) Just as with the linear formulation, different people have 
different threshold alarm levels, and enough of them would have to have a high enough 
cutoff point to prevent commons destruction. 
As for the "hump" shaped C(x) discussed in Chapter VI, recall that for this kind 
of C(x), the maximum values fall somewhere in the middle of the range ofx rather than 
towards the lower end. If the commons is in very poor condition, instead of caring 
more about saving the endangered commons, as they do in the linear or exponential 
formulations, DMs may decide that it does not matter what they do since the commons 
is doomed anyway. Then C(x) approaches zero as x declines. At the other end of the 
continuum, just as with the linear or exponential formulations, most DMs believe that 
as long as the commons is in excellent condition, again it does not matter what they do. 
Thus, DMs with a "humped" C(x) would be more reluctant to Take while x was in the 
mid range but less reluctant to Take ifthe commons became degraded (or ifit was in 
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good condition). Particularly if stochasticity is a factor, such a "Conscience" function 
would not tend to help solve the TOC because its effec;ts would become less effective 
just as the need for it intensified. Although no rigorom; study was conducted, during 
the development stages of this work, simulations were performed with the linear C(x) 
replaced with various "humped" functions, and no disqernible difference in outcome 
was found. 
A third possibility is to represent the "Conscier1ce" function as a stepwise, or 
discontinuous, function. The Endangered Species Act, for example, ,"kicks in" at a very 
low level of x and otherwise requires no particular activities to protlect species that 
may be at risk but are not defined as "threatened" und~r the Act. If the steps increased 
uniformly as x declined, it would have no discernible ~ffect on the ultimate conclusions 
because the effect would be approximately the same a~ a linear function drawn through 
the steps. If they increased more steeply, the equivaleqt continuous !function would be 
polynomial or exponential, with the effect discussed al;love; and if a more "humped" 
function could be fitted through the steps, the effect would be roughly the same as for 
the continuous "hump" function. 
As discussed in Chapter VI, it is difficult to say what people'1s various 
"Conscience" functions ought to be, and the linear forrn was chosen I because it seemed 
reasonable and because there was no compelling reaso,n for anything more complex. 
Nonetheless, this could be a fruitful line for further res~arch. 
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Nonconsumable value 
In the game theory analy&is, an appreciation for the nonconsumable value of the 
commons N(x) was found to be ivnportant. N(x) was not included in the factorial 
experiments because N(x) can be enjo~ed regardless of whether one Takes or Refrains, 
and so is irrelevant to an EMA V decision tree. N(x) is really more of an identification 
with nature than with community, in contrast to C(x), which encompasses any moral 
considerations. Individual DMs' (1Ctions have no effect on their N(x) payoffs, which are 
determined by the state of the covnmons, which is in tum affected by the actions of 
other people. The only way to im;rease one's N(x) payoff is thus by getting other people 
to Refrain. 
Increasing others' appreci11tion for nonconsumable values means getting them to 
add N(x) to their decision trees or incrrease the weight they give to N(x). This approach 
was explored by adding N(x) to some of the decision trees. Because it drops out of the 
decision trees (as discussed in Chapter VI and earlier in this chapter), if N(x) were 
added to the payoffs for all four ~)M 1lypes, it would have no effect on the results. It 
would have the effect of adding a. coni;tant to the "fitness" of all DMs, because 
everyone would get the N(x) pay9ffregardless of their actions. 
However, N(x) can affect the outcome if only some of the DMs include it, 
because it provides a bonus that f?ives 1DMs who value it more of a chance to be 
progenitors in the GA. That is, it increases the payoffs for any DM Types that include 
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it, and thus their relative fitness scores. Similarly, if all DMs included N(x) but gave it 
different weights, those who gave it higher weight would get higher scores. 
There is a subtle complication with this conclusion that must not be overlooked: 
N(x) adds a bonus to DM Types that include it, but the only effect it has on the fate of 
the commons is by giving those Types a boost; only if those Types happen to be 
Rejrainers will it help preserve the commons. If Type IV's include N(x), while Type I's 
do not, for example, then Type IV's (who always Refrain) will get a bonus for N(x) 
whereas Type l's (who always Take) will not. Type IV's will then have more of a 
chance in the progenitor selection lottery. It is important to keep in mind that N(x) does 
not change anyone's preferences; it just increases the relative attractiveness of being a 
DM Type that includes N(x). This is particularly so when the commons is in relatively 
good condition because N(x) increases with x. 
To simulate the effects of including N(x) in some of the DMs' decision trees, the 
simulation was modified so that Types III and IV DMs included N(x) in their payoffs. 
The rationale behind choosing the more "environmentalist" Types was that this was the 
only way N(x) could be expected to help save the commons; if an N(x) bonus were 
given instead to all DMs, it would make no difference to the outcome, and if it were 
given to only the more "extractor" Types I and II, it would tend to accelerate the 
commons destruction. Throughout this work the "burden of proof' has been left to 
Hardin: when assumptions have to be made, they are made in favor of any solution that 
is being simulated because Hardin said nothing will work unless population is 
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controlled. If even these optimistic assumptions do not produce solutions that are 
robust to population growth, it is less likely that they would work for more realistic 
assumptions. 
Table VIII shows the total payoffs assumed, including N(x). A reference run, 
without N(x), is shown in Figure 8.19. The simulation in Figure 8.19 lasts 117 
iterations14, and near the end ofthe simulation, the population consists of pessimistic 
Type I DMs who prefer to Take, and pessimistic Type III DMs who prefer to Refrain. 
DM payoffType Payoff for Payoff for 
Taki11g ReJrai11i11g 
I. Hard core Extractor 1r(T) 0 
II. DM with mild "Conscience" 1r(T)- C(x) 0 
III. Temptable conservationist ;rT)- C(x) + C(x) + N(x) 
with an appreciation for the N(x) 
nonconsumable commons value 
IV. Hard core Conservationist N(x) C(x) + N(x) 
Table VIII. The four DM payoff types and their payoffs. 1C(T) is profit, C(x) is 
the "Conscience" function, and N(x) is the nonconsumable value funlion. 
A histogram of the population just before the crash, at iteration 100, is shown in 
Figure 8.20. 
14 The settings for this simulation were the same as for tlte base case simulation shown in Figure 8.11; 
tlte only difference was tltat tlte initial population size was 150, mtlter tltan 100 as it was in Figure 
8.11. This is why the simulation of Figure 8.19 ended so much sooner tltan tlte earlier one. 
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Figure 8.20. Pqpulatioll distribution in reference simulation (Figure 8.19), 
shortly before the commons goes extinct (Iter 1 00; xl = 1380). All OMs are 
pessimists, and the 971Type l's, who r~lceive a higher payoff, prefer to Take, 
while the 68 Type Ill's prefer to Refrairl. I 
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In the next simulation, N(x) is added to the payoff functions (see Table VI). The 
N(x) and C(x) value functions are assumed to be equally weighted, and the slope of 
N(x) is assumed to be the same as for C(x), with opposite sign. These assumptions are 
somewhat arbitrary, because it is hard to justifY any particular relationship between the 
two. However, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that people who care about 
both "Conscience" and the nonconsumable commons product could assign them similar 
value functions. The same simulation that was shown in Figure 8.19, except with the 
addition of N(x), is shown in Figure 8.21. The commons lasts 155 iterations longer, but 
still is destroyed. 
Including N(x) 
Takers Pop CollilDns 
500 10000 
~ 400 8000 
., 
c 
~ 300 6000 Q 8 co: 8 
== 200 4000 Q ~ u 2000 
0 0 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
0 0 0 0 0 0 lters N 
""' 
ID 00 0 N 
... ... 
Figure 8.21. Simulation identical to reference simulation ( Figure 8.19), but 
with N(x). 
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Two histograms are shown in Figures 8.22 alnd 8.23: the population at iteration 
100, which can be compared to the histogram ~t iteration 100 in Figure 8.20; and the 
popul11tion shortly before the commons is destroyed, at iteration 272. 
A tt:omparison of the three histograms rc;veal•s the impact of N(x): without it, the 
popullltion quickly converges to Type I's (who Take·) and a smaller number of Type 
III's (who Refrain). With N(x), the Type IV Refrain~rs are predominant for awhile 
(Figure 8.22), at least until demand grows to the poKnt that the Type I's take over 
(Figure 8.23). The presence of the Type IV's s~rves1to slow the extraction rate at the 
time when the commons would otherwise hav~ been destroyed (Figure 8.20). As the 
popullttioru grows and demand increases, not only d<nes potential profit increase, but the 
payotrfrom N(x) decreases as the commons d~<;line$. Type I DMs regain their 
advan~age,, and at the end of the simulation (Fi~ure g.23), N(x) makes little difference. 
Doubling the magnitude of N(."C) allows ~he c:ommons to survive even longer 
(326 i~erations instead of272), but tripling it only aiHows the commons to survive ten 
more i.teraltions. Doubling both the N(x) and C(~) parameters allows the commons to 
suvive 611 itrerations, a significant improvement. 
N(x) and C(x) could increase like this t9~ethtbr, if, for exautple, society 
perceived iincreasingly important moral as well <.ts aesthetic reasons for Refraining; but 
either could increase alone. Aside from the simt~latio··ns in this section to examine the 
role ofN(x,~, all the other simulations ignore N();). 1 
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I Takers outnumber the Type Ill Refrainers. 
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These simulations consistently suggest that "Conscience" alone could make a 
significant difference in how long the commons survives. 
N(x) alone cannot. Including only N(x) and not C(x) in the simulations produces 
the same results as including only profit; without C(x), Taking is always dominant. It is 
C(.~). not N(x), that affects a person's choice. In this crude analysis, N(x) was only 
added to the payoffs for the two most conservationist DM Types (III and IV)1s. There 
is then a greater proportion of Types III and IV when the commons is in good 
condition, because N(x) gives them a competitive advantage over the Types that do not 
get the N(x) bonus. If N(x) had instead been given to Types I and II, it would have 
accelerated the destruction of the commons because Types I and II tend to always 
Take; if it had been given to all four Types, it would have made no difference at all. The 
purpose here was not to do a rigorous analysis of nonconsumable values, but to 
roughly investigate how N(x) could help save the commons. 
The game theory analysis showed that payoff structures that include N(x) can 
cause the payoff structures ofthe Type I and II players to be like the PD; but with 
both, or with only C(x), Chicken-like games more tractable to solution are possible. 
Here, N(x) was only added to Types III and IV, which does not significantly change the 
game form of their payoff graphs. What all this suggests is that people hoping to save a 
commons might be more successful if they concentrate their efforts more on matters of 
IS A more rigorous way to include N(x) would be by adding a gene to the genotypes so that N(x) could 
vary independently, just as docs C(x). This would have required significant time and effort to revise 
the computer code, however, and tl1e problem of functional form is substantial. 
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,community or moral concerns, than aesthetics, particularly when the commons 
,condition has already become degraded. 
This is not the approach that has always be~n used. The big environmental 
organizations such as the Sierra Club and Audubon Soc:iety were started in order to 
:secure hunting and fishing reserves on public lands for mostly wealthy, white men 
(Dowie, 1995). It is hard to imagine an environmeqtal group advocating setting aside 
public lands for the use ofhunters today. The emphasis' in the past 30 or so years has 
lbeen more on hiking, fly-fishing, and other low-impact :activities -reflecting N(x) 
!kinds of values, although many in the environmenta.l movement also express values that 
:sometimes sound almost religious. Concern for the righrts of future generations of 
people as well as other species is being expressed more: often, too, but members of 
tenvironmental groups are perceived in many rural a.reas1 (and in the poor countries of 
1the world) as self-righteous, urban, elitist, backpad~ers, and not as soft-hearted do-
gooders (Dowie, 1995). Ifthese groups were to inqrease their level of preaching about 
1the immorality of rural lifestyles dependent on resm.Jrcelextraction, they would probably 
lbe very poorly received16• 
Matters of conscience can be tricky to promote:: Refraining because one 
!believes it is the ethically right thing to do is not thfl same as lecturing others that they 
should Refrain because you believe it is the ethicall;v right thing for them to do. In the 
116 When Andy Kerr, an outspoken environmental leader in 9regon, moved to a timber town in 1994 
and began preaching to the laid-off timber workers about thq destructiveness of Uteir lifestyles, he 
1receivcd numerous deaUt Uucats and his log (I) cabin was pqlted with eggs. 
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simulations, decision models that provide more total satisfaction become more 
prevalent simply because they provide higher payoffs; the mechanism is assumed to be 
a social transmission mechanism analogous to biological recombination. DMs become 
more "Conscience"-driven essentially because being more "Conscience"-driven 
becomes more appealing. When "Conscience" and an appreciation for nonconsumable 
aspects of the commons add to total payoffs for Refraining, then the decision trees that 
provide those higher payoffs become more popular. Until, that is, population grows 
enough that demand offsets their beneficial effects. 
Financial incentives 
Financial incentives - penalties, fines, tax incentives and bonuses - are 
elements of the solution approaches that rely on changing the actual monetary payoffs 
in the TOC. The motivation behind this approach is to try to internalize the 
externalities: to get decision-makers to take into account the true costs of their actions. 
In this approach, a bonus of some kind is paid for Refraining, or a penalty is 
assessed for Taking. The idea is that people will then Refrain because they want to. 
Some kind of coercion (i.e., government, or at least within-group self-enforcement) is 
required, which implies that people may actually feel that they have to, rather than that 
they want to. Ifthe level of coercion required for enforcement is too high, then not 
enough people will comply for the solution to work; for some, the expected cost of 
noncompliance is less than the expected cost of compliance. 
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To simulate the reward/penalty approach, a penalty function for Taking, and/or 
a bonus function for Refraining, could be added to the computer model that increases 
as x declines. This is, incidentally, exactly what C(x) does. C(x) can even be viewed 
simply as a penalty/reward function in the utilitarian, rather than the moral, sense. 
A thought experiment can predict the outcome of this approach: just as with 
C(x), some reward/penalty function could certainly be identified for any population size 
that would cause a sustainable harvest level to be achieved. Then, as population grows, 
the reward/penalty function would have to grow, too, in order to offset the increase in 
demand. Either it would have to be linked to population as is profit, so that it would 
grow automatically with population, or the function parameter(s) would have to vary as 
k or 111 did in the solution simulations shown above. Graphs of such simulations would 
then exhibit the stepwise ratcheting effect that solutions based on decreasing k or 
increasing m produced. 
Just as with the above examples, however, as demand grows, and larger 
penalties or rewards are required, voluntary Refraining would become increasingly 
problematic. Objections would increase, not only from would-be Takers who resent the 
big penalties, but also from the rest of the population whose taxes must be used to pay 
the rewards. Enforcement would become increasingly difficult. 
Property rights 
If common access is the problem, then property rights advocates argue that the 
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solution must be to eliminate public property. Privatizing the commons could be 
implemented by selling it off, or somehow limiting public access in such a way as to 
allow access to be bought and sold as is private property. Land-based or enclosable 
commonses such as forests or rangeland would be straightforward to privatize, in 
theory, because it would be methodologically clear who owned what: for example, 
fences could be built. The "downstream" costs of grazing and logging (such as water 
pollution and aquatic habitat destruction) would not be accounted for, and it could be 
argued that this upstream-owner versus downstream-victim dichotomy can be viewed 
as a kind of commons dilemma itself. However, to property rights advocates, if 
upstream activities damage the property values of downstream property owners, then 
the legal system can be used to get the polluters to compensate the "pollutees." At 
least, they argue, property ownership and access are clear, because someone can be 
identified who is directly affected, as well as who is directly responsible. 
Other commonses, such as fish, groundwater, and clean air, are more difficult to 
privatize because delimiting ownership is virtually impossible. Artificial property rights 
are sometimes created that can be sold or traded, the idea being that if the linkage 
between supply and demand, or beneficiary and victim, is established, even artificially, 
then the market can solve the commons dilemma. For example, ocean fishery managers 
in New Zealand and Alaska have tried issuing tradable fishing access rights called 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) with little success, so far, mainly because of the 
enormous political pressures and enforcement problems involved (Duncan, 1995; 
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Mathews, 1995; Mace, 1993; see Chapter IV). 
Simulating private property solutions would require significant modification of 
the computer model, and since privatizing the commons implies "solving" the TOC by 
eliminating it, this "solution" was not simulated. However, this area of potential 
solutions would be a potentially fruitful line for further work, particularly because it 
seems reasonable to expect that population growth would have effects on any private 
property solutions similar to those it has on common property solutions. 
The main difference between the commons decision modeled by the influence 
diagram in Figure 3.2, and the decision of a private property owner, is that in the TOC 
model, the state of the commons is determined by the actions of others, not the DM; 
but in a private ownership model, the state ofthe (owned) resource is determined 
primarily by the actions of the DM because other potential Takers are excluded from 
access. An interesting simulation that comes to mind would be to include in the model 
the "downstream" stakeholder who has no access to the resource, but whose welfare is 
determined by the "upstream" resource owner. Some questions to investigate would be 
what role a "Conscience" function could have in regulating the actions of the 
"upstream" DM, and how population growth might affect that and other possible 
solutions such as financial incentives. 
Regulatory control 
Some kind of governmental system is necessary for any of the solutions to be 
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impleQlent~!d, with the possible e~ception of Hardin's historical state, where the 
popul~tion was so small relative to the1regeneration capacity of the commons that it did 
not mtltter what anyone did. "Sorpe kind of government" could be a council ofvillage 
elders, a shaman, a feudal lord, or a Federal Department of the Interior, and its power 
could range from merely advisory to strongly coercive. However broad the range of the 
"government" solution might be, fn this work, the "Regulatory control" category is 
assum~d to mean relatively coerc~ve solutions where a clearly identified authority 
determines an acceptable level of harvest, and enforces that level by means oflicenses, 
regulations, fines or jail terms, siQlilarly to the way state Departments ofFish and 
Wildlife lictense and regulate spoil and !commercial fishers (see Chapter IV). 
It is: worth noting that soh.1tions that create a kind of artificial property rights, 
such a~ the Individual Transferabl.e Quota (ITQs) in ocean fisheries, also rely on 
penalties and/or rewards for enfo1·ceme:nt. As long as the resource harvest level is 
determined and administered by spme regulatory body, a DM has to trade off whether 
it is pr~ferable to follow the rules of the property rights system, or to not follow the 
rules and run the risk of getting a1Testep or otherwise paying some penalty. The 
expect~d payoff for breaking the 111les depends on what the actual penalty would be, as 
well a& on the probability of getting caught. 
To investigate such a reg~latory solution, a simulation was developed that 
enforc~s a !harvest limit by assessing a penalty on lawbreakers who get caught. A 
maxim.um allowable total harvest level :Max Takers is set, and in each iteration, a penalty 
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is imposed on any DM who chooses to Take after the catch limit Max Takers has been 
reached. The penalty is set equal to the negative of what the profit would have been. 
The illegal Taker who gets caught receives a payoff of less than zero, and the illegally 
harvested product is confiscated. This is what happens in the real world when a DM 
gets caught with illegally caught fish: the fish are already dead, but the fisher, who does 
not get to keep them, has to pay the penalty. 
This way of simulating harvest limits is admittedly simplistic. Pollution limits are 
like harvest limits if the polluter is thought of as "harvesting" clean air; grazing 
commonses are regulated via grazing permits issued to individual ranchers; timber 
commonses are regulated by auctioning off parcels to private logging companies, and 
so on. There are many different ways of imposing harvest limits. In fisheries, gear 
restrictions or per-boat or per-fisher limits are perhaps the most common. Restrictions 
are enforced via fines, gear confiscation, and occasionally jail terms. However, a very 
common approach, particularly in Alaska and Pacific Northwest ocean salmon fisheries, 
is to open the fishery to a short-term free-for-all until a set number offish are caught, 
and then to shut it down. That is what is simulated here. 
In deciding whether or not to fish, DMs have to estimate the probability and 
likely payoff of being legally successful, as well as the probability and likely payoff of 
getting caught if they go on to fish illegally. The general situation facing anyone making 
a decision about exploiting a regulated commons is similar enough that the general 
conclusions of this simple simulation should apply to other commonses as well. The 
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decision tree on which the simulation is based is shown in Figure 8.24. 
PAYOFF 
I'm one of the first MaxTakers Profit 
pL 
TAKE 
LEGAL 
I'm not one of the first MaxTakers 0 
(1-pL) 
I'm one of the first Max Takers Profit 
pL 
Get caught -Profit 
I'm not one of the firs pC 
MaxTakers Get away with it Profit 
(1-pL) (1-pC) 
REFRAIN 0 
Figure 8.24. Decision tree for fishers In a "free for all" fishery subjected to 
catch limits and potential penalties. Only the profit attribute Is included. pL Is 
the probability of catching a unit of fish during the legal period, and pC is the 
probability of getting caught, given that a DM was not among the legal Takers 
and fished anyway. 
244 
In the decision tree ofFigure 8.24, it is assumed, as it was in all the previous 
simulations, that no Taker continues fishing after catching their fish. DMs who fish 
illegally receive the profit as usual if they do not get caught. If they do get caught, then 
they loose the profit and instead pay a penalty that is equal to the opposite of what the 
profit would have been. In this way, the penalty, like the profit, increases as the 
population grows. 
The EV of Refraining is zero. This village is assumed to be made up entirely of 
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Type I DMs (i.e., "Conscience" and N(x) are neglected, primarily to keep things 
simple). In these simulations, some are optimists who believe either that they will 
succeed during the open season (pL is high), or that they will not get caught if they go 
on to fish illegally (pc is low): they will Take, legally or illegally. Pessimists believe they 
either will not succeed during the open season (pL is low) or will get caught if they fish 
illegally (pc is high); they tend to Refrain. The GA thus selects for pessimism or 
optimism, rather than for the relative weights given to the profit and "Conscience" 
attributes. 
Leaving out "Conscience" leaves out some potentially interesting effects in this 
solution category, but including "Conscience" would require fairly extensive 
implementation effort. C(x) could certainly be affected by the legality of one's choice, 
as well as by the perceived fairness of the imposed restriction. Harvest regulation and 
people's responses to it is an extensive field of research that is outside the scope of this 
dissertation, but this simulation could be very useful for simulating different regulatory 
schemes and possible human responses. The present simple effort is intended to be only 
a preliminary investigation into how the simulated DMs might respond to penalties. 
In the simulation code, the sequence in which the DMs make their decisions is 
random, and so the probability ofbeing one of the DMs who gets caught is equal for 
all. Recall that the sustainable harvest level is 100 units per iteration. Ifthe population 
consists of 150 potential Takers, and they all decide to Take, then the true probability 
PL of being among the first 100 Takers is 100/150. CalculatingpL in advance is not 
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quite that straightforward, though, because in any iteration it is difficult to say in 
advance how many will decide to Take. The ~ctuallprobability ofbeing among the legal 
MaxTakers is unknown because it depends o;n hoWj many others end up Takeing. 
Assumed values for PL and Pc were varied iq the decision trees, and the results are 
described below. 
Although a rigorous experiment was pot conducted, two results were clear 
enough, and reasonable enough, to support r~latively strong conclusions: in order for 
the harvest limit approach to prevent the commons destruction, ( 1) the perceived 
probability of getting caught has to be high, ijnd (2)) unless the perceived probability of 
getting caught is 100%, Max Takers has to ~>e held lower than the desired harvest 
level. The less effective the perceived enforc~ment,l the lower MaxTakers has to be. 
Three typical runs are shown in Figure 8.25. 
Although not shown, histograms of the dist1ributions ofDM Types during 
simulation runs indicate that only when the pppulation is relatively pessimistic do they 
avoid destroying the commons. This solution is stalble with a growing population 
because the penalty function, like the profit fi,mction, is proportional to demand. If the 
penalty is instead set proportional to the leveJ ofthie commons, it will have the same 
effect as the guilt impact ofC(x), with the importa!nt exception that it would apply to 
everyone, including Type I's. Unfortunately, ~uch aJ solution will not be stable with 
increasing population. That is because demaqd grows with population, and if the 
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Figure 8.25. Typical results of simulations where the harvest levels are set at 
MaxTakers, and the perceived probability of getting caught for harvesting 
illegally is PrCaught. The commons tends to survive longer when Max Takers 
is low, and/or PrCaught is high. 
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penalty does not, then demand will always eventually cause the e>i-pected profit to 
exceed the expected penalty, even with perfect enforcement. 
These findings are hardly surprising. The more badly som~one wants or needs 
something, the more likely it seems to be that they might break the law: if the potential 
costs of lawbreaking are less than the potential benefits of selling ~ highly profitable 
product, even a decision analyst might recommend crime. Only a penalty function that 
is tied to demand, rather than to the state of the extractable prod~ct, appears workable 
over the long run, but such a penalty function seems unrealistic b~cause it is unlike any 
kind of familiar regulatory approach. Taxes on resources bought 9r sold may increase 
as profits increase, but in order to offset the increase in demand dlJe to1 increasing 
population, the tax rate (i.e., percentage of net profit) would hav~ to increase with 
demand. Regulatory penalty functions more familiarly depend on lhe s~ate of the 
commons, as does C(x), or on the magnitude of the crime (illegally harwesting one fish 
\ 
does not carry as large a penalty as illegally harvesting I 00 fish). 
An interesting implication ofthe need to tie the penalty fu~1ctio111 to demand 
rather than the state of the commons is that if a "Conscience" fun(/tion !Could somehow 
be tied to population size, it could also work for a growing popuh~tion.1 "Conscience" 
is, after all, a penalty function for Taking and a reward function fqr Refraining, but in 
this model it is tied to the state of the commons and not to the number 'Of potential 
Takers. Recall that the reason "Conscience" is a function only oftne state of the 
commons is that Hardin ( 1968, 1971) claims that environmental e~hics depend on the 
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state ofthe commons rather than the number of people. However, if enough people feel 
more virtuous for Refraining when the village begins suffer the effects of 
overpopulation, and/or feel guilty for Taking, then it is possible for a "Conscience"-
based solution to be stable over a longer period. 
People do sometimes behave more altruistically when struck by disasters, 
particularly in close-knit communities - at least, up to a point. Other people engage in 
looting and theft when the opportunity is created by a hurricane or earthquake. 
Starving homeless in the streets ofPortland, Oregon, are fed by some passers-by and 
spit on by others. Some people believe more food and medical aid should be sent to 
countries in Africa with ballooning populations of mostly starving people, others 
disgree, asserting that the misery in such countries is the poor people's own fault. If the 
number of starving homeless continues to increase, will people's compassion, let alone 
their willingness to do without in order to help those in need, increase? In the current 
political climate, the answer does not appear to be encouraging. 
Conclusions 
The model on which these solution simulations are based is very simple. There 
are only a few variables that are important in the baseline simulation: the population 
growth rate, the commons regeneration rate and stochasticity, the slope and magnitude 
of the demand curve, the slope and magnitude of the "Conscience" function, and the 
population diversity control parameters. The problem being analyzed is very complex, 
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and the solutions proposed are complex. There are only a few variables in the computer 
code that could be used to simulate a variety of complex phenomena, and yet the 
results are intuitively reasonable, if not exactly reassuring. 
The goal of these solution simulations was not to determine definitively whether 
any particular solution would work in the real world, but rather to investigate the 
question, "Was Hardin right?"- in other words, does it seem reasonable to expect 
that the problem of natural resource depletion can be solved over the long run unless 
population growth is stopped? Hardin says the answer is no. It seems difficult to 
believe that the correctness of Hardin's answer to the question is not obvious; yet the 
debate rages on in professional journals, and even within professional newsgroups on 
the Internet. Even people struggling to feed themselves continue having children, 
corporations continue trying to encourage consumption, and efforts to control people's 
reproductive freedom are viewed as violations of fundamental human rights. IfHardin 
is right, people do not behave as though they believed him, or as though they thought 
their actions mattered. 
Many people apparently believe that technology will allow people in the rich 
countries to continue to live and act as we have always done, as well as to allow poor 
countries to improve their standards of living. In the simulations, the contribution of 
technology was simulated by increasing supply via the regeneration rate constant r0, 
and increasing the availability of substitutes and/or efficiency of use via decreasing the 
demand function parameter k. The simple simulations of technological solutions can be 
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made successful for any population size; but if population continues growing, then 
technological solutions have to grow as well. If population growth is exponential, then 
so must be the decrease in demand, increase in efficiency of use, increase in commons 
regeneration rate, or production of new substitutes. The evidence so far is not 
encouraging. Technological fixes have helped over the short run in some areas, but 
there are no examples of any commonses that have been rescued by technology as yet. 
Community identification is a difficult idea to simulate, and the simple approach 
used here was to use the 11Conscience11 function to represent the importance of 
community, or other moral concerns. In the game theory analysis, the 11Conscience11 
function was instrumental in allowing games like Benevolent Chicken and Hero to 
develop. The payoff orders in these games actually favor payoffs to others under some 
situations. Much like the solutions based on increasing the contribution oftechnology, 
increasing the impact of 11Conscience11 can also be shown to work for any population 
size. Yet in order for 11 Conscience11 to work as population grows, each new generation 
has to be more 11 Conscience11-driven than previous generations, because in order to 
counteract the impact of growing demand, 11Conscience11 has to grow at the same rate. 
Unfortunately, if the community exhibits an increased commitment to preserving an 
increasingly scarce resource, a kind of arms race develops because of the increasing 
demand to reduce restrictions and allow more harvesting. A simple game theory 
analysis indicates that the tension between extractors and preservationists is likely to 
drive a cyclical pattern such as has occurred over the past 30-50 years in the United 
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States. Unfortunately1 while there is plenty of evidence that demand increases with 
growing populations, there1 is little evidence to support any contention that the 
importance of "Conscience." ever increases with growing populations, even in the face 
of certain disaster. 
Adding the nonconsumable attribute function N(x) to some DMs' decision trees 
helps increase the proportimn ofDMs who prefer to Refrain, and thus to preserve the 
commons longer than it would otherwise have lasted. As a first approximation, it was 
assumed that only the moH~ environmentalist-type DMs, Types III and IV, include N(x) 
in their decision trees. If N(x) were included for all four Types, N(x) would make no 
difference in the outc9me, because the payoff due to N(x) is the same regardless of 
whether a DM Takes or Re;frains. N(x) helps save the commons only because it gives a 
payoff bonus to Type~ III amd IV DMs, and helps them stay in the population pool, at 
least for awhile. Unfortunately, N(x), like C(x), does not increase with population. As 
demand grows, the relative importance of N(x) declines. The only way N(x) could 
actually help save a c9mmcms in the real world is if the demand for the nonconsumable 
aspects of the commons were to increase more than the increasing demand for the 
consumable product 9fthe; commons. The opposite assumption appears to be more 
supported by the real world. 
A great varietr of approaches that rely on regulatory control was crudely 
simulated with one very simple model of a "free-for-all" fishery subject to a harvest 
limit, with penalties iq1posed on violators who get caught. The intriguing thing about 
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this solution is that it is the only soluti10n simulated that relies on a function of the 
number of Takers, rather than on the state of the commons. Because the penalty 
function is simply the negative of the ~rofit function, it grows with population and thus 
I 
is stable with population growth. Not surprisingly, the outcome depends on 
enforcement effectiveness and the actual level ofharvest limits imposed. If such a 
penalty function could be iimposed, it seems reasonable to believe that it might work: 
i 
but it seems very unlikely that any polntical system could long sustain it. As demand for 
I 
a scarce product increases, pressure must also increase on its regulators to allow more 
of it to be harvested. Resource managers in the United States have had little success 
I 
resisting such pressures, a:s recent conflicts over public grazing, logging, air and water 
I 
pollution controls, and oc1~an fisheries1 attest. 
I 
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Chapter IX 
SUMM;ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Garrett Hardin s&id the reason humans destroy commonly-held, important 
resources is because of a. simple cost-benefit analysis all of us who are "rational" must 
do (Hardin, 1968): if I a~ld a cow td the commons (or cut a tree in the public forest, or 
catch a fish, or drive a c&r), I get alii the benefit, but the costs are shared among many. 
My benefits are+ 1, and 1ny costs are nearly 0. Ifl do not add a cow, I get nothing. 
Everyone else benefits frpm my self~restraint, and I may feel like a fool. Since everyone 
reasons this way, he said, the ultimate destruction of the commons is inescapable. 
Hardin argued that becat.Jse of the htescapability of this logic, social, economic, or 
technical solutions are d9omed to fail unless human population growth is controlled. 
This is the Tragedy of the Common's. 
In order to investigate the question, "Is Hardin right?" this dissertation 
integrates well-establish({d tools from disparate fields to model the evolutionary 
interactions between the decision-makers and the commons: expected multiple-attribute 
value (EMA V) theory fn~m the field of decision theory to model human decision-
making; modeling methodology from the field of ecology to model a stochastically 
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varying, simple natural system; and the genetic fl,lgorithm from the fields of artificial life 
and optimization. This work contributes to theory and practice in all these fields not by 
inventing a completely new computer methodolpgy, but by innovatively integrating 
methodologies already well established in their respective fields. 
Considering Hardin's lifelong battle with neoclassical economists, it is 
interesting that his seminal paper was based on ~ neoclassicatl economic model of 
human decision-making. To advance his model<.l step furtheir, this dissertation assumes 
that decision-makers may consider attributes other than pure profit, and that they 
explicitly take uncertainties into account by using expected multiple attribute value 
(EMA V) decision trees to make their decisions. A decision-maker (DM) who chooses 
to harvest a unit of the commons is called a Tak(!r, and one who decides not to is called 
a Rejrainer. "Harvest" means any consumptive ilctivity such I as catching fish, cutting 
down trees, polluting air or water, or grazing ca.ttle. 
Three attributes are considered: profit, nonconsumable value, and 
"Conscience". Profit is not treated as a constant+ 1 as Hardilll assumed. Instead, 
marginal profit varies inversely with supply. Hardin neglected costs such as 
depreciation and labor, arguing that extraction costs are effe,ctively zero because they 
are diffused among so many other herdsmen. In this work, extraction costs are 
subsumed in the declining marginal returns of th~ profit function. 
Ecological economists sometimes add a fiiOnotonically increasing 
nonconsumable value attribute N(x) (Pearce and Moran, 1994). N(x) represents 
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nonconsumptive uses sw;:h as hiking through an old-growth forest or across a grazing 
commons, enjoying the )j:nowledge that a wilderness exists even if one might never see 
it, or saving a commons for later. N(x) is an increasing function of the state of the 
commons x, and its valu.e is unaffected by whether a particular DM chooses to Take or 
Refrain - only by what a great many DMs choose in aggregate. To a particular DM, 
N(x) is thus not what an economist would call a marginal variable, as is profit (Boyle 
and Bishop, 1987). As a nonrriarginal attribute, N(x) drops out ofthe decision trees, 
and thus is not included ~n the base simulations of this work. It does play an important 
role in the game theory &nalysis: only if it is included can the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) 
and Chicken develop. 
A third attribute, "Conscience", is not discussed as an attribute per se in 
economics literature, but community and moral concerns are often presented in other 
literatures as an important medhanism for solving commons dilemmas (Collins and 
Barkdull, 1995; Daly, 1980; Etzioni, 1988; Sagoff, 1995; Stern, 1985-86; White, 
1995). "Conscience" is ir1cluded as an attribute here, where it represents the guilt some 
DMs might feel for Taking or the sense of virtue they might enjoy for Refraining. It 
may arise from concern for the rights of other people or other organisms (now and in 
the future), or from deoqtologncal moral or religious beliefs (Daly, 1995; Ehrenfeld, 
1981 ). Like profit, "Coqscieml:e" is also subject to declining marginal returns, but 
unlike profit, which is a function of the number of Takers, "Conscience" is a function of 
the state of the common~ x. The marginal "Conscience" function C(x) is assumed to be 
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a monotonically decreasing function ofx, in contrast to N(x), which is an increasing 
function of x. 
The way the DMs incorporate !uncertainties and the weighted attribute functions 
into their EMA V decision trees is determined by a structure in the computer code 
called a "genotype." The DMs r~nge from a hard-core extractor Type I, who only 
considers profit (a Hardin herdsrnan), to a hard-core preservationist who only considers 
"Conscience11 and the nonconsurrtable ,value (Type IV). Each of the four Types has an 
optimistic version and a pessimi~tic version. The genetic algorithm (GA) simulation 
method is used to simulate social evolution, whereby the distribution of beliefs and 
values in the population varies over time. The variation is driven by a selection 
mechanism called the 11fitness fur,ctionl" At the end of each iteration, this "fitness 
function" uses the relative payofl;'s achieved by the DM genotypes to modifY the 
distribution of genotypes for the next iiteration, so that genotypes that lead to higher net 
payoffs become more prevalent. Payoffs are determined by the actions of other DMs, 
the state of the commons, and the DMs' single attribute functions and attribute weights. 
The GA provides a feedback loop that: links the DMs' beliefs and values to the state of 
the commons. 
The commons is simulated as a. simple, stochastically regenerating public-access 
resource. In each iteration of the simul1ation, each DM who decides to Take depletes 
the commons by one unit ofx. Ttlls depletion is countered via the commons 
regeneration rate. If the total harvest is more than the total regeneration, then the 
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commons declines during that iteration; then tlhe C(x) payoff increases and the N(x) 
I 
payoff declines. The profit the Takers get is d€:termined only by the total number of 
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Takers; but the "Conscience" and nonconsumable value payoffs are determined by the 
I 
state of the commons. 
For harvesting of any renewable resource to be sustainable, the harvest rate 
I 
must mostly stay below the resource's ability to reg€:nerate, including enough margin 
I 
for inevitable natural stochasticity. Hardin said that the only way this can be achieved 
I 
for any commons over the long run is if population iis maintained below the commons 
I 
carrying capacity. Technology may increase the carrying capacity, either by improving 
I 
the commons regeneration rate, or by creating more: efficient ways to use the product 
I 
and/or manage the waste, but his fundamental thesi~; was that population belongs to the 
class of problems for which there is no technological solution. 
I 
Six overlapping categories of solutiom; to the TOC were investigated in this 
I 
work: technology, community identification and moral concerns, property rights, 
I 
coercion, changing the payoffs, and population control. A seventh, nonconsumable 
I 
value, was identified as potentially significant lby the game theory analysis. 
I 
The three objectives of this work were: 
I 
1. To develop an evolutionary computer model that can be used to shed new 
I 
light on the Tragedy of the Commons. 
I 
2. To investigate what variables have the miDst impact on the outcome, and how 
I 
they interact with one another. 
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3. To investigate the conditions under which the Tragedy of the Commons can 
be avoided. 
1. SHEDDING NEW LIGHT ON THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
Three particularly interesting insights were gained during this investigation: the 
importance of diversity; the requirement that solutions be driven by population growth, 
rather than the state of the commons; and the fact that the game theory analysis and 
the decision theory simulations revealed different, important aspects of the TOC. 
Diversity 
The most intriguing insi,ght that resulted from trjs work is that Ashby's Law of 
Requisite Variety (LRV) applies to the TOC: diversity in the population is a critical 
factor in determining whc~ther the DMs even have a chance to deal effectively with a 
changing commons. The factorial experiments (Chapter VII) as well as the game theory 
analysis (Chapter VIII) indicated that the parameters in the simulation that control 
diversity are among the most important. 
The reason diversity is important is that unless diversity is maintained in the 
population, the simulated. village is unable to deal with a varying commons. Just as in 
the real world, the commons in 1this simulation varies because of human impacts as well 
as because of natural stot:hasticity. The more stochastic the commons component of the 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
260 
9del, the rna e important diversity is. Diversity i~ maintained in the real world when a 
s ~iety protect and even encourages contrary viewpoints, and when it invests in 
e brts such as funding basic research and higher et;lucation, that work to constantly 
( ~)introduce d versity into the population. 
The ga1 e theory analysis showed that diversity ii:; necessary fm a different 
r <~son: the att inment of a pareto-optimal outcom~. If the entire population has a 
d minant strat gy, as they would in the PD, all will Take or all will Refrain. All 
efraining is a trivial solution, because it is assum~d here that some level of Taking is 
•, 
ise the slope of the marginal proqt funation would be relatively flat, 
t represent the importance of commonses relevant to this work such as 
a r, water, fore ·ts, fisheries, grazing land, and topsoil. All Taking is no solution either, 
fi ~·two reason : (1) destroying a commons such a:~ breathable air or potable water 
p 9bably mean human extinction; and (2) even if <,m economic case can be made for 
li uidating the ommons (Fife, 1971 ), this work as,sumes, that a solution implies 
If eve one has payoffs consistent with Chicken, Benevolent Chicken, or Hero, 
th~n there is n dominant strategy: everyone prefers to do the opposite of whatever 
oes. For example, if everyone were an optimist following an expected 
v jue rule, all 10uld Take. If everyone followed th,e maximin principle from game 
tlu~ory, all would Refrain. Even a population mad{{ up entirely of people who follow 
~nt's imperative or the golden rule would not sustainably utilize the commons. 
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A particularly intriguing finding related to diversity is that when "Conscience" is 
a factor in the decision trees, the dominance of the Taking option in the equivalent 
payoff graphs changes for some DMs as the commons becomes degraded. When the 
commons is in good condition, their payoff graphs for Taking are always above their 
graphs for Refraining (even though their payoffs for Taking if all Take are less than 
their payoffs for Refraining if all Refrain- the deficient outcome typical of the PD). 
However, when the commons becomes degraded, these DMs' preferences change so 
that their graphical payoff structures are what Hamburger ( 1973) calls "Chicken-like": 
the payoff graph for Taking crosses the payoff graph for Refraining, indicating that 
there is no dominallt strategy. 
The implication is that as long as the worst case outcome is seen as not too 
disastrous, some people may still be willing to accept the non-pareto-optimal outcome 
typical of the PD; but if the worst case outcome is seen as utter disaster, then more 
people may be willing to Refrain, as is typical of Chicken. Without "Conscience", the 
payoff graphs never cross. In order for the tragedy to be avoided, the population has to 
have enough people with a "Conscience", or with some other attribute function that 
increases as the commons declines, that they will stop harvesting once they recognize 
the consequences of their actions. The importance of diversity would be missed by 
models of the TOC based on N-person PDs, or any other homogeneous payoff 
structure. 
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Solutions as a function of population growth 
Diversity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, requirement for a solution. A 
second requirement is that, to be evolutionarily stable, solution mechanisms have to be 
functions of population growth, rather than ofthe state of the commons. This is a 
subtle point that became clear only as solution simulations based on "Conscience" and 
nonconsumable use values were investigated (Chapter VIII). C(x) and N(x) are 
functions ofthe state ofthe commons, whereas il(T) is a function of demand. Demand 
is driven by population growth17, but the factors in the simulation that counteract 
demand are driven by the state of the commons. As the population grows, two things 
happen that make solutions more difficult: (1) the demand curve shifts out, away from 
the origin, meaning that the profit per unit harvested goes up for any given supply. The 
result is that Taking becomes increasingly attractive~ (2) the state of the commons 
declines even faster because there are more people consuming and harvesting. 
Social dilemmas happen because of the tenuousness of the connection between 
people's choices and the impacts of those choices: the true costs of an individual's 
actions are paid by others, whereas the individual gets the benefits. In these simulations, 
the benefits (i.e., profits) are a function of supply and demand, which are functions of 
population size- but the costs ("Conscience" and nonconsumable commons values) 
are in terms of the state of the commons. Benefits of Taking thus increase with 
17 As well as by aspirations, of course. If per capita consumption increases at the same time population 
increases, as it appears to be doing worldwide for most resources, the problem becomes even more 
difficult. 
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population whereas costs of Taking do not. Any attempt to solve the TOC by resource-
driven solutions (i.e., any penalties or rewards that are functions of the state of the 
commons) will eventually be overtaken and overwhelmed by the effects of continued 
population growth. 
To illustrate how a solution mechanism based on population size might work, a 
simulation was developed for an imaginary "free for all" fishery, where the penalty 
imposed on an illegal fisher who gets caught is simply the opposite of the equivalent 
profit function. The potential penalty thus increases with population, just as does 
demand. The solution is evolutionarily stable in the simulations for a growing 
population, because of its ability to ratchet up with demand. Unfortunately, it seems 
questionable that it would work in the real world because of enforcement problems and 
political difficulties, both of which would undoubtedly increase with population if 
demand does. 
Different contributions of game theory and decision theory 
Table IX summarizes the key differences in contributions to this work by the 
decision theory simulations and game theory analyses, and indicates that there are seven 
important aspects of the TOC that are revealed by only one of the approaches used: if 
only the game theory analysis had been used, the impacts ofuncertainty, impacts of 
diversity on DMs' ability to adapt to change, and impacts of commons stochasticity 
would have been missed. If only the decision theoretical simulations had been used, the 
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conflicts between individual and group "rationality", pareto-optimality of outcomes to 
the community, impacts ofDM diversity on pareto-optimality of outcomes, and 
impacts of nonmarginal attributes would have been missed. 
Aspect ofTOC revealed (+)or not revealed(-) Game Decision 
by game theory analysis or decision theory theory theory 
simulations analysis simulations 
Net benefit of potential outcomes to individuals + + 
Pareto-optimality of outcomes to community + 
-
Conflicts between individual and group "rationality" + 
-
Tradeoffs among multiple attributes + + 
Impacts of uncertainty 
- + 
Impacts of diversity on DMs' ability to adapt to - + 
change 
Impacts ofDM diversity on pareto-optimality of + 
-
outcome 
Impacts of commons stochasticity 
-
+ 
Impacts of nonmarginal attribute N(x) + 
-
Table IX. Contrasting contributions of the game-theoretical analysis and the 
decision-theoretical simulations. Aspects of the development of, and potential 
solutions to, the Tragedy of the Commons that were revealed by each type of 
analysis are Indicated with a "+"; aspects that were not revealed are indicated 
with a"-". 
Game theory had more to contribute to understanding the TOC than was 
initially expected, particularly because ofthe effects of the nonmarginal, 
nonconsumable value N(x). N(x) is key to the illustration of the conflicts between 
individual and group rationality, because without N(x), the Prisoner's Dilemma cannot 
develop. Yet N(x), being a nonmarginal attribute, is irrelevant to the decision trees. In 
prescriptive decision theory, the only attributes that matter are those that are affected 
by a DM's individual choice (an economist would say that decisions should be made "at 
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the margin11), and so the nonconsumable value function N(x) drops out of the decision 
trees. As far as any DM would be concerned, it would not matter if N(x) were included 
in the decision tree or not. 
If the decision were framed to include a total social welfare attribute, the 
pareto-optimality of outcomes could be revealed. However, decision trees are 
ordinarily focused on a particular decision-maker (or decision-making body), and so 
individual-vs-group conflicts tend to be invisible. Expected utility to the individual DM 
is the focus of a decision tree, whereas pareto-optimality of the outcome to all 
concerned is highlighted in game theory analyses. 
In decision theory, considering payoffs to others is only useful insofar as it helps 
resolve uncertainties about what others might do. In game theory, payoffs to others are 
fundamental to the strategic aspects of games that involve cooperation as well as 
competition. A game theory matrix or graph of the PD makes it clear that if everyone 
chooses their dominant strategy (11always Take 11 ), the payoff each receives will be less 
than each would have received if all had chosen oppositely: the dominant strategy 
results in a deficient outcome. This is invisible to decision theory. 
Game theory analyses miss the fundamental impacts of uncertainty, adaptation, 
and stochasticity, that the decision theory based simulations enhance. Uncertainties 
about what others will do, and what the state of the commons will be, are well 
represented and quantified by decision trees, but uncertainty is only dealt with in game 
theory crudely, by making assumptions about payoffs and decision rules used by other 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266 
players. Environmental stochasticity is mostly invisible to game theory, because game 
theory focuses on interactions among human players; Nature is at most a disturbance 
input and has no "strategic" role to play (games against Nature are generally better 
dealt with by decision theory because they are really only decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty). In contrast, with its greater power to quantifY and represent uncertainty, 
the decision theory simulations incorporate, and illustrate the effects of, environmental 
stochasticity with ease. 
Game theory and decision theory are both powerful tools, and both revealed the 
net benefit of potential outcomes and the tradeoffs among multiple attributes. Most 
important, though, the contributions of both turned out to be important to 
understanding this problem and its potential solutions. Decision theory seems to have 
the edge in incorporating uncertainty, and hence natural phenomena, into the analysis; 
but game theory seems to have the edge in explicating the human-interaction kinds of 
issues. 
2. RELATIVE IMPACTS AND INTERACTIONS OF VARIABLES 
Five factorial experiments were conducted in order to investigate the relative 
impacts of simulation variables (Chapter VII). The variables found to be significant in 
the factorial experiments were: the profit function parameter k and "Conscience" 
function parameter m (k and m determine the functions' slopes andy-intercepts); 
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commons stochasticity Stoch; and the evolutionary diversity control parameters TSProb 
and mr. The probability estimates and outcome tables used in the EMA V decision trees 
were varied to represent populations that were whole relatively pessimistic or 
optimistic, but were not found to be statistically significant in any experiments. N(x) has 
no impact on people's choices because people get the N(x) payoff regardless of what 
they as individuals do; it was therefore not included in the experiments. 
The most important single parameter was the mutation rate mr. The mutation 
rate is the small probability (e.g., 0.001) that one of the variables in a OM's decision 
tree will be flipped to its opposite value. For example, a mutation in the optimism 
"gene" may convert an optimist to a pessimist; a mutation in one ofthe DM Type genes 
will tum a hard core extractor DM into a hard core preservationist. The mutation rate 
thus constantly (re)introduces variety into the population. The higher mr is, the more 
"irrational" DMs there will be in any iteration. 
The profit function parameter k, commons stochasticity Stoch, and progenitor 
diversity parameter TSProb, were all about equally important as main effects, and all 
were also involved in significant two-factor interactions. TSProb is important to 
population diversity because it impacts the probability that relatively more successful 
genotypes will be represented in successive iterations; if TSProb is low, then the 
population will have more nonconformists. The "Conscience" function parameter was 
involved in two-factor interactions and a three-factor interaction, but its significance as 
a main effect was hidden by the nature of the interactions it was involved in. 
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The profit function parameter and "Conscience" function parameter are 
important because they represent the tradeoffs people make between greed and guilt. 
Hardin's herdsmen only considered profit, but "Conscience" is arguably an important 
part of human decision-making. The simple function that represents "Conscience" in 
this work is very crude, at best, but the impact it had on the outcome was significant, 
not only because it was necessary for most solutions, but also because only if C(x) is 
included can games without the dominant but non-pareto-optimal strategy of the PD 
develop. Unlike the PD, which is the only game normally discussed in the context of 
the TOC18, Hero and Benevolent Chicken are representative of some ofthe more 
appealing aspects of human decision-making. 
Furthermore, C(x) is the only mechanism in the model that works to offset 
greed. Most of the simulated solutions depend on either decreasing the profit function 
parameter or increasing the "Conscience" function parameter, and it was expected that 
these two parameters would be the most important in the experiments. The importance 
of the evolutionary diversity control parameters mr and TSProb was a surprise. 
3. SOLVING THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
The solutions discussed in the literature all have to do with resolving conflicts 
between individual and group interests: in effect, changing the payoffs or changing the 
18 The only reference to Chicken with respect to the TOC that was found in the literature search was 
Hamburger's ( 1973) article. 
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The computer model was used to crudely simulate and explore such solutions. 
Technological solutions were simulated by changing the profit function to represent 
decreasing demand via increased efficiency ofuse or development of substitutes, and by 
changing the regeneration rate function to represent increasing supply. Community 
identification and moral concerns were simulated by increasing the 11Conscience11 
function parameter. Increasing people's appreciation of nonconsumable values such as 
aesthetics was simulated by adding a nonconsumable value function to the decision 
trees for some of the DMs. Financial incentives were examined via a 11thought 
experiment11 based on the results of varying the profit and 11Conscience11 functions. 
Property rights solutions were not simulated because the computer model was based on 
an assumption of public access to the commons, and property rights solutions require 
essentially turning the commons over to private ownership or at least private control. 
Modifying the computer model to include property rights-based solutions proved to be 
beyond the scope of this work, although investigating such solutions appears to be a 
promising line of further work. Population control was not simulated as a separate 
category, but was instead included in each of the solution simulations (as well as in the 
preliminary development work of Phase 1). This was justified because the question 
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being investigated was whether any solution could be shown to work with population 
growth, and thus each solution simulation had to "stand up" to the test of population 
growth. 
The main finding was that solutions based on increasing commons productivity 
or efficiency of use, or increasing the relative impacts of "Conscience" or 
nonconsumable resource value, or imposing rewards and penalties, could be invented 
for any fixed population size; but to work for growing populations, solutions have to 
keep up with population growth. For example, in order to provide enough of a solution 
to allow about a threefold increase in population, the relative importance of 
"Conscience" had to increase about tenfold in the simulations. 
Similarly, solutions based on technology had to provide about a tenfold 
decrease in the slope of the demand curve, or a ninefold increase in the commons 
regeneration rate constant, to support a threefold increase in population. 
The goal of the simulations was not to determine whether any particular 
solution would work, but rather to investigate Hardin's contention that no solutions 
would work unless population growth is stopped. This work supported Hardin's 
contention: for any simulated solution to continue working for a growing population, 
its effectiveness had to increase at least as fast as population increased. There is no 
evidence in the real world that any of the solution mechanisms has become more 
effective as population has grown, and in fact the evidence has been that population 
growth makes them all more problematic: the technological miracles of the green 
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revolution have become subject to declining marginal returns, while population 
continues to grow exponentially; the power of community identification and moral 
concerns becomes weaker, not stronger, as population grows; as population grows, 
solutions based on imposing property rights have failed not only in historical grazing 
commonses throughout Africa but also in fishing commonses around the world; and 
solutions based on financial incentives have shown themselves to be vulnerable to 
problems with enforcement and political pressures that increase with increasing 
population. 
This gloomy conclusion is hardly surprising, and it is worth noting that in the 
real world, the effectiveness of any solution actually has to increase at least as fast as 
consumption increases. As long as per-capita consumption continues to increase even 
faster than population growth, the challenge for any solution is even tougher than 
Hardin suggested. 
4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
This model is a first effort to extend Hardin's simple metaphor to something that 
can be used on a computer to help think through and perhaps to solve the tragedies of 
natural resource destruction. It produced a number of interesting and potentially 
powerful insights, not the least of which was that Hardin was right, even if attributes 
that Hardin dismissed are included, and even if an overly optimistic model of human 
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decision-making is assumed. It also suggested a number of lines of promising further 
work. 
The key elements in the model are represented here with very simple 
mathematical functions: "Conscience" and profit functions are continuous, linear, 
functions of single variables; all the elements of uncertainty are represented by one 
"gene" in the computer code; human population growth is modeled as a deterministic, 
apparently infinitely growing exponential function independent of anything in the rest of 
the model; commons regeneration is modeled with an introductory biology textbook's 
single-variable logistic function; commons stochasticity is added via a normal 
probability distribution. The human tendency to discount the future is not represented 
explicitly and is only vaguely implied in the "Conscience" function, and there is no real 
way to simulate private property issues and the conflicts between the profits of 
"upstream" extractors and costs paid by their "downstream" victims. 
Each of these simplifications is nonetheless a move towards reality from 
Hardin's simple assumption of a "+ 1" benefit for Taking and "-0" benefit for 
Refraining, with no accounting for potential impacts of"Conscience", uncertainty, 
environmental stochasticity, or discounting, all ofwhich are widely acknowledged to be 
important aspects of human decision-making. However, since all these elements turned 
out to have implications regarding at least buying time that appears to be needed, if not 
solving the TOC over the long run, they all inspire ideas for further work. 
Because this is almost entirely a theoretical model, the most important "next 
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step" in this line of work would have Jo be empirical. In particular, the "Conscience" 
function suggests the most immediat~ly interesting empirical investigation: that is, to 
derive an empirically-based function (or functions) that represents moral 
considerations. Two approaches com~ immediately to mind: analyzing money spent on 
conservation activity, in terms ofperqeived conditi.on ofthe resource (e.g., amount of 
money spent on activities to protect I~aho salmon I stocks perceived as endangered, 
threatened, sensitive, and healthy); and using decision-analytic value function elicitation 
methods to derive value functions for "Conscience" (perhaps as more than one 
attribute) of a variety of kinds of people. Each approach would be interesting alone, but 
a comparison of the two would proba.bly also reveal some significant issues about the 
relationship between environmentall~w and social values. 
The profit function could also be made considerably more complex and realistic, 
by, for example, explicitly including e.xtraction costs and discount rates, perhaps based 
on a real resource. Extraction costs (~.md perceptid:ns of"true" extraction costs), as well 
as discount rates, could certainly be r~presented by "genes" in the algorithm. DMs who 
ignore global and future ("true") extq1ction costs (1i.e., externalities) and discount the 
future would be more likely to Take than those who do not, resulting in higher short-
term payoffs but faster depletion ofH1e commons. :If time lags were included in the 
feedback loops, actual long-term paypffs could be1used in the selection mechanism, 
perhaps to illustrate how longer-term decision frames could help save the commons. 
Other additions or modificatiqns to the simulation that might be interesting but 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
274 
seem less pressing are: modifYing the model to represent private property issues such as 
the impacts of externalities on both the DMs and the stakeholders; incorporating the 
nonconsumable value attribute function N(x) as a variable in the genotypes; 
investigating the impacts of different assumptions about how population grows (e.g., 
not exponentially but logistically, or tying population growth to the commons in a 
Lottka-Volterra kind of model); and adding 11Conscience11 to the regulatory control 
solution simulations. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The conditions under which we evolved have changed, if for no other reason 
than because there are now so many more of us. Evolutionfavors having many 
offspring, but survival of the species now appears to favor having few. Hardin (1968) 
says that controlling population growth is the only solution to the most important 
problem in the world, and that the problem of controlling population growth is an even 
more difficult commons problem than is grazing or fishing. Since population growth 
drives commons problems such as overgrazing or overfishing, it is an even more 
important commons problem itself. 
It is important to think about not only what kind of world we can survive in, 
but what kind of world we want to survive in. Hardin (1968) points out that we could 
maximize population, but only if we minimize the quality of our lives. A great deal of 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
275 
research has recently been conducted to determine the world's human carrying capacity, 
with the odd result that the variance of the estimates has actually increased, rather than 
converging towards a probably true mean as one might expect (Cohen, 1995); yet it 
should not be difficult to see how much simpler these problems would be ifthere were 
fewer, not more, people than there ar~ now. It is inconceivable that anyone's quality of 
life will be improved with the doubling of the world's population predicted in the next 
40 years. 
It may even be that there have been too many people on the planet for some 
time. About four generations ago, when there were about one-sixteenth as many people 
as there are now, John Stewart Mill warned of the kind of world we were moving 
toward, and his warning is at least as relevant today as it was in our great-great-
grandparent's day (Mill, 1857, 320-326): 
It is not good for a man to be kept perforce at all times in the 
presence ofhis species .... Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating 
the world with nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature; with 
every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is capable of growing 
food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture plowed 
up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for man's use 
exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree 
rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower could 
grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved 
agriculture. 
IfMill and Hardin are right, then what should be done? 
The implications of this research related to that question are that: 
• Solving the TOC requires enough diversity of beliefs and values that the 
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population can respond in time to changes. Such ~iversit.y is maintained in 
political and social systems that tolerate and nurt4re contrary viewpoints, 
and are willing to invest in education and basic re~earch.: 
• Stochasticity of the commons must be low enough. and/or forecasting 
accurate enough. to allow planning and decision-making' to be effective. 
This is partly a technological challenge, but it is also a conservation 
challenge: the stability of natural systems is a stropg funetion of their 
biodiversity, and biodiversity is inversely related tp human impacts. As 
population grows, biodiversity decreases, and stot;;hasticity increases. 
• There must be enough of a benefit for Refrainil% or cost for Taking. that 
enough people will choose to Re(rain to conserve impontant commonses. 
The most common mechanisms for providing a bflnefit fmr Refraining or 
penalty for Taking are social and economic. Peopfe in small, closely-knit 
communities share and conserve because of grouii pressure; in large, 
unconnected communities, people have to rely on more c~omplex political 
systems to impose bonuses and penalties that are part of1what Hardin called 
"mutual coercion, mutually agreed on." 
• Demand must be elastic enough that people feel they actually have a choice. 
There needs to be an abundance of the resource o.r acceptable substitutes 
available, because demand is increasingly inelastic as people feel 
increasingly desperate. In the limit, abundance car~ be increased only by 
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improving efficiency of use. If the rate of const:~mptnon of natural resources 
continues to increase, then resources will need to be used only for the 
highest-priority uses, and reaching world-wide consensus on prioritization 
(particularly between rich and poor countries) would probably be 
impossible. 
• These measures (maintaining diversity. reducin~ stochasticity. changing the 
payoffs so people can and will Refrain) are merely stopgap measures that 
will fail if population continues to grow. It bec;ome.~ more difficult, but 
more important, to achieve these measures as population grows. Controlling 
population growth may be viewed as a social djleilllilla in its own right. 
These are not revolutionary findings, and if it were not for the heated debates in 
professional journals of economics, ecology, biology, and lJ.uman ecology, one would 
think they were more or less obvious. Are they hopeful finpings? There is little 
indication in human history, particularly recently, that any of these requirements for 
solving the Tragedy of the Commons is likely to be met anytimle soon. Denial, as 
Hardin has often said, is one of the most powerful human ~endencies because it has 
been selected for over millennia of evolution: there is little benefit to any of us as 
individuals in sacrificing our own desires for the sake of other people's children's 
futures. 
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A. I 
I" GENETIC ALGORITHM PROGRAM, FROM THE DISSERTATION OF 
GRETCHEN OOSTERHOUT, 1996. "I 
I* Microsoft Quick C v. I.O *I 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <limits.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <ctype.h> 
#ifndefmin 
#define min(a,b) ((a)<=(b )?(a);(b )) 
#define max(a,b) ((a)>(b )?(a):(b )) 
#end if 
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define 
unsigned int 
Commonslnit 5000 
RegenRate 0.04 
Range 2.0 
PopSZ 500 
GenomeLEN 3 
GenerationMX 20I2 
GrowthRATE Q.OO 
GenomeLen = 3; 
struct PopStr { 
unsigned int Id; 
int Option; 
char Genome[GenomeLEN+I]; 
double Fitness; 
1*: Initial state of commons *I 
1~.· Commons regeneration rate *I 
I* Stoch *I 
I~ max population size *I 
I* generations we can remember *I 
I* human pop growth rate per year *I 
I 
r' structures for individuals *I 
struct PopStr *NextHigherFit, *NextLowe:rFit; 
} PI [PopSZ], P2[PopSZ]; I* Room for a current and new population *I 
struct PopStr *CurPop, *NewPop; I* pointers to current and new population *I 
struct PopStr *Bestlndiv, *Worst~·ndiv; I* pointers to highest and lowest fitness 
individuals *I 
int PopSize = 200; 
int OldSize; 
float PopFioat; 
unsigned int Nextld = I; 
unsigned int CurGen; 
I* starting population size *I 
I* ne;d id to assign to new individual *I 
I* G~neration count, used when GA is running. •1 
I* VARIABLES FOR CONTROLLING THE GENETIC ALGORITHM *I 
double MuRate = O.I; I'* probability *per gene* *I 
unsigned int MuMax = GenomeLEN; l* max mutations per individual *I 
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A.2 
/* probability per pair *I double 
unsigned int 
double 
XOverProb = 0. 75; 
XOverCnt = 0; 
TSProb = .8; /* probability higher fitness individual 
wins tournament selection */ 
unsigned int Elitist= 1; 
I* DEFINITIONS RELATED TO THE FITNESS FUNCTIONS */ 
/*float FitnessOfString; now a variable instead of a function 2/14/95 */ 
double BinaryCharToDouble ( register char *Buff, register int L ); 
double BinaryCharToDoubleX( register char *Buff, register int L ); 
double Maxf = -1; 
double AveFitness[GenerationMX], BestFitness[ GenerationMX]; 
/*VARIABLES AND ROUTINES TO GENERATE RANDOM NUMBERS *I 
#define random() rand() 
#define URandOI ((double) random() I (double) INT_MAX) 
#define RandStateSZ 256 /*for calls to random() in Ultrix lib*/ 
char *RandState[RandStateSZ]; /*store state used by random()*/ 
unsigned int RandSeed = 3787; /* 103 user settable seed to get different sequences 
*I 
#define initstate( RandSeed, RandState, RandStateSZ ) srand( RandSeed ); 
/*******control pop. display format and frequency, and debugging messages*/ 
unsigned int DisplayPoplnt = 3000; /*If not 0, display pop every n generations*/ 
unsigned int DisplayPopFmt = 0; /* default format for pop display */ 
/*FORWARD DECLARATIONS *I 
void Restart(), EvaluatePop(), GenerateRandomPop(), PrintPop(); 
void Copylndiv(), TournamentSelection(), ModifyPopulation(), AddNew(); 
char *readline( char *S, unsigned int L, FILE *F); 
char *striptoken( char *S, char *Token, unsigned int L, char *Breaks); 
/*MISC. VARIABLES AND FUNCTION PROTOTYPES*/ 
FILE *fp, *fp2; /* file pointers */ 
double Sum, Delta, StDev; /*for standard dev of generation's fitness*/ 
char static MaxG~nome[GenomeLEN+ I]; /* Genome ofBestlndiv */ 
double xmax; /*for BinaryCharToDouble */ 
float Commons; 
float Takers; 
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float TotalCommons, AveCommons, TotalTakers, AveTakers, GenCount; 
float Regen; 
float z; 
float StochReg; 
void CharTolnt(char Charray[4], int Intarray[3]); 
void Decoder( char Genotype[4], float w[3]); 
int FindChoice(char geno[4]); 
float Payoff(float NTakers, float State, float *k, float *d, int Choice); 
A.3 
float gasdev(); 
/********************************************************************* 
* 
*MAIN: MAIN ENTRY POINT* 
* 
*********************************************************************/ 
void main ( int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
char inline[256], cmd[16], par1[64], par2[64], *cp; 
unsigned int i, j, p, fint, step, steps; 
struct PopStr *ip; 
if((fp = fopen("c:\\fileout.txt","w+")) !=NULL) 
{ 
fclose( fp ); 
} 
if ((fp2 = fopen("c:\\printout.txt","w+")) !=NULL) 
{ 
fclose(fp2); 
} 
for ( p = 1; p < argc; ++p ) 
{ /*process command-line parameters*/ 
} 
{ 
for ( cp = argv[p]; isalpha( *cp ); ++cp ); 
SetPar( argv[p ], cp ); 
} 
Cur Pop = P 1; NewPop = P2; 
initstate( RandSeed, RandState, RandStateSZ ); /* initialize system random number 
generator*/ 
Restart( "", 1111 ); /* call to initialize ga system */ 
for (;; ) 
{ 
fprintf{ stderr, "\n Cmd? 11 ); 
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cp = readline( inline, sizeof(inline), stdin ); /* read command -~r,/ 
cp = striptoken( cp, cmd, sizeof( Cfild), " " ); /* get command into cmd, any par 
starts at *cp */ 
if( stmcmp( cmd, "q", 4) = 0 II ~tmcmp( cmd, "ex", 4) = 0 
II stmcmp( cmd, "EX", 4 ) = 0) 
{ 
break; 
} 
else if( stmcmp( cmd, "di", 2) ==:= 0) 
{ 
cp = striptoken( cp, pari, sizeof{pari), "," )~ 
/* split into two paramters i4< I 
cp = striptoken( cp, par2, sizeof{par2), " " ); 1 
if( strcmp( pari, "pop")= 0) 
{ 
} 
if ( *par2 = '\0' ) fmt = Di~playPopFm~.; 
else fmt = atoi( par2 ); 
PrintPop( CurPop, fmt ); 
else 
{ 
Display( par I ); 
} 
} /* end else if*/ 
else if( strncmp( cmd, "set", 3) ::;== 0) 
{ 
} 
cp = striptoken( cp, pari, sb~eof(pari), "~" ); 
cp = striptoken( cp, par2, si+eof(par2), " i" ); 
SetPar( pari, par2 ); 
else if( strncmp( cmd, "res", 3) --0) 
{ 
} 
cp = striptoken( cp, pari, si+eof(pari), "~ "); 
cp = striptoken( cp, par2, si+eof(par2), "i" ); 
Restart( pari, par2 ); 
else if( strncmp( cmd, "ep", 2) :::;:= 0) 
{ 
EvaluatePop( CurPop ); 
} 
else if( strncmp( cmd, "d2b", 3) = 0) 
{ 
A.4 
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} 
cp = striptoken( cp, par1, sizeof(par1), 11 , 11 ); 
DisplayD2B( par1 ); 
•~lse if( strncmp( cmd, "b2d 11 , 3) = 0) 
{ 
} 
cp = striptoken( cp, par1, sizeof(parl), 11 ," ); 
DisplayB2D( par1 ); 
·~Ise if( cmd[O] = 'r' II cmd[O] = 'R' II strcmp( cmd, 11 St 11 ) = 0 ) 
{ 
if( strcmp( cmd, 11St11 ) = 0 II *cp = '\0') 
steps = 1800; 
else 
sscanf( cp, 11%U 11 , &steps); 
if ( steps < 0 II steps > GenerationMX ) 
steps= 1; 
fprintf( stderr, 11 run for %d steps ... \n 11 , steps); 
I* THE MAIN LOOP */ 
for ( step = 0; step < steps; -H-step ) 
{ 
-H-CurGen; 
-H-GenCount; 
TournamentSelection( CurPop, NewPop ); 
ModifyPopulation (NewPop); 
ip = CurPop; 
CurPop = NewPop; 
NewPop = ip; 
/****************************************/ 
OldSize = PopSize; 
PopFioat = PopFloat * ( 1 + GrowthRA TE ); 
PopSize = PopFloat; /* Truncates PopFloat. This allows 
the population to grow at less than one person per 
year*/ 
if( PopSize > PopSZ ) 
PopSize = PopSZ; 
if( PopSize <= 2 ) 
{ printf{ 11 Villagers gone, program halting \n 11); 
printf{ 11 new seed= %6f\n11 , 10000*URand01); 
goto end; 
} 
A.5 
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if(PopSize > OldSize) 
for (i = OldSize; i< PopSize; i-t+, Nextld-t+) 
AddNew( CurPop, i ); 
1*********************************************1 
EvaluatePop( CurPop ); 
if ( Maxf < Bestlndiv-·>Fitness ) 
{ Maxf= Bestlndiv->Fitness; 
strncpy(MaxGenome, Bestlndiv->Genome, GenomeLen); 
} 
{ xmax = BinaryCharTolDoubleX(MaxGenome,GenomeLen+l); 
} 
if(step =steps- I) 1 
{ printf(" new seed= %6f\n", IOOOO*URandOl); 
printf("Nextld = %d \n"~ Nextld); 
} 
if( Commons <= 0 ) 
{ printf(" Commons gone, program halting \n"); 
printf(" new seed= %6f1'\n", lOOOO*URandOI); 
goto end; 
} 
I* END THE MAIN LOOP *I 
if ( CurGen % DisplayPoplnt = 0 ) 
PrintPop( CurPop, DisplayPopFmt ); 
} I* end for, steps loop *I 
} I* end else if( cmd[O] = 'r' loo~ *I 
else if( cmd[O] = '\0') 
; I* noop *I 
else 
{ 
fprintf( stderr, "\nlllegal comman1d. \n" ); 
} 
} I* end for (; ; ) *I 
fprintf( stderr, "\ndone.\n" ); 
end:; 
} I* end main *I 
I****************************~'************************** 
* 
* TournamentSelection Select pare 1ts by running a series of'tournaments'. 
* 
A.6 
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*Pick pairs from the population, and for each pair, pick the hjghest 
*fitness to be reproduced with probability TSProb (eg 0.75), 1 
* otherwise use the lower fitness member of the pair. 
* Continue this until the new population is the desired size. 
*Pick the pairs (uniform) randomly, with replacement. 
* c[ Goldberg and Deb. 
*******************************************************I 
void TournamentSelection ( struct PopStr CurP[], struct PopStr l'l'ewP[] ) { ' 
register unsigned int g; I* for genes *I 
register struct PopStr *higher, *lower, *best; 
unsigned int old1, old2; I* the candidates in old pop *I 1 
unsigned int np; I* new pop size *I 
unsigned int oldid; I* used for testing *I 
float dummy; 
if ( Elitist = 1 ) 
{ 
Copylndiv( Bestlndiv, &NewP[O] ); I* just copy th~ best *I 
I* NewP[O].Id = Bestlndiv->Id; keep same ld, GenCreateq for this 
first one *I I 
np= 1; 
} 
else if (Elitist > 1) 
{ 
} 
ReSortPopulation( CurP, PopSize ); 
for (np = 0, best = Bestlndiv; np < 
Elitist; -H-np, best= best->NextLowe.rFit ) 1 
{ Copylndiv( best, &NewP[np] ); 
oldid = NewP[np].Id; 
NewP[np].Id = Nextld-H-; 
} 
for ( ; np < PopSize; np++ ) 
{ I* run the tournament till have a full new pop *I 1 
old1 =random()% PopSize; I* get two different cqmpethors *I 
while ( 1 ) 
{ 
old2 = random() % PopSize; 
if( old1 != old2) 
break; 
} 
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if ( CurP[ old 1 ].Fitness>= CurP[ old2].Fitness) 
{ /* figure out which has greater fitness*/ 
higher= &CurP[old1]; 
lower = &CurP[ old2]; 
} 
else 
{ 
higher = &CurP[ old2]; 
lower = &CurP[ old 1 ]; 
} 
if ( URandO 1 < TSProb ) 
{ /* the best wins! */ 
Copylndiv( higher, &NewP[np] ); 
oldid = higher->Id; 
} 
else 
{ /*the weaker wins! */ 
Copylndiv( lower, &NewP[np] ); 
oldid = lower->Id; 
} 
NewP[np].Id = Nextld++; 
} 
for ( np = 0; np<PopSize; ++np) /*Reassign IDs starting with 1 */ 
NewP[np].Id = np; 
Bestlndiv->Id = NewP[O].Id; 
Nextld = PopSize; 
} /*end TournamentSelection */ 
/**************************************************** 
* Copylndiv Copy an individual's Genome and Fitness from one 
* structure to another. 
****************************************************/ 
void Copylndiv( struct PopStr *From, struct PopStr *To ) 
{ 
register unsigned int g; 
for ( g = 0; g < GenomeLen; ++g ) 
{ 
} 
To->Genome[g] = From->Genome[g]; 
To->Fitness = From->Fitness; 
To->Option = From->Option; 
/* Don't copy ID *I 
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} I* end Copylndiv *I 
I****************************'*********************** 
* 
* Modif)'Population 
* Apply Crossover and Mutation to ~nodifiy a pmpulation. 
* Just work through the population l;ly pairs, since they were put in place 
*at random. 
*For each pair, perform a single poi\1t crossover with 
* probability XOverProb. For each gene of each1 individual, perform a 
* mutation with probability MuRate. However, only do MuMax mutations per 
* individual. Count the number of crpssovers, mutations, individuals 
* changed, and so on. 
*****************************~**********************I 
void Modif)'Population ( struct PopStr *P ) 
{ 
register unsigned int i, g, xpt, lchar; 
register struct PopStr *ip, *ip 1; 
unsigned int maxi = PopSize - 1; 
unsigned int mu 1, mu2; 
if (Elitist = 0) 
{ I* start with first in new pop *I 
i=O; 
ip = P; ip1 = P+l; 
} 
else 
{ I* start with seconq in new pOfJ *I 
i = 1; 
ip = P+1; ip1 = P+2; 
} 
for ( ; i < maxi; i += 2, ip += 2, ip l += 2 ) 
{ I* note we go two-by-two *I 
mu1 = mu2 = 0; I* init cqunters for this individual *I 
if ( URandO 1 < XOver.t'rob ) 
{ I* let's cross this pair! *I 
++ XOverCnt; 
xpt = random() % Genom~Len; I* pick cross point at random *I 
for ( g = 0; g < xpt; ++g ) 
{ I* ifxpt=O,don't d9 it--we lose: 1/GenomeLen crosses *I 
tchar = ip->Genome[g]; 
ip->Genome[g] = ip1->G~nome[g]; I 
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ip I->Genome[g] = tchar; 
} 
} 
for ( g = 0; g < GenomeLen; -t+g ) 
{ /* perhaps mutate the first new individual *I 
if ( URandO I < MuRate ) 
} 
{ /* a locus to mutation! */ 
-t+mui; 
if ( ip->Genome[g] = '0' ) 
ip->Genome[g] ='I'; 
else 
ip->Genome[g] = '0'; 
} 
if( mui > MuMax) /*that's all we want in one individual*/ 
break; 
for ( g = 0; g < GenomeLen; -t+g ) 
{ /* repeat for the other new individual *I 
if ( URandO I < MuRate ) 
{ 
-t+mu2; 
if ( ip I->Genome[g] = '0' ) 
ipi->Genome[g] ='I'; 
else 
ip I->Genome[g] = '0'; 
} 
if ( mu2 > MuMax ) 
break; 
} 
ip->Option = FindChoice(ip->Genome); 
A IO 
ipi->Option = FindChoice(ipl->Genome); /*corrected ip to ipl 3/14/95 */ 
} 
} /* end ModifYPopulation *I 
/************************************************* 
* 
* Restart Restart the system, perhaps with a new seed and genome length. 
* Seed if present set Rand Seed to it and use it to initialize random number 
* generator. If not, just reinitialize with same RandSeed. 
* L if present, set GenomeLen to it, else use old value. 
* Set counters ( eg CurGen, etc) all as if starting from scratch. 
*************************************************/ 
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void Restart ( char Seed[], char L[] ) 
{ 
int newl = atoi( L ); 
int news = atoi( Seed ); 
unsigned int i, maxix, maxi; 
double f; 
char buff{GenomeLEN+ 1 ]; 
if((fp = fopen("c:\\fileout.txt","w+")) !=NULL) 
{ 
fclose(fp ); 
} 
if ((fp2 = fopen("c:\\printout.txt","w+")) !=NULL) 
{ 
fclose(fp2); 
} 
if( *L != '\0') 
{ 
} 
} 
if ( 1 < newl && newl < GenomeLEN ) 
{ 
GenomeLen = newl; 
fprintf{ stderr, "\nNew GenomeLen %d ... ", GenomeLen ); 
if ( *Seed != '\0') 
{ 
if( 1 <news ) 
{ 
RandSeed = news; 
initstate( RandSeed, RandState, RandStateSZ ); 
All 
fprintf{ stderr, "\nNew RandSeed %d to initstate RandState ... ", RandSeed ); 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
initstate( RandSeed, RandState, RandStateSZ ); 
fprintf{ stderr, "\nUse same Rand Seed %d to initstate RandS tate ... ", Rand Seed ); 
} 
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------*1 
Nextld= 1; 
CurGen = 0; 
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GenCoumt = 0; 
Commons = Commonslnit; 
1'ota1Commons = 0; 
F'opFioat = PopSize; 
CJenerateRandomPop( CurPop ); 
Evaluatel~op( CurPop ); 
MuMax == min( MuMax, GenomeLen ); 
XOverCnt = 0; 
I 
I*-----------··----------------------------------,-----------------------* I 
fprintf( stderr, "\nL=%d, P=%d, Seed=%d. ", GenomeLen, PopSize, RandSeed ); 
fprihtf( stderr, 
"\nTSProb %.31f, MuRate=%.41f, MuMax %d, XOverProb=%.31.\n", 
'fSProb, MuRate, MuMax, XOverProb ); 
if( Maxf<== Bestlndiv->Fitness) I* changed 7128193*1 
{ Maxf = Bestlndiv->Fitness; 
stm:::py(MaxGenome, Bestlndiv-~Genome, GenomeLen); 
} 
} I* end Restart *I 
I 
1**************************************************1 
I* PrintPop Print the population. *I 
1**************************************************1 
voiH PrintP10p( struct PopStr Pop[], int F;mt ) 
{ int a,b,c;. 
~egister i:nt i, maxi, s; 
c:har tbuff[GenomeLEN+l]; /* G* was+64 */ 
iht ibuff[GenomeLEN]; 
noat wt[3]; 
double x; 
struct PopStr *p; 
I 
if((fp2 = fopen("c:\\printout.txt","w+")) !=NULL) 
{ fclose(fp2); , 
} 
ReSortPopulation( Pop, PopSize ); 
if~: Fmt =: 0) 
: maxi == PopSize; 
dse 
I maxi == Fmt - PopSize; 
maxi = min( maxi, PopSize ); 
fprintf( stderr, "\nSorted Pop at Gen %d:", CurGen ); 
I 
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} 
for ( i = 0, p = Bestlndiv; i < maxi && i < PopSize; +H, 
p = p->NextLowerFit ) 
{ 
strncpy( tbuff, p->Genome, GenomeLen ); 
tbuff[GenomeLen] = '\0'; 
x = BinaryCharToDoubleX( p->Genome, GenomeLen ); 
I* CharTolnt(tbuff, ibufi); 
a = ibuff[O]; 
b = ibuff[l]; 
c = ibuff[2]; *I 
Decoder(p->Genome, wt); 
fprintf( stderr, "\n% 8d %5d: %8.5lf'%s' %5.0f", 
p->Id,p->Option, p->Fitness, tbuff, x); 
if((fp2 = fopen("c:\\printout.txt","a")) !=NULL) 
fprintf(fp2, 
"\n %5d, %8.5lf, '%s', %5.0f, %4.4f, %4.4f, %4.4f', 
p->Option, p->Fitness, tbuff, x, wt[O], wt[l], wt[2]); 
fclose( fp2 ); 
I* fprintf( stderr, "\nPop AveFitness %.4lf.", AveFitness[CurGen] ); *I 
fprintf( stderr, "\nCommons = %9.1f. ",Commons); 
fprintf( stderr, "\nTakers = %9.1f. ", T~kers); 
fprintf( stderr, "\n" ); 
} I* end PrintPop *I 
I************************************************ 
* GenerateRandomPop 
*Generate a population of with random binary strings as their 'genomes'. 
* P is pointer to array of PopStr's in which to store the random genomes. 
* Just generate and store 50% l's and 50% O's (more or less). 
* Assign !d's in sequence, incrementing Nextld as we go. 
* Also store generation these were created Gust for analysis). 
************************************************I 
void GenerateRandomPop( struct PopStr *P ) 
{ int dummy; 
register unsigned int i, j; 
int Choice; 
register struct PopStr *ip; 
int ibuff[GenomeLEN]; 
for ( i = 0, ip = P; i < PopSize; ++i, ++ip, ++Nextld ) 
{ 
ip->Id = Nextld; 
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} 
if(URandOI <== 0.5) ip->Genome[O] == '0'; /*Optimism gene*/ 
else ip->Genome[O] =='I'; 
for ( j == 1; j < GenomeLen; -H-j ) 
/*Mostly Takers: if( URandOI <== 0.05 ); */ 
if(URandOl <== 0.5) ip->Genome[j] == '0'; 
else 
ip->Genome[j] == '1 '; 
dummy= FindChoice(ip->Genome); 
ip->Option == dummy; 
} /* end GenerateRandomPop *I 
/************************************************* 
* EvaluatePop 
*Evaluate and store fitness of the population members. 
*************************************************/ 
void EvaluatePop( struct PopStr * P ) 
float w[3]; 
float k,d; 
float FitnessOfString; 
register unsigned int i; 
register struct PopStr *ip; 
register double avef; 
int SumOption, Choice, dummy; 
Bestlndiv = P; Bestlndiv->Fitness = 0; 
for ( i == 0, ip = P, SumOption = 0; i < PopSize; -H-i, -H-ip) 
{ SumOption +== ip->Option; 
} 
Takers = SumOption; 
iftCurGen = 0) Commons == Commonslnit; 
else 
{ /* Grant's equation, for delta t = 1 :*/ 
A 14 
Regen = RegenRate*Commons-(RegenRate/1 OOOO)*Commons*Commons; 
z= gasdev(); 
StochReg==z*(Range*Regen)+Regen; 
Commons == StochReg + Commons -Takers ; 
TotalCommons +==Commons; 
AveCommons == TotalCommons/GenCount; 
TotalTakers +==Takers; 
AveTakers == TotaiTakers/GenCount; 
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I* Commons= Regen+ Commons- Takers; *I 
} 
for ( i = 0, ip = P, avef= 0; i < PopSize; ++i, ++ip) 
{ Decoder(ip->Genome, w); 
k = w[l]; 
} 
d = w[2]; 
Choice = ip->Option; 
FitnessOfString = PayofftTakers,Commons,&k,&d,ip->Option); 
ip->Fitness = FitnessOfString; 
avef += ip->Fitness; 
if ( ip->Fitness > Bestlndiv->Fitness ) 
Bestlndiv = ip; 
if ( CurGen < GenerationMX ) 
{ 
AveFitness[CurGen] = avef I PopSize; 
I********** = StandDev[CurGen];*********l 
printf{11\n CurGen %u 11 , CurGen); 
BestFitness[CurGen] = Bestlndiv->Fitness; 
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printf{11 Commons= %9.lf AveCommons = %9.lf\n11 , Commons, AveCommons); 
fprintf( stderr, 11Takers = %9.lf PopSize = %d \n11 , 
Takers, PopSize); 
if((fp = fopen( 11c:\\fileout.txt11 , 11a11)) !=NULL) 
fprintf(fp, 11 %9.lf %5.lf %d\n11 , 
Commons, Takers, PopSize); 
fclose( fp ); 
} I* end if ( CurGen < GenerationMX ) *I 
} I* end EvaluatePop *I 
I*************************************************** 
* 
* BinaryCharToDouble convert ascii binary string to its integer equivalent, 
returned as a double. 
* BinaryCharToDoubleX convert ascii binary string to double in domain 
accepted by current fitness function. 
* IntToBinaryChar convert binary value to ascii binary string. 
* 
* Buff is the ascii string to convert and return as a double. 
* L specifies the length of the string to convert. 
* B is the binary string to convert to ascii. 
* 
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* BinaryCharToDouble maps an ascii binary representation into a double (real), 
*where 000 ... 00 maps to 0, 000 ... 01 to 1, ... etc., up to 1Il...II to 2**L-l. 
* IntToBinaryChar does the inverse. 
* BinaryChar2DoubleXjust calls BinaryCharToDouble, and then scales the return 
* value so its in the domain of the current fitness function. 
* 
/************************************************/ 
double BinaryCharToDouble ( register char *Buff, register int L ) 
{ 
register int i, r; 
for ( i = r = 0; i < L; ++i, ++Buff) 
{ r <<=I; 
if( *Buff= 'I') ++r; 
} 
return( (double) r ); 
} /*end BinaryCharToDouble */ 
/************************************************/ 
double BinaryCharToDoubleX( char *Buff, int L ) 
{ 
double x = BinaryCharToDouble( Buff, L ); 
} /*end BinaryCharToDoubleX */ 
/***********************************************/ 
int IntToBinaryChar ( int B, char *Buff, int L) 
{ 
register int i; 
for ( i = L-I; i >= 0; --i ) 
{ if( B&I ) 
} 
Buff[i] = '1'; 
else 
Buff[i] = '0'; 
B >>= 1; 
} /*end IntToBinaryChar */ 
/******************** Riolo's utilities ************************* 
* 
* Included here are: 
* - routines to count schema instances, calculate average schem:! fitnesses, 
* and so on 
* - routines to sort the population by fitness 
* - routines to read lines and help parsing them. 
• 
A. 16 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A 17 
* - routines to set and display various parameters 
* - routines to allow the user to see the ascii binary string representations 
* of specified decimal values, and to see the fitness assigned by the current fitness 
function. 
* (and to do the inverse, i.e., display the decimal version of an ascii string). 
* 
********************************************************/ 
/************************************************ 
* ReSortPopulation 
* This just uses lnsertSortlndiv() to re-insert sort individuals, since the 
* list is typically almost sorted anyway (i.e., most individuals don't change 
* relative fitness ifwe turnover only a small fraction of the population 
* each step). 
* For efficiency, start with the high-fitness end, since InsertSortlndiv() 
* inserts at low end. 
*NOTE: 
* On loading individuals (either vi LoadPop or GenRandPop ), HighFitlndiv 
* and LowFitlndiv list heads are NULLed, and then InsertSortlndiv() is 
* called to set up the list. 
* 
* InsertSortlndiv 
* The Individual nodes are linked to form a two-way linked list sorted on 
*fitness. 
* HighFitlndiv points to the highest, and NextLowerFit is link to decreasing 
* fitness individuals. 
* LowFitlndiv points to lowest fit, and NextHigherFit is link to increasing 
*fitness. 
* 
*****************************************/ 
int ReSortPopulation ( struct PopStr Pop[], unsigned int Size ) 
{ unsigned int i; 
Bestlndiv = Worstlndiv = NULL; 
for ( i = 0; i < Size; ++i ) 
{ InsertSortlndiv( &Pop[i] ); 
} 
} /*end ReSortPopulation */ 
/*****************************************/ 
int InsertSortlndiv( struct PopStr *IPtr ) 
{ double f; 
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struct PopStr *prev; 
f= IPtr->fitness; I* this is fitness of one to add *I 
if( WorstJndiv =r= NULL) 
{ I* List is empty - so make new one first and only *I 
Worstlndiv = Bestlndiv = IPtr; 
IPtr->NextLowerFit = IPtr->NextHigherFit =NULL; 
} 
else if ( Worstlndiv->Fitness >= f) 
{ I* new one goes first (it is new low) *I 
IPtr->NextHigherFit = Worstlndiv; 
IPtr->NextLowerFit =NULL; 
Worstlndiv->NextLowerFit = IPtr; 
Worstlndiv = IPtr; 
} 
else 1 
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{ I* M~>ve pnev until it points to node that should be before (lower than) new one 
*I 
prev = Worstlndiv; 
whil~ 
( pr~v->Nci:lxtHigherFit !=NULL && f> prev->Ne,:tHigherFit->Fitness) 
prev = prev->NextHigherFit; 
I* lin.k new node to node after it (ifthere is one)-- both ways *I 
IPtr-;>NextHigherFit = prev->NextHigherFit; 
if ( prey->NextHigherFit =NULL ) 
Bestlndiv == IPtr; I* prev was last, so new one is now *I 
else 
prev'">NextHigherFit->NextLowerFit = IPtr; 
I* liqk new to prev -- both ways *I 
IPtr-:>NextLowerFit = prev; 
prev·,·>NextHigherFit = IPtr; 
} I 
} I* InsertSqrtlndi~ *I 
1*********~***********************************************1 
char *readline( char *S, unsigned int L, FILE *F) 
{ char *cp; 1 
fgets( S, L, F ); 1 
for ( cp = S; *cp != '\0'; ++cp ) 
if( *cp = '\n') 
{ *cp = '\CI'; 
brea~; 
} 
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for ( cp = S; *cp = 11 && *cp != '\01; ++cp) ; /*span blanks*/ 
return( cp ); 
} /*********************************** end readline */ 
char *striptoken( char *S, char *Token, unsigned int L, char *Breaks) 
{ unsigned int n; 
for (; *S = 1 1; ++S); /*skip leading blanks*/ 
for ( n = 0, --L; n < L && !tokenend( S, Breaks); ++S, ++n, ++Token) 
*Token= *S; 
*Token = 1\01; 
for (; *S != 1\01 && tokenend( S, Breaks); ++S); 
return( S ); 
} /* end striptoken ****************************************/ 
int tokenend( char *S, char *Breaks) 
{ if( *S = 1\01 ) 
return( 1 ); 
for ( ; *Breaks != 1\01; ++Breaks ) 
if( *S =*Breaks) 
return( 1 ); 
return( 0 ); 
}/* end tokenend */ 
/************************************************************** 
* SetPar Set a specified parameter Par to a value, Value. 
* SetUI Set an unsigned int parameter. 
* SetD Set a double parameter.* 
**************************************************************/ 
int SetPar( char *Par, char *Value) 
{ unsigned int m; 
double d; 
if( strncmp( Par, "dpi", 3) = 0) 
{ DisplayPoplnt = atoi( Value); 
if ( DisplayPoplnt < I ) 
DisplayPoplnt = 0; 
} 
else if( strncmp( Par, "dp£11, 3) = 0) 
{ DisplayPopFmt = atoi( Value); 
} 
if ( DisplayPopFmt < I ) 
DisplayPopFmt = 0; 
else if( strncmp( Par, "p", I ) = 0) 
SetUI( &PopSize, "PopSize", Value, 1, PopSZ ); 
else if( strncmp( Par, "1", I ) = 0) 
SetUI( &GenomeLen, "GenomeLen", Value, 1, 3I ); 
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else if( strncmp( Par, ''rs", 2) = 0) 
SetUI( &RandSe~d, "RandSeed", Value, 0, INT_MAX ); 
else if ( strncmp( Par, ''tsp", 3 ) = 0 ) 
SetD( &TSProb, "TSProb", Value, 0.0, 1.0 ); 
else if ( strncmp( Par, ''mr", 2 ) = 0 ) 
SetD( &MuRate, "MuRate", Value, 0.0, 1.0 ); 
else if( strncmp( Par, ''mm", 2) == 0) 
SetUI( &MuMax, "MuMax", Value, 0, GenomeLen ); 
else if( strncmp( Par, "xp", 2) ='0) 
SetD( &XOverPmb, "XOverlProb", Value, 0.0, 1.0 ); 
else 
{ fprintf( stderr, 
"\nCan't set '%s' yet (Value '%s').\n", Par, Value); 
} 
} /* end SetPar *I 
/*******************~***********************************/ 
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int SetUI( unsigned int *Var, char *VarName, char *Val, unsigned int LB, unsigned int 
UB) 
{ 
unsigned int ui; 
ui = atoi( Val ); 
if ( ui < LB II ui > UB ) 
fprintf( stderr, "\nlllegal %s '%s~ (LB %d, UB %d: ui=%d).\n", VarName, Val, 
LB, UB, ui ); 
else 
*Var= ui; 
} /* end SetUI */ 
int SetD( double *Var, c,har *VarName, char *Val, double LB, double UB) 
{ 
doubled; 
d = atof( Val); 
if ( d < LB II d > UB ) 
fprintf( stderr, "\nlljegal %s '%s~ (LB %If, UB %If: d=%lt).\n", VarName, Val, 
LB, UB, d); 
else 
*Var= d; 
} /* end SetD */ 
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/**************************************************** 
* 
* Display Display parameters settings, or summary values, 
* schema counts, etc. 
* 
****************************************************/ 
int Display ( char *PI ) 
{ register int s, g; 
if( strncmp( PI, "vars", 4) = 0) 
{ 
fprintf( stderr, "\nCurGen %d. PopSize %d. AveFitness %If, BestFitness 
%If.", 
CurGen, PopSize, AveFitness[CurGen], BestFitness[CurGen] ); 
A 2I 
fprintf( stderr, "\n TSProb %.3lf, MuRate %.3lf(MuMax %d), XOverProb 
%.3lf.", 
TSProb, MuRate, MuMax, XOverProb ); 
fprintf( stderr, "\n; XOverCnt %d.",XOverCnt ); 
/* fprintf( stderr, "\n Xwt is %d, LoF is %d, HiF is %d.", Xwt, LoF, HiF );*/ 
else if( strncmp( PI, "vars", 4) = 0) { 
fprintf( stderr, "\nCurGen %d. PopSize %d. AveFitness %If, BestFitness 
%If.", 
CurGen, PopSize, AveFitness[CurGen], BestFitness[CurGen] ); 
fprintf{ stderr, "\n TSProb %.3lf, MuRate %.3lf(MuMax %d), XOverProb 
%.3lf.", 
TSProb, MuRate, MuMax, XOverProb ); 
fprintf( stderr, "\n; XOverCnt %d.", XOverCnt ); 
/* fprintf( stderr, "\n Xwt is %d, LoF is %d, HiF is %d.", Xwt, LoF, HiF );*/ 
else if( strncmp( PI, "sum", 3) = 0) { 
fprintf( stderr, "\nAveFitness:=[%d,%lf', 0, AveFitness[O] ); 
for ( g =I; g <= CurGen; ++g) 
if( g% I2 = 11) 
fprintf( stderr, "\n ,%d,%1f', g, AveFitness[g] ); 
else 
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} 
} 
fprintf( stderr, 11 ,%d,%lf', g, AveFitness[g] ); 
fprintf( stderr, "]\n" ); 1 
fprintf( stderr, "\nBestFitness:=[%d,%lf', 0, Be:stFitness[O] ); 
for ( g =I; g <= CurGen; ++g) 
if( g% I2 =II) 
fprintf( stderr, "\n ,%d,%1f', g, BestFitness[g] ); 1 
cl~ I 
fprintf( stderr, 11 ,%d,%1f', g, BestFitness[g] ); 
fprintf( stderr, "]\n" ); 1 
else { 
fprintf( stderr, "\nCan't display '%s' yet.", P 1 ); 
fprintf( stderr, "\n" ); 
} /*end Display*/ 
/*************************************************************** 
* 
* DisplayB2D Display binary (ascii) string converted to decimal, and its fitness. 
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* DisplayD2B Display decimal value converted to an ascii I string ofGenomeLen, and 
its fitness. 
* 
* This encode/decode decimal/ascii binary values, in the domain accepted 
* by the fitness function, and display the converted value (and its fitness). 
* For B2D, the string is padded on the right with O's 1to GenomeLen. 
* 
*NOTE: These may have to be changed if the fitnes:s function is changed. 
* 
****************************************************************/ 
int DisplayD2B( char Par[] ) 
{ 
double x, sx, fx; 
int IX, 1; 
char tb[GenomeLEN+l]; 
x = atof( Par ); 
I* if ( X < 0 II X > M-PI ) 
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{ 
fprintf( stderr, 11\nOut ofrange 0 ... %1£? Par= '%s', x %lf.\n11 , M_PI, Par, x ); 
return 0; G.O. changed because M_PI not needed 
} */ 
ix=x; 
IntToBinaryChar( ix, tb, GenomeLen ); 
tb[GenomeLen] = '\0'; 
fprintf( stderr, 11X %.12lf=> scaled int %d; \n Binary string: %s\n 
tb ); 
for ( i = 0; i < GenomeLen; ++i ) { 
if( i% 5 =4) 
fprintf( stderr, 11+11 ); 
else 
fprintf( stderr, 11 • 11 ); 
} 
fprintf( stderr, 11\n11 ); 
II • 
, X, IX, 
} /* end DisplayD2B */ 
/********************************************************************/ 
int DisplayB2D( char Par[] ) 
{ 
double x, sx, fx; 
int i. 
' 
if ( strlen( Par ) > GenomeLen ) { 
fprintf( stderr, 11\nToo long (len %d). GenomeLen is %d.\n11 , strlen( Par), 
GenomeLen ); 
return 0; 
} 
for ( i = strlen( Par ); i < GenomeLen; ++i ) 
Par[i] = '0'; 
Par[i] = '\0'; 
x = BinaryCharToDouble (Par, GenomeLen ); 
sx=x; 
fprintf( stderr, 11 int x %.0lf=> scaled x %.12lf; \n Binary string: %s\n 
x, sx, Par); 
for ( i = 0; i < GenomeLen; ++i ) { 
if( i% 5 =4) 
fprintf( stderr, 11+11 ); 
else 
fprintf( stderr, 11 • 11 ); 
II 
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} 
fprintft stderr, 11\n 11 ); 
} /* end DisplayB2D *I 
/********************************************************************/ 
I* TOC FUNCTIONS*/ 
void CharTolnt(char Charray[4], int lntarray[3]) 
{ char bufl2]; 
inti; 
int dummy; 
for (i=O; i<GenomeLen; i-t+) 
{ 
} 
buflO] = Charray[i]; 
dummy = atoi(buf); 
Intarray[i] = dummy; 
} /*end ofCharTolnt*/ 
I* DECODER */ 
void Decoder( char Genotype[4], float w[3]) 
{ char a,b,c; 
a = Genotype[O]; 
b =Genotype[!]; 
c = Genotype[2]; 
if(Genotype[O]= '0') w[O] = 0; 
else w[O] = 1; /*Optimist*/ 
if(Genotype[l] = '0'&& Genotype[2] = '0') 
{w[l] = 0; w[2] = 0;} 
if(Genotype[l] = '0' && Genotype[2]= '1') 
{w[l] = 0; w[2] = 1;} 
if(Genotype[l] = '1' && Genotype[2]='0') 
{w[l] = 1; w[2] = 0;} 
if(Genotype[l] = '1' && Genotype[2] = '1') 
{w[l] = 1; w[2] = 1;} 
I* w[O] = 1; w[l] = 0; w[2] = 1;*/ 
} 
I* FINDCHOICE */ 
int Find Choice( char geno[]) 
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{ float w[3], k, d, Opt, PessTakers, OptTakers; 
float PrRight = .75; 
float TakeSum = 0; float RefrainSum = 0; 
int Take; 
float GoodCommons, BadCommons; 
Decoder(geno, w); 
Opt= w[O]; k = w[1]; d = w[2]; 
PessTakers = PopSize; if(PessTakers>PopSize) PessTakers = PopSize; 
OptTakers = .S*PopSize; I* .5 times, *I 
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BadCommons = 0.7*AveCommons; if(BadCommons < 0) BadCommons = 0; 
GoodCommons = 1.5* AveCommons ; if (Good Commons> 1 0000) GoodCominons = 
10000; 
if(Opt = 0) 
{ TakeSum = PrRight* (Payoff{PessTakers, BadCommons, &k, &d, 1)); 
TakeSum += (1-PrRight)* (Payoff{OptTakers, GoodCommons, &k, &d, 1)); 
RefrainSum = PrRight * (Payoff{PessTakers, DadCommons, &k, &d, 0)); 
RefrainSum += (1-PrRight) * (Payoff{OptTakers, GoodCommons, &k, &d, 0)); 
} 
else 
{ TakeSum = PrRight * (Payoff{OptTakers, GoodCommons, &k, &d, 1)); 
TakeSum += (1-PrRight) * (Payoff{PessTakers, BadCommons, &k, &d, I)); 
RefrainSum = PrRight * (Payoff{OptTakers, GoodCommons, &k, &d, 0)); 
RefrainSum += (1-PrRight) * (Payoff{PessTakers, BadCommons, &k, &d, 0)); 
} 
if(TakeSum < RefrainSum) Take = 0; 
else Take = I; 
return(Take ); 
} 
I* PAYOFF *I 
float Payoff{float NTakers, float State, float *k, float *d, int Choice) 
{ float fpayoff, b,m,kk,dd, Conscience; 
b=l.S; I* profit function parameter *I 
kk=*k; 
dd=*d; 
m = 0.03; I* C(x) parameter*/ 
Conscience= -m*State+m*IOOOO; 
if(kk=O && dd = 0) I* type 0, 4 */ 
{ if(Choice = 0) fpayoff= 0; 
else fpayoff= b*(PopSize-NTakers); 
} 
else if(kk=O && dd > 0) /*type I, 5 *I 
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} 
{ if\Choice = 0) fpayoff= 0; 
else fpayoff= b*(PopSize-NTakers)- Conscience; 
} 
else if(kk=I && dd=O) /*type 2, 6 *I 
{ if(Choice =0) fpayoff= Conscience; 
else fpayoff= b*(PopSize-NTakers)- Conscience; 
} 
else if(kk=I && dd>O) /*type 3, 7 */ 
{ if(Choice=O) fpayoff= Conscience; 
else fpayoff= 0; 
} 
else printf ("error in Payoff\n"); 
return(fpayofl); 
/*NORMAL SAMPLING */ 
float gasdev() 
{ static int iset=O; 
static float gset; 
float fac, rsq, vI, v2; 
if(iset = 0) 
{ do 
} 
{ vI =2. O*URandO I-1. 0; 
v2=2.0*URandOI-l.O; 
rsq=v I *vI +v2 *v2; 
} 
whik (rsq >= 1.0 II rsq = 0.0); 
fac=sqrt( -2.0*log(rsq)/rsq); 
gset=vi *fac; 
iset=I; 
return v2*fac; 
else 
{ iset=O; 
return gset; 
} 
/*POPULATION GROWTH*/ 
void AddNew( struct PopStr CurP[], unsigned int I) 
{ register int j; 
forG=O; j<GenomeLen; ++j) 
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} 
if(URandOl <= 0.5) CurP[I].Genome[j] = '0'; 
else CurP[I].Genome[j] = '1'; 
CurP[I].Option = FindChoice(CurP[I].Genome); 
CurP[I].Id = Nextld; 
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